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ABSTRACT
Networked systems now have significant impact on human lives: the Internet,
connecting the world globally, is the foundation of our information age, the
datacenters, running hundreds of thousands of servers, drive the era of cloud
computing, and even the Tor project, a networked system providing online
anonymity, now serves millions of daily users.
Guided by the end-to-end principle, many computer networks have been
designed with a simple and flexible core offering general data transfer ser-
vice, whereas the bulk of the application-level functionalities have been imple-
mented on endpoints that are attached to the edge of the network. Although the
end-to-end design principle gives these networked systems tremendous suc-
cess, a number of new requirements have emerged for computer networks and
their running applications, including untrustworthy of endpoints, privacy re-
quirement of endpoints, more demanding applications, the rise of third-party
Intermediaries and the asymmetric capability of endpoints and so on. These
emerging requirements have created various challenges in different networked
systems.
To address these challenges, there are no obvious solutions without adding
in-network functions to the network core. However, no design principle has
ever been proposed for guiding the implementation of in-network functions. In
this thesis, We propose the first such principle and apply this principle to pro-
pose four designs in three different networked systems to address four separate
challenges. We demonstrate through detailed implementation and extensive
evaluations that the proposed principle can live in harmony with the end-to-
end principle, and a combination of the two principle offers more complete,
effective and accurate guides for innovating the modern computer networks
and their applications.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivations and Challenges
The end-to-end principle articulates the fundamental principle of how the
computer networks have been designed. The end-to-end principle concerns
how application requirements should be implemented in a networked system.
In particular, the principle suggests that application-level functions usually
cannot, and preferably should not, be built into the core of the network, which
was stated as follows in the original paper [1]: The function in question can
completely and correctly be implemented only with the knowledge and help of
the application standing at the endpoints of the communications system. There-
fore, providing that questioned function as a feature of the communications sys-
tems itself is not possible. Many people attribute the tremendous success of the
computer networking (e.g., the Internet) to this end-to-end principle.
Guided by the end-to-end principle, over the past few decades, many com-
puter networks have been designed with a simple and flexible core offering very
general data transfer service, whereas the bulk of the application-level func-
tionalities have been implemented on endpoints that are attached to the edge
of the network. However, as our information age continues to thrive, a number
of new requirements have emerged for computer networks and their running
applications. These various new requirements create a set of new dimensions
for designing computer networks. In this section, from the following five di-
mensions, we argue for the need of a new design principle to inter-operate with
the classic end-to-end principle for computer network designs.
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1.1.1 Untrustworthy of Endpoints
The end-to-end principle was first articulated assuming that all endpoints are
trusted to obey application-level protocols for the wellness of entire system.
However, in open computer networks like the Internet, given the tremendous
growth in the number of devices connected to the network and dramatic di-
versification of motivations for using the network, there is no reason to believe
that an endpoint will behave as desired. As a consequence, malicious or com-
promised endpoints are constructed to launch various abuse or attacks on a
networked system as a whole to make the network less usable and attacks on
a specific endpoint (e.g., a competitor) to knock it offline for the best interest
of an adversary. To make a network more trustworthy while without trusting
endpoints, it seems inevitable that additional functionalities are demanded in
the network core.
Perhaps the volumetric Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are and
will continue to be the most disruptive attacks since the invention of the In-
ternet. Due to the connectionless of the network layer (designed based on
the end-to-end principle), an Internet endhost can send any IP packets to any
other endhosts without obtaining the receiver’s permission. As a result, a target
server cannot control which sources are sending traffic to it and how much traf-
fic is delivered to it. As a consequence, a concerted effort from a group of mali-
cious/compromised endpoints can easily overwhelm a target server’s network
with unwanted traffic, knocking off the target server offline. The end-to-end
principle would say the target server is responsible for protecting itself from at-
tacks via various control mechanisms implemented on the target server (i.e.,
intrusion detection systems, anti-virus software and hardware), the volumetric
DDoS attack traffic, however, must be handled inside the network and before
all bottleneck network links.
Consider the Tor network as a second example. Tor is the most widely used
anonymous network, which is an overlay built on a set of globally located In-
ternet hosts, called relays. Although Tor is designed to be used by legitimate
users to protect their online privacy, malicious Tor clients often abuse Tor as
a stepping stone to launch various attacks against websites, including content
scraping, comment spamming and vulnerability scanning. To give some sense,
based on data from Project Honey Pot, 18% of global email spam, or approxi-
mately 6.5 trillion unwanted messages per year, begin with an automated bot
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harvesting email addresses via Tor [2]. As a response, websites take radical
countermeasures against Tor traffic, including completely block Tor or serving
endless CAPTCHA challenges for Tor clients. Since all client requests, from both
legitimate users and abusive endpoints, are multiplexed by Tor relays to protect
their privacy, the above countermeasures that ideally should only be applied
against abusive endpoints equally apply to legitimate users, which makes Tor
less usable for these legitimate users. Making Tor more trustworthy, without
breaking the privacy of Tor users, implies additional support and functionality
from the center of the Tor network.
1.1.2 Privacy of Endpoints
In an era of mass surveillance, our online communications are being increas-
ingly monitored by many third parities (e.g., businesses and government en-
tities) to infer sensitive information. However, there are a number of circum-
stances where a desire for online privacy might arise, including law enforce-
ment, intelligence agencies, political dissidents, journalists, whistle-blowers,
businesses and ordinary citizens looking for privacy enhancement. The desire
for anonymity represents an extreme situation of un-aligned interest of the two
endpoints: one endpoint may wish to hide its identity whereas the other end-
point may require such identity for policy-compliance control, such as assets
protection, action authorization and so on.
Note that the requirement for endpoint privacy itself may not break the un-
derlining assumption of the end-to-end principle since trusted anonymous
endpoints can still behave as desired. However, together with the untrust-
worthy nature of endpoints (described in Section 1.1.1), endpoint privacy vi-
olates the assumption of end-to-end principle to a even larger extent: not only
endpoints are untrusted, but also the network can not account their activi-
ties. Therefore, in a computer network that offers endpoint privacy, without
in-network support, it is almost certainly that no desired goals can be achieved
by protocols and algorithms that are merely implemented on endpoints.
The Tor network, again, is a perfect example here. There has been a long
tension between the Tor network and many websites content delivery network
(CDN) providers (e.g., Cloudflare and Akamai) that these CDN providers often
block Tor traffic as a whole or offer limited service for Tor requests, or serve nu-
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merous challenges. This is neither because these providers intentionally dis-
criminate Tor users nor these providers did not implement any anti-abuse de-
fense mechanism. It is simply because there is no way out only based on the
effort from these providers (endpoints), without having additional functionali-
ties inside the Tor network.
1.1.3 More Demanding Applications
The end-to-end principle essentially proposes a “best-effort” service model of
networked systems: the network makes no guarantee about the performance
(e.g., throughput, latency) that a particular application can achieve at any mo-
ment. As the rise of cloud computing, various business-critical applications
have been deployed on multi-tenant datacenters. Although tenants are typ-
ically allocated with guaranteed compute and storage resource when provi-
sioning virtual machines, the multi-tenant networks, guided by the end-to-end
principle, are still at the phase of offering best-effort delivery services. Conse-
quently, datacenter networks quickly become the bottleneck of high demand-
ing applications in the cloud.
Big data analytic application is one of the most popular applications de-
ployed in multi-tenant datacenters. Big data analytic workloads generated
by the popular frameworks (such as Hadoop and Spark) can involve mas-
sive amounts of data exchange among network endpoints (i.e., servers). For
instance, the shuffle process bridging the Map phase and Reduce phase of
MapReduce jobs can manipulate terabytes or even petabytes of data among
tens of thousands of machines. To give some sense, Hadoop traces from Face-
book show that, on average, transferring data between successive stages ac-
counts for 33% of the running times of jobs with reduce phases [3]. In frame-
works like MapReduce, a stage cannot complete before it receives all the data
from its previous stage. As a result, a single “laggard” task can dramatically de-
lay the entire job. Therefore, offering guaranteed bandwidth for tenant VMs
becomes desirable to ensure predictable lower bound performance for tenant
applications. Augmenting network with such capabilities, clearly, requires ad-
ditional mechanisms in the network core.
Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) has seen a rapid growth in multi-tenant datacen-
ters. The biggest upside of VPC is that tenants can optimize various perfor-
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mance metrics for business-critical applications. Under the end-to-end prin-
ciple, optimization effort should be made on endpoints (severs), including de-
signing more efficient transport control protocol [4] for datacenters, improving
computation models to reduce data transfers. However, for high-demanded
applications, for instance requiring bounded latency [5, 6], optimization can
never been done solely at endpoints if the underlining network connecting
these endpoints offers only best-effort delivery.
1.1.4 The Rise of Third-Party Intermediaries
An undeniable fact of the Internet is the increasing third-party involvement
in communications between network endpoints. These third parties include
cloud service providers (e.g., CDN providers for accelerating content delivery),
government officials whose interests range from taxation to law enforcement
and public safety, and cooperate organizations (e.g., Internet Service Providers,
ISPs) that enforce organizational policies. Regardless of whether the interpo-
sition of these third parities is desired by endpoints or not, it is not obvious to
derive the reasoning about this situation from the end-to-end principle. To ex-
plain the rise of these third-party Intermediaries, we must either abandon the
end-to-end principle or propose a new design principle that inter-operates the
end-to-end principle. Clearly, the first option is infeasible since the end-to-end
principle still plays a fundamental role of computer networks, which validates
the need for another design principle.
1.1.5 The Asymmetric Capability of Endpoints
Created as a research network, the Internet was designed and used initially
by technologists. As a result, the end-to-end principle offers perfect guide for
networked systems since the technologists controlling the endpoints have full
flexibility of designing and implementing applications without worrying about
the underlining network. However, as the Internet witnesses its tremendous
success, the majority of devices (endpoints) connected to the Internet are pre-
built boxes (i.e., PCs or mobile devices) controlled by ordinary people. In such
circumstance, the asymmetric capabilities of all endpoints reach an extreme
where one party (e.g., service providers, researchers) wishes to innovate the
5
network, for instance, to make it more reliable and secure, whereas the other
party (e.g., ordinary clients) simply may not have the ability of installing, con-
figuring, maintaining or/and upgrading the software to implement these new
designs accurately.
A good example lying in this dimension is that many academic research pro-
posals designed around the end-to-end principle turn out to be difficult to
deployed in the Internet. In particular, one major category of academic ap-
proaches of addressing the volumetric DDoS attacks is the capability-based
scheme in which each client needs to carry a permission (capability) in or-
der to send traffic to a destination [7]. These designs typically require clients
to change their network stack to insert capabilities into a layer between the IP
layer and transport layer such that the target server’s network is secured with
minimal support from intermediate verification points (no more complicated
than typical packet forwarding). The difficulty of enforcement of an end-to-end
design in the Internet also speaks for the need for another design principle in
computer networks.
1.2 The Arguments of the New Principle
The above five dimensions are intended to illustrate the richness of new de-
sign requirements of computer networks. The existence of these requirements
does not mean that end-to-end principle is no longer valid and should be aban-
doned. Instead, it shows that designing computer networks is becoming much
more complex than it was when the end-to-end principle was first articulated
several decades ago. As a result, to better meet these emerging requirements,
we need a new principle for the design space that has not been explored by the
end-to-end principle, such that a combination of the two principles provides
more complete, effective and accurate guides for innovating the modern com-
puter networks and their applications.
It is straightforward that the design space not explored by the end-to-end
principle is how an in-network function should be implemented if it is a must.
However, the self-evident design space in fact implies that it is non-trivial to
propose valid new design principle since the network design has already been
guided by, essentially, an opposite principle, i.e., the end-to-end principle. It
is highly possible that an improper new principle could offset or even neutral-
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ize the success achieved by the end-to-end principle. Toward proposing valid
design, we articulate the two primary arguments for the new principle.
1.2.1 Minimal Intermediary Deployment
The new design requirements lying in the first three dimensions described in
Section 1.1 all lead to a call for adding new mechanism or function, besides
the basic packet forwarding, inside the network core. Adding an in-network
function is the most explicit challenge that the new principle imposes on the
end-to-end principle. To preserve the power of the end-to-end principle as
much as possible, the new principle argues for minimal intermediary deploy-
ment when implementing an in-network function that cannot be completely
and accurately implemented only at the endpoints of the networked system.
The minimal intermediary deployment argument essentially speaks that the
implementation of an in-network function should impose as little modification
on the networked system as possible. There are many forms of modification
to a networked system, including requiring upgrading the network core (e.g.,
adding cryptographic support on Internet routers), requiring software upgrade
from other endpoints, scarifying network performance (e.g., reduced through-
put or added latency) and weakening network properties (e.g., reduced entropy
of anonymous systems). Of course, in different networked systems, the will-
ingness for accepting each form of modification can vary dramatically. For in-
stance, weakening the privacy guarantee in Tor is much more disruptive than
in the Internet, whereas upgrading Internet clients is far more difficult (as ex-
plained in Section 1.1.5) than that in Tor and datacenter networks. Regardless
of how each form of modification is weighted, the minimal intermediary de-
ployment argument states an bias toward implementing an in-network func-
tion while imposing as small change as possible on the networked system.
The followings are concrete examples of how the minimal intermediary de-
ployment argument drives the system designs in this thesis. Consider Middle-
Police that is designed for addressing volumetric DDoS attacks in the Internet
as the first example. Since the Internet is composed by over 60,000 Autonomous
Systems (ASes) with varying levels of technological sophistication and coopera-
tiveness, it would impose significant disruption if the implementation of an in-
network function requires upgrades from a large majority of ASes. Thus, driven
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by the minimal intermediary deployment argument, MiddlePolice’s in-network
function requires deployment only at the target server and possibly at related
parties on commercial terms (e.g., the cloud), makingMiddlePolice to be readily
deployable in the existing infrastructure of the Internet.
The Tor network is designed to protect the online privacy of Tor users. Un-
der the principle of minimal intermediary deployment, any in-network func-
tion must be implemented without weakening the privacy guarantee offered
by Tor. Towards this end, TorPolice’s design to relies on anonymous identities
and blind signatures to completely preserve Tor user privacy. Finally, in QShare
andOpReduce designed for optimizing tenant networks to support their perfor-
mance demanding applications, the minimal intermediary deployment argu-
ment drives their designs to leverage only existing features on the commodity
switches so that the datacenter networks do not experience any performance
degradation for implementing in-network functions.
1.2.2 Endpoint-Driven In-Network Function
The end-to-end principle is not offered as an absolute. Therefore, a number of
in-network functions have been deployed inside the core network. One of the
most widely adopted in-network functionalities is the security firewalls or mid-
dleboxes that are inserted into inside the network to protect their downstream
networks. These intermediate servers inspect and analyze traversing traffic and
enforce corresponding forwarding decisions after determining the intent or na-
ture of the traffic. One of the most well-known parties that offer such security
in-network functionality is the commercial DDoS-prevention service providers
such as Arbor Networks, Akamai and Cloudflare. These service providers ask
their customers to redirect customer traffic to their massively over-provisioned
intermediate infrastructures, and then they apply a variety of techniques to
scrub traffic, separating malicious from benign, and then re-injects only the be-
nign traffic back to their customers. Another well-known in-network function
is the various load balancing techniques (e.g., ECMP) in datacenter networks
to distribute traffic across multiple available paths to fully utilize the bisection
datacenter bandwidth. In the Tor network, the immediate relays on Tor circuits
even implement queue-based congestion controls so that each Tor circuit is
given a fairshare of the relay’s bandwidth.
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The commonality of these existing in-network functionalities is that no end-
point intelligence and information are ever considered for the design and im-
plementation of these functions. For instance, the DDoS-prevention service
providers rely on empirical and proprietary filtering algorithms to discard traf-
fic that they believe is malicious. As a result, the target server cannot prioritize
desired traffic kinds or choose preferred scheduling policies during DDoS mit-
igation. The in-network load balancing functions in datacenter networks dis-
tributed flows, for instance, based on static hashing of the flow identifier (typ-
ically the five-tuple), without considering which flows are sent by which VMs
(tenants). Although such in-network functions in general improve networking
performance by reducing congestion, they are still incapable of optimizing ten-
ant networks for their performance demanding applications. Finally, the con-
gestion control currently implemented on Tor relays is to achieve local fairshare
among circuits, which neither prevents attackers from gaining more resources
by building more circuits nor makes any contributions to separate abusive traf-
fic from legitimate one.
It is clear that existing in-network functions are far from being effective
in meeting these emerging requirements. Fundamentally, any network core
driven in-network functions would reach finally their limitations since the net-
work only has limited knowledge about the endpoint applications. Consider,
for example, the large DDoS-prevention vendors that monitor and measure
huge amount of Internet traffic. Even after decades of operation, the best offer-
ing from these vendors is still empirical filtering, which is certainly insufficient
against sophisticated and unprecedented attacks: based on our interviews with
multiple customers (e.g., hosting companies), they are attacked every single
day even after purchasing services from these vendors.
To address above fundamental limitation, we argue that an in-network func-
tion should be designed in an open framework such that network endpoints
can configure and customize the in-network function to achieve self-desired
network forwarding. Essentially, the argument of endpoint-driven in-network
function advocates for augmenting the implementation of a new in-network
function with endpoint-specified policies. For instance, rather than using any
network-defined filtering rules, MiddlePolice’s in-network function mitigates
DDoS attacks by forwarding traffic based on destination-driven policies, in-
cluding accepting only privileged traffic sent with permissions to prevent net-
work overwhelming by unwanted traffic, determining how much privileged
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traffic is allowed from each source, from each AS or for solving one challenge
to achieve a wide variety of fairness metrics, and designing specific policies for
mission-critical traffic. Such destination-driven in-network defense not only
enables the target server to minimize its possible disruption during DDoS mit-
igation, but also makes the defense itself more effective since the network only
needs to deliver all victim-desired traffic without needing to engaging in an
arms race with attackers to accurately identity attack traffic.
Similarly, in TorPolice, rather than relying on Tor relays to decide malicious
or abusive traffic, which may impose additional privacy threats, TorPolice’s in-
network access control mechanism enables a website to determine, anony-
mously, the number of service requests allowed by any Tor client. As a result,
the website can effectively throttle Tor-emitted abuse and meanwhile serve le-
gitimate Tor clients properly. Finally, in bothQShare andOpReduce, rather than
distributing network traffic using any network-implemented load balancer,
both systems design an in-network tenant routing control mechanism to ac-
curately control the forwarding path of tenants. Augmented with a search and
optimization decoupled framework, such in-network routing control is open to
optimize tenant network for arbitrary performance metrics.
There are no fundamental limitations about what types of endpoint-driven
policies are allowed and what types of policies are prohibited. In general, there
is a tradeoff between the complexity or/and benefit of endpoint-driven poli-
cies and the cost of enforcing them by in-network functions. For instance, one
extreme case is that the implementation of a specific policy is so heavyweight
that it even violates the argument of minimal intermediary deployment. There-
fore, all endpoint-driven policies proposed in this thesis strike a balance among
being general, being effective to address a specific challenge and being cost
efficient. For instance, in MiddlePolice, one of the primary policies designed
and implemented is per-sender fairshare. This policy has a high level of gen-
erality since it may be desired by a fairly large number of target servers and
it can be easily customized, for instance, by classifying some senders as privi-
leged ones. Second, this policy is effective against DDoS attacks since it offers
guaranteed bandwidth share for legitimate clients, which is in fact the opti-
mal policy against strategic attackers that can behave the exactly same as legit-
imate users (therefore the target servers cannot differentiate them). Finally, the
implementation of the per-sender fairshare policy introduces reasonable cost,
e.g., the network throughput declines less than 9% even against massive scale
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DDoS attacks involving hundreds of thousands bots.
Similarly, TorPolice considers a policy that allows a website to control the ser-
vice request rate by any Tor client using self-desired parameters. Clearly, the
policy is general as the parameters are defined by the website. Meanwhile it
is effective since a website can properly set its parameters so as to bound the
service request rate by any strategic adversary and therefore limit Tor-emitted
abuse. Finally, the implementation cost is reasonable, comparing with the ex-
isting cost of setting up Tor circuits. Both QShare and OpReduce have the same
balance: (i) they are designed as a general optimization framework that can
optimize a variety of performance metrics for tenant applications, (ii) they are
effective due to the search and optimization decoupled design and (iii) they
introduce negligible overhead since their implementations leverage existing
built-in features of commodity hardware.
1.3 Thesis Statement
Based on the above discussion, in this thesis, we claim the following statement
is true.
If implementing an in-network function is a must for meeting an emerging re-
quirement in networked systems and their running applications, the in-network
function should be implemented with minimal intermediary deployment and
its design should be augmented with endpoint-driven policies.
1.4 Thesis Organization
In this thesis, based on above principle, we design four systems in three differ-
ent networked systems to address four emerging challenges. In Section 1.2, we
have briefly explained how the design of each system is driven by the princi-
ple. In each of the following four chapters, we will elaborate on each of these
systems, Specifically,
• In Chapter 2, we propose MiddlePolice, the first readily deployable DDoS
defense mechanism that can enforce a wide variety of victim-selectable
policies during DDoS mitigation
11
• In Chapter 3, we propose TorPolice, the first privacy-preserving access
control framework for Tor that enables service providers to effectively
throttle Tor-emitted abuses and meanwhile serving legitimate Tor clients.
• In Chapter 4, we propose QShare, a complete in-network solution to
achieve work-conserving bandwidth guarantees in multi-tenant data-
centers, which not only offers predictable performance for tenants, but
also achieves efficient network resource utilization compared with static
reservation.
• In Chapter 5, we propose OpReduce, a virtual tenant network manage-
ment framework for optimizing tenant networks in multi-tenant data-
centers.
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes this thesis.
12
CHAPTER 2
TOWARD ENFORCING
DESTINATION-DEFINED POLICIES IN THE
MIDDLE OF THE INTERNET
2.1 Introduction
Attacks against availability, such as distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS),
continue to plague the Internet. The most common of these attacks, represent-
ing roughly 65% of all DDoS attacks in 2015 [8], are volumetric attacks. In these
attacks, adversaries seek to deny service by exhausting a victim’s network re-
sources and causing congestion. Such attacks are difficult for a victim network
to mitigate as the largest of these attacks can exceed the available upstream
bandwidth by orders of magnitude. For example, Internet service providers
(ISP) reported attacks in excess of 500 Gbps in 2015 [8].
One common solution to this problem is the use of DDoS-protection-as-
a-service providers, such as CloudFlare. These providers massively over-
provision datacenters for peak attack traffic loads and then share this capacity
across many customers as needed. When under attack, victims use DNS or BGP
to redirect traffic to the provider rather than their own networks. The DDoS-
protection-as-a-service provider applies a variety of techniques to scrub this
traffic, separating malicious from benign, and then re-injects only the benign
traffic back into the network to be carried to the victim. Such methods are ap-
pealing, as they require no modification to the existing network infrastructure
and can scale to handle very large attacks. However, these cloud-based systems
use proprietary attack detection algorithms and filtering which limit the ability
of customers to prioritize traffic kinds or choose preferred scheduling policies.
Further, existing cloud-based systems assume that all traffic to the victim will
be routed first to their infrastructure, an assumption that can be violated by a
clever attacker [9, 10].
A second approach to solving volumetric DDoS attacks is network capability-
based solutions [7, 11–13]. Such systems require a source to receive explicit
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permission before being allowed to contact the destination. Such capabilities
are enforced by the network infrastructure itself (i.e., routers) and capabilities
range from giving the victim the ability to block traffic from arbitrary sources
to giving the victim control over the bandwidth allowed for each flow. A major
advantage, then, of these capability-based systems is the ability of the victim to
control precisely what and how much traffic it wants to receive. However, these
capability-based systems are not without challenges, and most face significant
deployment hurdles. For instance, approaches such as SIFF [11], TVA [12] and
NetFence [13] require secret key management and router upgrades across dif-
ferent Autonomous Systems (ASes). Yet other approaches require clients to
modify their network stack to insert customized packet headers, creating ad-
ditional deployment hurdles.
In this proposal, we present MiddlePolice, which seeks to combine the de-
ployability of cloud-based solutions with the destination-based control of
capability-based systems. MiddlePolice is built on a set of traffic policing units
(referred as mboxes) which rely on a feedback loop of self-generated capabili-
ties to guide scheduling and filtering. MiddlePolice also includes a mechanism
to filter nearly all traffic that tries to bypass the mboxes, using only the ACL con-
figuration already present on commodity routers. We implement MiddlePolice
as a Linux kernel module, and evaluate it extensively over the Internet using
cloud infrastructures, on our private testbed, and via simulations. Our results
show thatMiddlePolice can handle large-scale DDoS attacks, and effectively en-
force the destination-chosen policies.
In MiddlePolice, underpinning is a novel and robust network capability de-
sign. To begin with, the capability design itself incorporates a Message Authen-
tication Code (MAC) so that the adversaries without valid keys cannot sabo-
tage the system. Functionally, the capabilities allow the mboxes to learn down-
stream bandwidth availability without additional deployment, which is the key
to remove deployment from irrelevant network entities. Atop capabilities, vari-
ous bandwidth sharing algorithms are designed and implemented at mboxes to
faithfully enforce the victim-defined policies.
This chapter elaborates on the design of MiddlePolice, including the capabil-
ity generation and traffic policing algorithms. A prototype built atop the exist-
ing Internet infrastructure demonstrates MiddlePolice’s immediate deployabil-
ity. Finally, extensive evaluations on both physical testbed and the ns-3 simula-
tor are performed to proveMiddlePolice’s effectiveness to stop large-scale DDoS
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attacks.
2.2 Problem Formulation
2.2.1 MiddlePolice’s Properties
Readily Deployable and Scalable. MiddlePolice is designed to be readily de-
ployable in the Internet and sufficiently scalable to handle large-scale attacks.
To be readily deployable, a system should only require deployment at the desti-
nation, and possibly at related parties on commercial terms. The end-to-end
principle of the Internet, combined with large numbers of endpoints, is what
gives rise to its tremendous utility. Because of the diversity of administrative
domains, including endpoints, edge-ASes, and small transit ASes, ASes have
varying levels of technological sophistication and cooperativeness. However,
some ASes can be expected to help with deployment; many ISPs already pro-
vide some sort of DDoS-protection services [14], so we can expect that such
providers would be willing to deploy a protocol under commercially reason-
able terms. We contrast this with prior capability-based work, which requires
deployment at a large number of unrelated ASes in the Internet and client net-
work stack modification, that violates the deployability model.
The goal of being deployable and scalable is the major reason that MiddlePo-
lice is designed to be built into existing cloud-based DDoS defense systems.
Destination-Driven Policies. MiddlePolice is designed to provide the destina-
tion with fine-grained control over the utilization of their network resources.
Throughout this chapter, we use “destination” and “victim” interchangeably.
Existing cloud-based systems have not provided such functionality. Many pre-
viously proposed capability-based systems are likewise designed to work with
a single scheduling policy. For instance, NetFence [13] enforces per-sender
fairness, CRAFT [15] enforces per-flow fairness, Portcullis [16] and Mirage [17]
enforce per-compute fairness, SIBRA [18] enforces per-steady-bandwidth fair-
ness, and SpeakUp [19] enforces per-outbound-bandwidth fairness. If any of
these mechanisms is ever deployed, a single policy will be enforced, forcing the
victim to accept the choice made by the defense approach. However, no single
fairness regime can satisfy all potential victims’ requirements. Ideally, Middle-
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Police should be able to support victim-chosen policies. In addition to these
fairness metrics, MiddlePolice can implement ideas such as ARROW’s [20] spe-
cial pass for critical traffic, and prioritized services for premium clients.
Fixing the Bypass Vulnerability. Existing cloud-based systems rely on DNS or
BGP to redirect the destination’s traffic to their infrastructures. However, this
model opens up the attack of infrastructure bypass. For example, a majority of
cloud-protected web servers are subject to IP address exposure [9, 10]. Larger
victims that join in the Shared Whois Project (SWIP) [21] may be unable to keep
their IP addresses secret from a determined adversary. In such cases, the ad-
versary can bypass the cloud infrastructures by routing traffic directly to the
victims. MiddlePolice includes a readily deployable mechanism to address this
vulnerability.
MiddlePolice is designed to augment the existing cloud-based DDoS preven-
tion systems with destination-selectable policies. The literature is replete with
capability-based systems that provide a single fairness guarantee with exten-
sive client modification and deployment at non-affiliated ASes. The novelty
and challenge of MiddlePolice is therefore architecting a system to move de-
ployment to the cloud while enforcing a wide variety of destination-selectable
fairness metrics. Built atop a novel capability feedback mechanism, Middle-
Police meets the challenge, thereby protecting against DDoS more flexibly and
deployably.
2.2.2 Adversary Model and Assumptions
Adversary Model. We consider a strong adversary owning large botnets that
can launch strategic attacks and amplify its attack [22]. We assume the adver-
sary is not on-path between any mbox and the victim, since otherwise it could
drop all packets. Selecting routes without on-path adversaries is an orthogo-
nal problem and is the subject of active research in next-generation Internet
protocols (e.g., SCION [23]).
Well-Connected mboxes. MiddlePolice is built on a distributed and replicable
set of mboxes that are well-connected to the Internet backbone. We assume the
Internet backbone has sufficient capacity and path redundancy to absorb large
volumes of traffic, and DDoS attacks against the set of all mboxes can never be
successful. This assumption is a standard assumption for cloud-based systems.
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Victim Cooperation. MiddlePolice’s defense requires the victim’s cooperation.
If the victim can hide its IP addresses from attackers, it simply needs to remove
a MiddlePolice-generated capability carried in each packet and return it back to
the mboxes. The victim needs not to modify its layer-seven applications as the
capability feedback mechanism is transparent to applications. If attackers can
directly send or point traffic (e.g., reflection) to the victim, the victim needs to
block the bypassing traffic. MiddlePolice includes a packet filtering mechanism
that is immediately deployable on commodity Internet routers.
Cross-Traffic Management. We assume that bottlenecks on the path from an
mbox to the victim that is shared with other destinations are properly managed,
such that cross-traffic targeted at another destination cannot cause unbounded
losses of the victim’s traffic. Generally, per-destination-AS traffic shaping (e.g.,
weighted fair share) on these links will meet this requirement.
2.3 System Overview
MiddlePolice’s high-level architecture is illustrated in Figure 2.1. A MiddlePo-
lice-protected victim uses a DNS entry to redirect its traffic to the mboxes. Each
mbox polices traversing traffic, enforcing the sharing policy chosen by the vic-
tim. This policing relies on a feedback loop of MiddlePolice-generated capabil-
ities to eliminate the need for deployment at downstream routers. When the
victim keeps its IP addresses secret (CloudFlare [24], for example, assumes the
same model), a single deployingmbox can secure the entire path from thembox
to the victim. Deployments of distributed mboxes close to the Internet core,
for instance by outsourcing them to the cloud, can therefore police traffic be-
fore it reaches downstream bottlenecks. Further, since tasks performed by each
mbox is trivially parallelizable, MiddlePolice can scale through the replication of
mboxes at diverse geographical and network locations.
Larger victims that SWIP [21] their IP addresses may be unable to keep their
IP addresses secret from a determined adversary. As a result, attackers can
bypass the mboxes and send attack traffic directly to the victim. MiddlePolice
designs a novel packet filtering mechanism relying on the ACL on deployed
routers or switches to eliminate the traffic that does not traverse any mbox. As
long as each bottleneck link is protected by an upstream filter, direct attack can
be prevented.
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Figure 2.1: The architecture of MiddlePolice to protect a dual-homed victim.
2.4 Detailed Design of mboxes
MiddlePolice’s traffic policing algorithm (i) probes the available downstream
bandwidth from each mbox to the victim and (ii) allocates the bandwidth to
senders according to the fairness regimes chosen by the victim.
Bandwidth Probe. The fundamental challenge of estimating downstream
bandwidth is that MiddlePolice requires no deployment at downstream links.
Such a challenge is two-sided: an overestimate will cause downstream flood-
ing, rendering traffic policing useless, while an underestimate will waste down-
stream capacity, reducing performance.
To solve the overestimation problem, MiddlePolice relies on a capability feed-
back mechanism to make senders self-report how many packets they have suc-
cessfully delivered to the victim. Specifically, upon a packet arrival, the mbox
stamps an unforgeable capability in the packet. When the packet is delivered to
the victim, MiddlePolice’s capability handling module (CHM) deployed on the
victim is responsible to return the carried capability back to the mbox. If the ca-
pability is not fed back to the mbox after a sufficiently long time interval (com-
pared with the RTT from thembox to the victim), themboxwill consider that the
packet has been lost. Thus, the feedbacks enable the mbox to infer a packet loss
rate (hereafter referred as LLR) for each sender. Then the downstream capacity
is estimated as the difference between the number of arrived packets from all
senders and lost packets on the downstream path. As the estimation is based
on the traffic volume delivered to the victim, it solves overestimation problem.
However, the above technique is not sufficient to overcome the underesti-
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mation problem. Specifically, because sender demand may be less than down-
stream capacity, simply using the volume of delivered traffic may cause un-
derestimation. To solve the problem, the mbox categorizes packets from each
sender as privileged packets and best-effort packets. Specifically, the mbox
maintains a rate windowWR for each sender to determine the amount of privi-
leged packets allowed for the sender in each period (hereafter referred detection
period). WR is computed based on the above downstream capacity estimation
as well as the sharing policies chosen by the victim. Packets sent beyond WR
are classified as best-effort packets. The mbox forwards all privileged packets
to the victim, whereas the forwarding decisions for best-effort packets are sub-
ject to a short-term packet loss rate (hereafter referred as SLR). The SLR reflects
downstream packet loss rates (congestion) at a RTT granularity. That is, if the
downstream is not congested upon an arrival of a best-effort packet, the mbox
will forward the packet. Thus, even when the downstream capacity is underes-
timated (the WR is underestimated), the mbox can still further deliver packets
as long as the downstream path is not congested.
Fairness Regimes. Each mbox allocates its probed bandwidth to senders based
on the sharing policies chosen by the victim. For policies enforcing global fair-
ness among all senders, the mboxes sharing the same bottleneck may need to
share their local observations. We address the problem of co-bottleneck detec-
tion in Section 2.8.3.
2.4.1 Information Table
The basis ofMiddlePolice’s traffic policing is an information table (iTable) main-
tained by each mbox. Each row of the iTable corresponds to a single sender.
The contents of the iTable depend on the victim-selected sharing policy; this
section describes iTable elements needed for per-sender fairness, and Sec-
tion 2.4.3.5 extends the iTable to other fairness regimes. In Section 2.6, we de-
scribe a mechanism to filter source spoofing at thembox, so this section ignores
source spoofing.
Table 2.1: Fields of an iTable entry and their sizes (bits).
f TA Pi d NR ND WR WV LR
64 32 16 32 32 32 128 64
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Each sender si has one row in the iTable , identified by a unique identifier
f . The fields and their corresponding sizes in each entry are illustrated in Ta-
ble 2.1. Other than f , each field is updated each detection period. The times-
tampTA records the current detection period. The capability IDPi d is the max-
imum number of distinct capabilities generated for si . NR stores the number of
packets received from si . ND indicates the number best-effort packets dropped
by the mbox. WR determines the maximum number of privileged packets al-
lowed for si . The verification window WV is designed to compute si ’s packet
loss rate, whereasLR stores the LLR for si .
2.4.2 Capability Computation
For si , the mbox generates two types of capabilities: distinct capabilities and
common capabilities. The CHM can use either capability for authentication,
whereas only distinct capabilities are used to infer downstream packet losses.
A distinct capability for si is computed as follows:
C= I PMP || t s || Pi d || f || TA ||
M ACKs (I PMP || t s || Pi d || f || TA),
(2.1)
where I PMP is the IP address of the mbox issuing C and t s is the current times-
tamp to mitigate replay attack. The combination of Pi d || f ||TA ensures the
uniqueness of C. The MAC is computed based on a secret key Ks shared by
all mboxes. The MAC is 128 bits, so the entire C consumes ∼300 bits.
A common capability, defined in Equation (2.2), carries a MAC for packet au-
thentication.
Cc = I PMP || t s || M ACKs (I PMP || t s). (2.2)
The design of capability incorporates a MAC to ensure that attackers without
secure keys cannot generate valid capabilities, preventing capability abuse.
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Table 2.2: System parameters.
Para. Definition Value
Dp The length of the detection period 4s
T hcap Distinct capability ID upper bound 128
T hr r t Maximum waiting time for cap. feedbacks 1s
T hdr opsl r SLR thres. for dropping best-effort pkts 0.05
β The weight for historical loss rates 0.8
T hl pass The threshold for calculating LLR 5
Ssl r The length limit of cTable 100
2.4.3 Traffic Policing Logic
2.4.3.1 Populating the iTable
We first describe how to populate the iTable . At time t s, the mbox receives the
first packet from si . It creates an entry for si , with f computed based on si ’s
source address, and initializes the remaining fields to zero. It then updates TA
to t s, increases both NR and Pi d by one to reflect the packet arrival and com-
putes a capability specific to the updated Pi d and TA.
Upon receiving a packet from si with arrival time ta−TA >Dp (ta is the ar-
rival time and Dp is the length of the detection period), the mbox starts a new
detection period for si by setting TA = ta . The mbox also updates the remaining
fields based on the traffic policing algorithm (as described in Section 2.4.3.4).
As the algorithm depends on si ’s LLR and the mbox’s SLR, the computation of
which is described in the following sections.
2.4.3.2 Inferring LLR
Capability Generation. For each packet from si , the mbox generates a distinct
capability for the packet if (i) its arrival time ta −TA <Dp −T hr t t , and (ii) the
capability ID Pi d < T hcap . The first constraint ensures that the mbox allows at
least T hr t t for each capability to be returned from the CHM. By setting T hr t t
well above the RTT from the mbox to the victim, any missing capabilities at the
end of the current period correspond to lost packets. Table 2.2 lists the system
parameters including T hr t t and some suggested values.
The second constraint T hcap is to bound the number of distinct capabilities
issued for si in one detection period, so as to bound the memory requirements.
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We set T hcap = 128, large enough to reduce the sampling error in computing
the LLR.
Packets violating any of the two constraints, if any, will carry a common ca-
pability (Equation (2.2)). The common capability will not be returned by the
CHM to learn si ’s LLR. However, it can be used for packet authentication.
Capability Feedback Verification. Assume the mbox generates Kth distinct ca-
pabilities for si with capability ID ranging from [1,Kth]. Each time a capability
is returned, the mbox checks the capability ID to determine which packet (car-
rying the received capability) has been received by the CHM. WV represents a
window with T hcap bits. Initially all the bits are set to zero. When a capability
with capability ID i is received, the mbox sets the i th bit in WV to one. At the
end of the current detection period, the zero bits in the first Kth bits ofWV indi-
cate the losses of the corresponding packets. To reduce memory consumption,
the mbox only processes capabilities issued in the current period.
LLR Computation. LLR in kth detection period is computed at the end of the
period, i.e., the time when the mbox decides to start a new detection period for
si . si ’s lost packets may contain downstream losses and dropped best-effort
packets by the mbox. The number of packets that si sent to downstream links is
NR−ND , and the downstream packet loss rate is V0Pi d , where V0 is the number of
zero bits in the firstPi d bits ofWV . Thus, the estimated number of downstream
packet losses is Nd str eamloss = (NR −ND ) V0Pi d . Then we have LLR = (N
d str eam
loss +
ND )/NR .
Our strawman design is subject to statistical bias, and may have negative ef-
fects on TCP timeouts. In particular, assume one legitimate TCP source recov-
ers from a timeout and sends one packet to probe the network condition. If
the packet is dropped again, the source will enter longer timeouts. However,
the source would have a (biased) 100% loss rate based on the strawman design.
Adding a low-pass filter can fix this problem. Specifically, if si ’s NR in the cur-
rent period is less than a small threshold T hl pass , the mbox sets its LLR in the
current period as zero. In Section 2.4.3.4, we explain why the low pass filter is
robust. Formally, we have
LLR =
0, ifNR < T hl passNd str eamloss +ND
NR
, other wi se.
(2.3)
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2.4.3.3 Inferring SLR
SLR is designed to reflect downstream congestion on a per-RTT basis, and is
computed across all flows from the mbox to the victim. Like LLR, SLR is learned
through capabilities returned by the CHM. Specifically, the mbox maintains a
hash table (cTable) to record capabilities used to learn its SLR. The hash key
is the capability itself and the value is a single bit value (initialized as zero) to
indicate whether the corresponding key (capability) has been returned.
As described in Section 2.4.3.2, when a packet arrives (from any source), the
mbox stamps a capability on the packet. The capability will be added into
cTable if it is not a common capability and cTable ’s length has not reach a pre-
defined threshold Ssl r . The mbox maintains a timestamp Tsl r when the last
capability is added into cTable . Then, it uses the entire batch of capabilities in
cTable to learn the SLR. We set Ssl r = 100 to allow fast capability loading to the
cTable , while minimizing sampling error from Ssl r being too small.
As in LLR, the mbox allows at most T hr t t from Tsl r to receive all feedbacks
in cTable . Note some capabilities may be returned before T hr t t (i.e., before
cTable is full). Once a capability in cTable is returned by the CHM, the mbox
sets its hash value to one. Upon receiving a new packet with arrival time ta >
Tsl r +T hr t t , the mbox computes SLR = Z0Ssl r , where Z0 is the number of cTable
entries whose value is zero. The mbox then clears the current cTable entries to
start a new monitoring cycle for SLR.
2.4.3.4 Traffic Policing Algorithm
We formalize the traffic policing logic in Algorithm 1. Upon receiving a packet
P , the mbox retrieves the entry F in iTable matching P (Line 3). If no entry
matches, the mbox initializes an entry.
P is categorized as a privileged or best-effort packet based onF’sWR (line 5).
If P is privileged, the mbox performs necessary capability handling (line 6)
before appending P to the privileged queue. The mbox maintains two FIFO
queues to serve all accepted packets: the privileged queue serving privileged
packets and the best-effort queue serving best-effort packets. The privileged
queue has strictly higher priority than the best-effort queue. CapabilityHandling
(line 11) executes the capability generation and cTable updates (line 32), as de-
tailed in Section 2.4.3.2 and Section 2.4.3.3.
23
Algorithm 1: Traffic policing algorithm.
1 Main Procedure:
2 begin
3 F← iTableEntryRetrieval(P);
4 F.NR ←F.NR +1;
5 if F.NR <F.WR then
/* Priviledged packets */
6 CapabilityHandling(P, F);
7 Append P to the privileged queue;
8 else
/* Best-effort packets */
9 BestEffortHandling(P, F);
/* Starting a new detection period if necessary */
10 if t s−F.TA >Dp then iTableHandling(F);
11 Function: CapabilityHandling(P, F):
12 begin
/* Two constraints for capability generation */
13 if F.Pi d < T hcap and t s−F.TA <Dp−T hr t t then
14 F.Pi d ←F.Pi d +1;
15 Generate capability C based on Equation (2.1);
16 cTableHandling(C);
17 else
/* Common capability for packet authentication */
18 Generate capability Cc based on Equation (2.2);
19 Function: BestEffortHandling(P, F):
20 begin
21 if SLR < T hdr opsl r and F.LR < T h
dr op
sl r then
22 CapabilityHandling(P, F);
23 Append P to the best-effort queue;
24 else
25 Drop P ; F.ND ←F.ND +1;
26 Function: iTableHandling(F):
27 begin
28 Compute r ecentLoss based on Equation (2.3);
/* Consider the historical loss rate */
29 F.LR ← (1−β) · r ecentLoss+β ·F.LR ;
30 BandwidthSharingPolicy(F);
31 ResetWV , Pi d ,NR andND as zero;
32 Function: cTableHandling(C):
33 begin
/* One batch of cTable’s is not ready */
34 if cTable.length < Ssl r then
35 Add C into cTable ;
36 if cTable.length == Ssl r then Tsl r ← t s ;
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If P is a best-effort packet, its forwarding decision is subject to the SLR and
F′s LLR (line 19). If the SLR exceeds T hdr opsl r , indicating downstream conges-
tion, the mbox discards P . Further, if F’s LLR is already above T hdr opsl r , the mbox
will not deliver best-effort traffic for F as well since F already experiences se-
vere losses. T hdr opsl r is set to be few times larger than a TCP flow’s loss rate in
normal network condition [25] to absorb burst losses. If the mbox decides to
accept P , it performs capability handling as necessary (line 22).
Finally, if P ’s arrival triggers a new detection period for F (line 10), the mbox
performs corresponding updates for F (line 26). To determine F’s LLR, the
mbox incorporates both the recent LLR (r ecentLoss) obtained in the current
period and F’s historical loss rate LR . Such a design prevents attackers from
hiding their previous packet losses via on-off attacks. Similarly, adding a low
pass filter in Equation (2.3) is not subject to abuse. F’sWR is updated based on
the sharing policy proposed by the victim (line 30), as described below.
2.4.3.5 Bandwidth Sharing Policies
We list the following representative policies that may be chosen to implement
in BandwidthSharingPolicy.
NaturalShare presents a simple policy: for each sender, the mbox sets its WR
for the next detection period as the number of delivered packets in the current
period. The design rationale is that the mbox allows a rate that the sender can
sustainably transmit without experiencing a large LLR.
PerSenderFairshare allows the victim to enforce per-sender fair share at bot-
tlenecks. Each mbox fairly allocates its estimated total downstream bandwidth
to all serving senders. By maintaining a global value Ntot alsi ze to store the total
capacity estimate, and updating each sender’s contribution to the Ntot alsi ze each
time the sender starts a new period, the mbox can obtain the fair rate for each
sender via a single entry access rather than traversing through the entire iTable .
To ensure the global fairness among all senders, the mboxes sharing the same
bottleneck need to share their local observations. We design a co-bottleneck
detection mechanism based on the SLR correlation of the mboxes: if two
mboxes’ SLRs are correlated, they share a bottleneck with high probability. In
Section 2.8.3, we validate the effectiveness of the mechanism.
PerASFairshare is similar to PerSenderFairshare except that the mbox fairly al-
locates the bandwidth on a per-AS basis. This policy mimics SIBRA [18], pre-
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venting bot-infested ASes from taking bandwidth away from legitimate ASes.
PerASPerSenderFairshare is a hierarchical fairness regime: the mbox first al-
locates its bandwidth on a per-AS basis, and then fairly assigns the bandwidth
obtained by each AS among the AS’s senders.
2.5 Packet Filtering
When the victim’s IP addresses are kept secret, attackers cannot bypass Middle-
Police’s upstream mboxes to route attack traffic directly to the victim. In this
case, the downstream packet filtering mechanism is unnecessary since Middle-
Police can throttle attack traffic at the upstream mboxes. However, with tools
like WHOIS [26], it may be difficult for a large victim owning a large chunk of
IP addresses to keep all of them secret. In this case, the victim needs to de-
ploy a packet filtering mechanism to filter out packets that have not traversed
MiddlePolice’s mboxes.
Filtering Primitives. Although the MAC-incorporated capability can prove that
a packet indeed traverses an mbox, it requires upgrades from deployed com-
modity routers to perform MAC computation to filter bypassing packets. Thus,
we invent a mechanism based on the existing ACL configurations on commod-
ity routers. Specifically, eachmbox encapsulates its traversing packets into UDP
packets (similar techniques have been applied in VXLAN and [27]), and uses the
UDP source and destination ports (a total of 32 bits) to carry an authenticator, a
shared secret between thembox and the filtering point. Although a 32-bit secret
is not long enough to prevent attackers from generating the secret, a 400 Gbps
attack (the largest attack viewed by Arbor Networks [8]) that uses random port
numbers will be reduced to∼90 bps as the chance of a correct guess is one over
232. The shared secret can be negotiated periodically based on a cryptograph-
ically secure pseudo-random number generator. Note that although the UDP
source address can also be adopted for filtering, attackers may spoof thembox’s
source address.
Packet Filtering Points. The filtering mechanism should be deployed at, or up-
stream of, each bottleneck link. Deployed filtering points should have sufficient
bandwidth so that the bypassing attack traffic cannot cause packet losses prior
to the filtering. To ensure this, the victim can either purchase sufficient band-
width from large ISPs and deploy the filtering mechanism at the inbound points
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of its network. Or it can work with its ISP to deploy the filtering deeper in the
ISP’s network. Working with the victim’s ISP does not violate the deployment
model in Section 2.2 as MiddlePolice never requires deployment from unrelated
ASes.
2.6 Source Validation
The design of MiddlePolice relies on the ability to punish sources that have ex-
cessive LLRs. In order for such punishment to be effective and correctly di-
rected, we must limit an attacker’s ability to create many new sources. Middle-
Police could build on previous work (e.g., [16]) that ensures fairness or account-
ability in the setup process; however, such work often includes mechanisms
that are difficult to deploy. As a result, we also design a source verifier for Mid-
dlePolice to ensure that a sender is on-path to its claimed source IP address.
The verifier is completely transparent to clients, and is enforced entirely at the
mboxes.
Our key insight is that the HTTP Host header is in the first few packets of each
connection. As a result, the mbox monitors a TCP connection and reads the
Host header. If the Host header reflects a generic (not sender-specific) host-
name (e.g., victim.com), the mbox intercepts this flow, and redirects the con-
nection (HTTP 302) to a Host name containing a token cryptographically gen-
erated from the sender’s claimed source address, e.g., T .victim.com, where T is
the token. If the sender is on-path, it will receive the redirection, and its further
connection will use the sender-specific hostname in the Host header. When an
mbox receives a request with a sender-specific Host, it verifies that the Host is
proper for the claimed IP source address (if not, the mbox initiates a new redi-
rection), and forwards the request (and any keys established by HTTPS) to the
victim. TCP Fast Open can be adopted between the mbox and the victim to
reduce the handover latency; because traffic from the mbox is authenticated,
Denial-of-Service concerns of TCP Fast Open can be mitigated.
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Figure 2.2: The software stack of the mbox and CHM.
2.7 Implementation
In this section, we discuss the implementation ofMiddlePolice, starting with the
and the capability handling module (CHM).
2.7.1 mboxes and CHM Implementation
The mboxes and the CHM at the victim are implemented based on the NetFilter
Linux Kernel Module, which combined have ∼1500 lines of C code (excluding
the capability generation code). The software stack is illustrated in Figure 2.2.
We elaborate each component following the packet handling process.
All inbound traffic from clients to an mbox is subject to the traffic policing
whereas only accepted packets go through the capability-related processing.
Packet dropping due to traffic policing triggers iTable updates. For each ac-
cepted packet, the mbox rewrites its destination address as the victim’s address
to point the packet to the victim. To carry capabilities, rather than defining a
new packet header, the mbox appends the capabilities to the end of the origi-
nal data payload, which avoids compatibility problems at intermediate routers
and switches. The CHM is responsible to trim these capabilities to deliver the
original payload to the victim’s applications. If the packet filter is deployed, the
mbox performs the IP-in-UDP encapsulation, and adopts the UDP source and
destination ports to carry the secret. Note that all checksums need to be recom-
puted after packet manipulation to ensure correctness.
To avoid packet fragmentation due to the additional 68 bytes added by the
mbox (20 bytes for outer IP header, eight bytes for the outer UDP header and
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40 bytes reserved for a capability), the mbox needs to be a priori aware of the
MTU Md on its path to the victim. Then the mbox sets its MSS as no more than
Md−68−40 (the MSS is 40 less than the MTU). Note that we do not directly
set the MTU of the mbox’s NIC to rely on the path MTU discovery to find the
right packet size because ISPs may block ICMP packets. One our testbed, as
Md = 1500, we set the mbox’s MSS as 1360.
Upon receiving packets from upstream mboxes, the CHM strips their outer
IP/UDP headers and trims the capabilities. To return these capabilities, the
CHM piggybacks capabilities to the payload of ACK packets. To ensure that a
capability is returned to thembox issuing the capability even if the Internet path
is unsymmetrical, the CHM performs IP-in-IP encapsulation to tunnel the ACK
packets to the right mbox. We allow one ACK packet to carry multiple capa-
bilities since the victim may generate cumulative ACKs rather than per-packet
ACKs. Further, the CHM tries to pack more capabilities in one ACK packet to
reduce the capability feedback latency at the CHM. The number of capabilities
carried in one ACK packet is stored in the TCP option (the 4-bit res1 option).
Thus, the CHM can append up to 15 capabilities in one ACK packet if the packet
has enough space and the CHM has buffered enough capabilities.
Upon receiving an ACK packet from the CHM, the mbox strips the outer IP
header and trims the capability feedbacks (if any) at the packet footer. Further,
the mbox needs to rewrite the ACK packet’s source address back to its own ad-
dress since the client’s TCP connection is expecting to communicate with the
mbox. Based on the received capability feedbacks, the mbox updates the iTable
and cTable accordingly.
2.7.2 Capability Generation
We use the AES-128 based CBC-MAC, based on the Intel AES-NI library, to gen-
erate MAC due to its fast speed and availability at modern CPUs [28–30]. We
port the capability implementation (∼400 lines of C code) into the mbox and
CHM kernel module. The mbox needs to perform both capability generation
and verification whereas the CHM only performs verification.
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Table 2.3: Rerouting traffic to mboxes causes small AS-hop inflation, and ∼10%
ASes can even access the victim with fewer hops through mboxes.
Victims N hopi n f l a P
shor t
cut P
no
i n f l a
Non-stub ASes 1.1 10.6% 22.2%
Stub ASes 1.5 8.4% 18.0%
Overall 1.3 9.5% 20.1%
2.8 Evaluation
2.8.1 The Internet Experiments
Global Deployment. In this section, we demonstrate the feasibility of outsourc-
ing the mboxes to the cloud via Internet-scale evaluation. Specifically, we show
that rerouting clients’ traffic through mboxes introduces small path length in-
flation and small extra latency.
We construct the AS level Internet topology based on the CAIDA AS relation-
ships dataset [31], including 52680 ASes and their business relationships [32].
To construct the communication route, two constraints are applied [33, 34].
First, an AS prefers customer links over peer links and peer links over provider
links. Second, a path is valid only if each AS providing transit is paid. Among all
valid paths, an AS prefers the path with least AS hops (random tie breaker ap-
plied if necessary). We use Amazon as the cloud provider to host mboxes, and
obtain its AS number based on the report [35]. Amazon claims 11 ASes in the
report. We first exclude the ASes not appeared in the global routing table, and
then we find AS 16509 is the provider of the rest Amazon ASes. Thus, we use AS
16509 to represent Amazon.
We randomly pick 2000 ASes as victims, and for each victim we randomly pick
1500 access ASes. Among all victims, 1000 victims are stub ASes without direct
customers and the remaining victims are non-stub ASes. For each access AS
and victim pair, we obtain the direct route from the access AS to the victim, and
the rerouted route through the mboxes. Table 2.3 summarizes the route com-
parison. N hopi n f l a is the average number of hop inflation of the rerouted path
compared with the direct route. P shor tcut is the percentage of ASes that can ac-
cess the victim with fewer hops after rerouting and P noi n f l a is percentage of ASes
without hop inflation.
Overall, it takes an access AS 1.3 more hops to reach the victim after rerout-
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Figure 2.3: [Internet] FCTs for direct routes and rerouted routes under various
Internet conditions.
ing. Even for stub victims, which are closer the Internet edge, the average hop
inflation is only 1.5. We also notice that ∼10% ASes in fact have shortcuts due
to the rerouting.
Prototype Deployed in the Internet. In our prototype running on the Internet,
we deploy three mboxes on Amazon EC2 (located in North America, Asia and
Europe), one victim server in a U.S. university and about one hundred senders
(located in North America, Asia and Europe) on PlanetLab [36] nodes. We also
deploy few clients on personal computers to testMiddlePolice in home network.
The wide distribution of clients allows us to evaluateMiddlePoliceon various In-
ternet links. Note that we cannot launch DDoS attacks over the Internet, which
raises ethical and legal concerns. Instead, we evaluate how MiddlePolice may
affect the clients in normal Internet without attacks, and perform the experi-
ments involving large scale DDoS attacks on our private testbed and simula-
tions.
In the experiment, each client posts a 100 KB file to the server, and its traffic is
rerouted to the nearest mbox before reaching the server. We repeat the posting
on each client for 10 thousand times to reduce bias. We also run the experiment
during both the rush hour and midnight (based on the server’s timezone) to
further test various network conditions. As a control group, clients post their
files directly to the server.
Figure 2.3 shows the CDF of the flow completion times (FCTs) for the file post-
ing. Overall, we notice∼9% average FCT inflation, and less than 5% inflation in
home network. Thus, MiddlePolice introduces small extra latency to the clients.
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Figure 2.4: [Testbed] Throughput and goodput when policing different
numbers of senders.
2.8.2 Testbed Experiments
Policing Overhead. In this section, we evaluate the traffic policing overhead
on our testbed. We organize three servers as one sender, one mbox and one
receiver. All servers, shipped with a quad-core Intel 2.8 GHz CPU, run the 3.13.0
Linux kernel. The mbox is installed with multiple Gigabit NICs to connect both
the sender and receiver. A long TCP flow is established between the sender and
receiver, via the mbox, to measure the throughput. To emulate large numbers
of sources, the mbox creates an iTable with N entries. Each packet from the
sender triggers a table look up for a random entry. We implement a two-level
hash table in the kernel space to reduce the look up latency. Then the mbox
generates a capability based on the obtained entry.
Figure 2.4 shows the measured throughput and goodput under various N .
The goodput is computed by subtracting the additional header and capability
size from the total packet size. The baseline throughput is obtained without
MiddlePolice. Overall, the policing overhead in high speed network is small.
When a single mbox deals with 100 thousand sources sending simultaneously,
the throughput drops by ∼10%. By replicating more mboxes, the victim can
distribute the pressure of a single mbox when facing large scale attacks.
Testbed Topology. We now evaluate MiddlePolice’s performance of stopping
attacks. Figure 2.5 illustrates the network topology, including a single-homed
victim AS purchasing one Gbps bandwidth from its ISP, an mbox and 10 access
ASes. The ISP is emulated by a Pronto-3297 48-port Gigabit switch to support
packet filtering. The mbox is deployed on a server installed multiple Gigabit
NICs, and each access AS is deployed on a server with a single NIC. We add
100ms latency at the victim via Linux traffic control to emulate the typical In-
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Figure 2.6: [Testbed] Packet filtering via ACL.
ternet RTT. To emulate large-scale DDoS attacks, nine ASes are compromised.
Attackers adopt a hybrid attack profile: six attack ASes directly send large vol-
umes of traffic to the victim, emulating amplification-based attacks, and the re-
maining attack ASes route traffic through thembox. Thus, the total attack traffic
volume is nine times as much as the client AS’s rate and the victim’s bottleneck
capacity. Note both the inbound and outbound point of the mbox are provi-
sioned with four Gbps bandwidth to ensure the mbox is not the bottleneck. In
reality, such a property is ensured by replicating more mboxes.
Packet Filtering. We first show the effectiveness of packet filtering. Six attack
ASes spoof the mbox’s source address and keep dumping total six Gbps UDP
traffic to the victim. The attack ASes scan all possible UDP port numbers to
guess the shared secret. Figure 2.6 shows the volume of attack traffic bypass-
ing the mbox and its volume received by the victim. Clearly, as the chance of a
correct guess is small, the packet filtering mechanism can effectively stop the
traffic bypassing the mbox. We further assume that at time ts , the shared secret
is stolen by attackers. However, as all packets traversing the mbox carry capa-
bilities, the CHM suddenly receives huge amounts of packets without valid ca-
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pabilities. Then it realizes that the upstream filtering has been compromised.
Thus, the victim re-configures the ACL based on a new secret to recover from
the key stolen. The ACL is effective within few milliseconds after reconfigu-
ration. Thus, the packet filtering mechanism is robust even in case of secret
stolen.
Bandwidth Sharing Policies. In this section, we show that the mbox can en-
force victim-chosen bandwidth sharing policies. NaturalShare and PerASFair-
share policies are considered. We use the default parameter setting in Table 2.2,
and defer detailed parameter study in Section 2.8.3. The performance metric,
defined as the window size, is the larger value between an AS’s WR and its de-
livered packets to the victim as MiddlePolice conditionally allows an AS to send
faster than its WR . For clear presentation, we normalize the window size to
the maximum number of 1.5 KB packets deliverable through a one Gbps link
in one detection period. We do not translate window sizes to throughput as
packet sizes vary.
Attackers adopt two representative strategies: (i) they send flat rates regard-
less of packet losses, and (ii) they dynamically adjust their rates based on packet
losses (reactive attacks). To launch flat-rate attacks, attackers keep initiating
new TCP flows regardless of whether previous flows have been finished. Thus,
the attack rate is flatted by attackers’ link capacity. We do not use UDP to send
flat traffic since the CHM returns capabilities via TCP ACKs. Note that if a victim
normally serves UDP clients, it needs to extend the CHM to return capabilities
to the mboxes in other ways, e.g., via dedicated flows. One way of launching re-
active attacks is that attackers simultaneously maintain much more TCP flows
than the legitimate AS. Such a many-to-one communication pattern may allow
attackers to occupy almost the entire bottleneck in some cases, even through
each single flow seems completely “legitimate".
The legitimate AS always communicates with the victim via a TCP connec-
tion.
Figure 2.7 shows the results for the NaturalShare policy. As the bottleneck is
flooded by attack traffic, the legitimate AS is forced to enter timeout at the be-
ginning, as illustrated in Figure 2.7(a). We notice that attackers’ window sizes
are dropping over time, which can be explained via Figure 2.7(b). Clearly, all
attack ASes’ LLRs are well above T hdr opsl r because their flat rates are much larger
than the bottleneck’s capacity. Thus, the mbox will not deliver best-effort pack-
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Figure 2.7: [Testbed] Enforcing the NaturalShare policy. The legitimate AS
gradually obtains a certain amount of bandwidth share under flat-rate attacks
since attackers’ window sizes consistently drop over time (Figures 2.7(a) and
2.7(b)). However, the attack ASes can consume over 95% of bottleneck
bandwidth via reactive attacks (Figure 2.7(c)) while maintaining similarly low
LLRs as the legitimate AS (Figure 2.7(d)).
ets for them. As a result, assuming the 1st attack AS’s window size is W (t ) in
detection period t , then W (t +1)≤W (t ) no matter how many packets it sends
to the mbox in period t+1. Further, any new packet losses from the attack AS,
caused by either bottleneck buffer overflow due to burst or packet dropping by
the victim since it sees numerous requests, will further reduce W (t +1). There-
fore, all attack ASes’ windows are consistently dropping over time, which cre-
ates spare bandwidth at the bottleneck for the legitimate AS. As showed in Fig-
ure 2.7(a), the legitimate AS gradually recovers from the timeout.
The NaturalShare policy, however, cannot well protect the legitimate AS if at-
tackers adopt the reactive attack strategy. By adjusting their rates based on
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Figure 2.8: [Testbed] Enforcing the PerASFairshare policy. The legitimate AS
can obtain at least the per-AS fair rate at the bottleneck regardless of the attack
strategies (Figures 2.8(a) and 2.8(c)). Further, the legitimate AS gains a few
more bandwidth than attackers under flat-rate attacks as the attack ASes have
large LLRs (Figure 2.8(b)).
packet losses, attackers can keep their LLRs low enough to regain the advan-
tages of delivering best-effort packets. Further, they can gain larger bandwidth
by initiating more TCP flows. Figure 2.7(c) shows the window sizes when each
attack AS starts 200 TCP long flows whereas the client AS has one. Clearly, at-
tackers consume over 95% of the bottleneck’s bandwidth, while keeping simi-
larly low LLRs as the legitimate AS (Figure 2.7(d)).
Figure 2.8 shows the results for the PerASFairshare policy. Figures 2.8(a) and
2.8(c) demonstrate that the legitimate AS can gain at least per-AS fair rate at the
bottleneck regardless of the attack strategies, overcoming the shortcomings of
the NaturalShare policy. Further, under flat-rate attacks, the legitimate AS can
have slightly larger window sizes than attackers since, again, the mbox does not
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Figure 2.9: [Testbed] MiddlePolice ensures that the premium client (AS A)
receives consistent bandwidth.
deliver any best-effort packets for attackers due to their high LLRs (showed in
Figure 2.8(b)).
PremiumClientSupportPolicy. This section evaluates thePremiumClientSup-
port policy. We consider a legitimate AS (AS A) that is a premium client which
reserves half of the bottleneck bandwidth. Figure 2.9 plots AS A’s bandwidth
when the number of senders from the attack ASes increases. With thePremium-
ClientSupport policy, MiddlePolice ensures AS A receives consistent bandwidth
regardless of the number of senders from the attack ASes. However, without
such a policy, the attack ASes can selfishly take away the majority of bottleneck
bandwidth by involving more senders.
2.8.3 Large-Scale Evaluation
In this section, we further evaluate MiddlePolice via large-scale simulations on
ns-3 [37]. We desire to emulate real-world DDoS attacks in which up to millions
of bots flood a victim. To circumvent the scalability problem of ns-3 at such a
scale, we adopt the same approach in NetFence [13], i.e., by fixing the number
of nodes (about five thousand) and scaling down the link capacity proportion-
ally, we can simulate attack scenarios where one million to 10 million attackers
flood a 40 Gbps link. The simulation topology is similar to the testbed topology,
except that all attackers are connected to the mbox.
Besides the flat-rate attacks and reactive attacks, we also consider the on-
off shrew attacks [38] in the simulations. Both the on-period and off-period
in shrew attacks are 1s. The number of attackers is 10 times larger than that
of legitimate clients. In flat-rate attacks and shrew attacks, the attack traffic
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(c) Jain’s fairness index (FI).
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 2  4  6  8  10
J
a
in
’s
 f
a
ir
n
e
s
s
 i
n
d
e
x
The number of attackers (million)
Single mbox
10 mboxes
20 mboxes
(d) FI for various mbox counts.
Figure 2.10: [Simulation] Evaluating NaturalShare and PerSenderFairshare in
Scale. Figures 2.10(a) and 2.10(b) show that the clients’ average window size is
larger than that of the attackers under both flat-rate and shrew attacks. Figure
2.10(c) proves that the clients’ window sizes converge to fairness in the
PerSenderFairshare policy. Figure 2.10(d) shows that MiddlePolice can enforce
strong fairness even without coordination among the mboxes.
volume is three times larger than the victim’s link capacity. In reactive attacks,
each attacker opens 10 connections, whereas a client has one. The bottleneck
router buffer size is determined based on [39], and the RTT is 100 ms.
NaturalShare and PerSenderFairshare in Scale. Figure 2.10 shows the re-
sults for enforcing the NaturalShare and PerSenderFairshare policies with de-
fault parameters settings. Figure 2.10(a) illustrates the ratio of clients’ average
window size to attackers’ average window size for the NaturalShare policy. For
flat-rate attacks and shrew attacks, it may be surprising that the clients’ aver-
age window size is larger than that of the attackers. Detailed trace analysis
shows that it is because that the window sizes of a large fraction of attackers
keep dropping. As the number of attackers is much larger than the client count,
the attackers’ average window turns out to be smaller than that of the clients,
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Figure 2.11: [Simulation] The SLR correlation coefficient reflects whether two
mboxes share a bottleneck.
even though the absolute attack traffic volume is still higher. Under reactive
attacks, the clients’ average window size (almost zero) is too small to be plotted
in Figure 2.10(a).
Figure 2.10(b) shows that the clients enjoy even larger window ratio gains un-
der the PerSenderFairshare policy in flat-rate and shrew attacks because even
more attackers enter the window dropping mode. Further, the PerSenderFair-
share ensures that the clients’ average window size is close to the per-sender fair
rate in reactive attacks. Figure 2.10(c) demonstrates that each client’s window
size converges to the per-client fairness as the Jain’s fairness index [40] (FI) is
close to one.
mboxCoordination. To enforce global per-sender fairness, themboxes sharing
the same bottleneck link need to share their local observations. We first inves-
tigate how bad the FI can be without such inter-mbox coordination. We recon-
struct the network topology to create multiplemboxes, and uniformly map each
client to a random mbox. The attackers launch reactive attacks. The results, il-
lustrated in Figure 2.10(d), show that the FI drops slightly by ∼8% even if 20
mboxes make local rate allocations without any coordination.
To make our design complete, we also propose a co-bottleneck detection
mechanism. The design rational is that if two mboxes’ SLR observations are
correlated, they share a bottleneck with high probability. To validate this, we re-
build the network topology to create the scenarios where two mboxes share and
do not share a bottleneck, and study the correlation coefficient of their SLRs.
We compute one coefficient for every 100 SLR measurements from each mbox.
Figure 2.11 shows the CDF of the coefficient. Clearly, the coefficient reflects
whether the two mboxes share a bottleneck. Thus, by observing such correla-
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Table 2.4: [Simulation] Clients’ average window size under differnent
parameter settings.
(a) The NaturalShare Policy
Dp T h
dr op
sl r β
2s 8s 0.03 0.1 0.5 0.9
Flat 1.1 0.17 0.78 0.39 1.1 0.78
Shrew 1.3 0.65 0.77 1.0 1.2 0.80
(b) The PerSenderFairshare Policy
Dp T h
dr op
sl r β
2s 8s 0.03 0.1 0.5 0.9
Flat 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.69 0.85 0.81
Shrew 1.1 0.98 0.72 0.83 1.0 0.98
Reactive 1.0 0.99 1.0 0.94 1.0 1.0
tion between two mboxes’ SLRs over a period of time, MiddlePolice can deter-
mine with increasing certainty whether or not they share a bottleneck, and can
configure their coordination accordingly.
Parameter Study. We evaluate MiddlePolice using different parameters than
the default values in Table 2.2. We mainly focus onDp , T h
dr op
sl r and β. For each
parameter, we vary its value to obtain the clients’ average window size under
the 10-million bot attack. The results showed in Table 2.4 are normalized to the
window sizes obtained with the default parameters.
Under the NaturalShare policy, the shorterDp produces a larger window size.
Because each sender’s WR is updated per-period so that a smaller Dp causes
faster cut in attackers’ window sizes. For T hdr opsl r , a smaller value slows down
clients’ recovery whereas a larger value allows larger window sizes for attackers.
Both will reduce clients’ share. A larger β has some negative effects as it takes
more time for clients to recover to a low LLR.
With the PerSenderFairshare policy, MiddlePolice’s performance is more con-
sistent under different parameter settings. The most sensitive parameter is
T hdr opsl r because it determines whether or not one source can send best-effort
packets.
40
Table 2.5: Property comparison with other DDoS defense approaches. “O(N )
states" means that the number of states maintained by a router increases with
the attacker count. “Cryptography" means that a router needs to support
cryptography operation, i.e., MAC computation. “Puzzle" means that the
mechanism requires puzzle distribution.
Pushback [41] SIFF [11] TVA [12] Phalanx [42]
Source upgrades No Yes Yes Yes
Dest. upgrades Yes Yes Yes Yes
AS deployment Unrelated Unrelated Unrelated Related
Router support O(N ) states None O(N ) states None
Fairness regimes None Per-sender None None
Other
requirements
None New header New header New header
NetFence [13] Mirage [17] SIBRA [18] MiddlePolice
Source upgrades Yes Yes Yes No
Dest. upgrades Yes Yes Yes Yes
AS deployment Unrelated Unrelated Unrelated Related
Router support
O(N ) states;
Cryptography
O(N ) states;
Cryptography
O(N ) states;
Cryptography
O(N ) states
Fairness regimes Per-sender Per-compute Per-AS Victim-chosen
Other
requirements
New header;
Passport [43]
Puzzle;
IPv6 upgrade
Redesign
the Internet
None
2.9 Related Work
Previous approaches can be generally categorized into capability-based ap-
proaches (SIFF [11], TVA [12], NetFence [13]), filtering-based approaches
(Traceback [44, 45], AITF [46], Pushback [41, 47], StopIt [48]), overlay-
based approaches (Phalanx [42], SOS [49]), deployment friendly approaches
(CRAFT [15], Mirage [17]), approaches based on new Internet architectures
(SCION [23], SIBRA [18], XIA [50], AIP [51]) and others (SpeakUp [19], SDN-
based [52, 53], CDN-based [54]). We summarize the properties of one or two
approaches from each category in Table 2.5. The comparison shows that Mid-
dlePolice requires the least deployment (no source upgrades, additional router
support and deployment from unrelated ASes) while providing the strongest
property (enforcing victim-chosen policies).
2.10 Discussion
In this section, we briefly cover some undiscussed aspects.
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mboxes Mapping. MiddlePolice can leverage the end-user mapping [55] to
achieve bettermbox assignment, such as redirecting clients to the nearestmbox,
mapping clients according to their ASes and load balancing.
Other Policies. (i) Premium service. The victim needs to register premium
clients’ identifiers to the mboxes to enable premium service, i.e., bandwidth
reservation. With the source validation mechanism (detailed in Section 2.6),
such identifiers can simply be the premium clients’ source IPs. (ii) Per-flow
fairness. Each mbox needs to maintain per-flow state and fairly allocates rates
on a per-flow basis. (iii) Per-challenge fairness. Additional challenge distribu-
tion services are required to enforce this fairness metric.
Incorporating Endhost Defense. MiddlePolice can cooperate with the DDoS
defense mechanism deployed, if any, on the victim. For instance, via botnet
identification [56, 57], the victim can instruct the mboxes to block botnet traffic
early at upstream so as to save more downstream bandwidth for clients.
2.11 Chapter Summary
This chapter presents MiddlePolice, the first readily deployable Internet DDoS
defense mechanism that can enforce victim-chosen policies. MiddlePolice re-
lies on a set of well-connected mboxes to police traffic for the victim. Attack
traffic bypassing the mboxes can be effectively eliminated. Extensive evalua-
tions on the Internet, testbed and simulations validate MiddlePolice’s effective-
ness for stopping attacks and enforcing policies.
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CHAPTER 3
TORPOLICE: TOWARD ENFORCING
SERVICE-DEFINED ACCESS POLICIES FOR
ANONYMITY SYSTEMS
3.1 Introduction
Counting almost two million daily users, the Tor network [58] is among the
most popular digital privacy tools. As of May 2017, the network consists of
over 7,000 volunteer-run relays, carrying nearly 100 Gbps of traffic [59]. Tor
clients1 build a path (also known as circuit) consisting of three relays (guard,
middle and exit) to reach service providers such as Yelp or Wikipedia. Tor is
used by law enforcement, intelligence agencies, political dissidents, journal-
ists, whistle-blowers, businesses, and ordinary citizens to enhance their online
privacy [60].
Today’s Tor network does not implement any access control mechanism,
meaning that anyone with a Tor client can use the network without limita-
tion. While the lack of access control fosters network growth, it has also caused
various problems, most importantly botnet abuse [61]. In practice, botnets
use Tor to attack third-party services, spam comment sections on websites,
scrape content, and scan services for vulnerabilities [2]. In response, many ser-
vice providers and content delivery networks (CDNs) have started to treat Tor
users as “second-class" Web citizens [62] by forcing Tor users to solve numer-
ous CAPTCHAs [2, 63] or blocking Tor exit relay IP addresses altogether (e.g.,
Akamai and its powered sites).
Another type of botnet-related abuse of Tor arises from command and con-
trol (C&C) servers run as Tor hidden services [64–66]. In the past, such events
caused a rapid spike in the number of Tor clients [67, 68]. Besides the repu-
tational issue of Tor “hosting” botnet infrastructure, the massive number of
circuit creation requests from botnets is a heavy burden on Tor relays, caus-
1In this chapter, we use the term client(s) to refer to the onion proxy (OP) software running
on the Tor user’s machine.
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ing significant performance degradation for legitimate Tor users (e.g., frequent
Tor circuit failures). Other types of botnet abuse include paralyzing Tor relays
via relay flooding attacks [69, 70] and performing large-scale traffic analysis via
throughput or congestion fingerprinting [71, 72].
We present TorPolice, the first privacy-preserving access control framework
for Tor. Leveraging cryptographically computed network capabilities, TorPolice
allows service providers to define access policies for Tor connections, to throttle
abuse while still serving legitimate Tor users. In the past, abuse-plagued service
providers opted to simply block Tor users. We seek to offer a viable alterna-
tive to these service providers. Further, TorPolice improves the Tor network’s
resilience to botnet abuse by enabling global access control for Tor relays. Cru-
cially, TorPolice achieves these benefits while still retaining Tor’s anonymity
guarantees.
TorPolice’s design introduces a set of fully distributed and partially-trusted
access authorities (AAs) that manage and certify network capabilities. Both ser-
vice providers and the Tor network provide differentiated service to Tor clients
that possess valid capabilities. Our AAs generate capabilities using blind signa-
tures [73] to preserve the anonymity of Tor users.
We conduct a rigorous security analysis to prove that TorPolice completely
preserves Tor’s anonymity. Specifically, none of the capability-issuing authori-
ties, service providers, or Tor relays gain any advantage in terms of linking Tor
users to their online activities. We further implement a prototype ofTorPolice to
demonstrate its practicality and evaluate the prototype extensively to validate
TorPolice’s design goals. Our results show that TorPolice can effectively enforce
service-selected access policies and mitigate large-scale botnet abuses against
Tor at the cost of negligible overhead.
3.2 Problem Formulation
In this section, we provide brief background on Tor (Section 3.2.1), outline
TorPolice’s design goals (Section 3.2.2), and discuss our threat model (Sec-
tion 3.2.4).
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3.2.1 Tor Background
Tor clients anonymously connect to service providers by building three-hop cir-
cuits consisting of a guard, middle, and exit relay. Tor’s use of layered encryp-
tion ensures that each relay only knows the identities of its direct neighbors (i.e.,
the previous and next hop in the circuit). A list of all Tor relays—the network
consensus—is published hourly by a set of nine globally distributed directory
authorities that are run by volunteers trusted by the Tor Project. Clients ran-
domly select these relays, weighted by the relays’ bandwidth.2 While the direc-
tive authorities and guard relays learn a Tor client’s network identity (i.e., her IP
address), they cannot observe the client’s online activity. Exit relays, however,
can monitor the client’s activity, but do not know her identity. Tor’s anonymity
stems from unlinking network identity from activity.
Another functionality of Tor is server-side anonymity. Tor allows service
providers to host their service anonymously over hidden services (HS). Once
a hidden service is set up, it creates circuits to at least three relays that are its
introduction points (IPs). Then, the HS publishes its descriptor—which con-
tains the IPs—to a distributed hash table that consists of a subset of all Tor re-
lays. To connect to the HS, a Tor client first fetches the HS’s descriptor using its
onion address, and then builds two circuits; one to an IP and another one to a
randomly-selected relay called the rendezvous point (RP). The client instructs
the IP to send the identity of the RP to the HS, which then creates a circuit to
the RP to be able to finally communicate with the client.
3.2.2 Design Goals
TorPolice adds access control to the Tor network, benefiting both service
providers and the Tor network. The main challenge is to design TorPolice in
a way that it (i) keeps Tor’s anonymity guarantees, (ii) prevents central points
of control, and (iii) is incrementally deployable.
Service-Defined Access Policies. Project Honey Pot lists nearly 70% of all Tor
exit relays as comment spammers [2], causing many service providers and
CDNs to block and filter traffic originating from the Tor network. To reduce this
2The published bandwidth of each relay in the network consensus is based on a relay’s ad-
vertised bandwidth and adjusted by live bandwidth measurements that are performed by Tor’s
bandwidth authorities.
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tension between Tor users and service providers, TorPolice must allow service
providers to express access rules for Tor connections, allowing them to throttle
abuse while still serving legitimate Tor users.
Mitigate Botnet Abuse Against Tor. Being a service provider itself, Tor is sub-
ject to botnet abuse, such C&C servers hosted as hidden services and (D)DoS
attacks against relays. TorPolice allows the Tor network to control the network
usage of Tor clients, making it possible to throttle the abuse. TorPolice’s access
control mechanism is global, meaning that an adversary cannot circumvent
our defense by enumerating all relays.
Preserving Tor User Privacy. TorPolicemust not degrade Tor’s anonymity guar-
antees. While we add a new layer of functionality to Tor (access control), this
layer—like Tor itself—unlinks a client’s identity from her activity, and therefore
preserves Tor’s anonymity.
Fully Distributed and Partially Trusted Authorities. In accordance with Tor’s
design philosophy of distributing trust, TorPolice relies on a set of fully dis-
tributed and partially trusted access authorities (AAs) to issue capabilities. An
AA is operated either by the Tor Project, a service provider, or a trusted third
party. Since Tor clients are free to choose any AA to request capabilities, no
single AA has a global view on all Tor clients. Further, each AA is only partially
trusted and a service provider can blacklist any misbehaving AA.
Incrementally Deployable. TorPolice must be incrementally deployable. Up-
to-date Tor clients, relays, and service providers can benefit from a partially-
deployed TorPolice immediately while outdated entities can continue their op-
erations.
3.2.3 Elided Design Goals
Various attacks seek to break Tor’s unlinkability. For instance, an AS-level ad-
versary may de-anonymize a Tor user’s Internet activities if the adversary is in a
position to monitor both ingress and egress traffic [74]. TorPolice is not designed
to mitigate those attacks on unlinkability. Instead, we preserve the unlinkability
guarantees that Tor currently provides.
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3.2.4 Adversary Model and Assumptions
We consider a Byzantine adversary that deviates from our protocol and abuses
Tor in arbitrary ways. The adversary can use Tor to abuse third-party services,
e.g., by scraping content, spamming comments, and scanning for vulnerabili-
ties. The adversary may also abuse the Tor network directly, e.g., by using Tor
HSes as C&C servers, performing traffic analysis, or launching (D)DoS attacks
against Tor relays. The adversary may further control a large number of bots,
and hence a significant amount of resources. The bots can act passively (e.g.,
monitor Tor traffic) or actively (e.g., spoof and manipulate packets). We assume
that the AAs are well-connected to the Internet backbone so that traffic-based
DDoS attacks can be mitigated. Tor’s existing directory authorities are subject
to the same assumption.
3.3 Design Overview
In a nutshell, TorPolice is a generic access control framework based on capabil-
ities. Clients must first request these capabilities, and can then spend them in
return of service. TorPolice enables both service providers and the Tor network
itself to enforce access control on Tor clients to mitigate various types of botnet
abuse. To this end, we consider two types of capabilities: site-specific capabili-
ties for accessing TorPolice-enhanced service providers through Tor, and relay-
specific capabilities for creating TorPolice-enhanced Tor circuits. Both types of
capability are signed by a set of fully distributed Access Authorities (AAs) that
are deployed either by the Tor Project, service providers, or trusted third parties.
To request capabilities from a particular AA, a Tor client is required to possess a
capability seed—basically a costly-to-scale resource—accepted by the AA. Each
AA accepts only a single type of capability seed. Since Tor clients are free to
choose their AAs, no single AA has a global view on all Tor clients. TorPolice
employs blind signatures [73] to unlink the requesting and spending of capa-
bilities. When requesting capabilities from an AA, Tor clients express what kind
of capability they request because the issuing process for two capability types
differs. There are separate signing keys and rate limiters.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the requesting and spending process. While both ca-
pability types have in common step one and two, the subsequent steps differ.
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Figure 3.1: The architecture of TorPolice. A Tor client (step one) presents its
capability seed to an AA to request pre-capabilities (step two), based on which
the client computes site(relay)-specific capabilities (step three). The client
then spends capabilities on either service access or Tor circuit creation (step
four). The capability recipients validate capabilities before allowing services
(step five). We intensionally separate two capability use cases for clear
presentation.
A site-specific capability can only be spent at the service provider specified in
the capability while a relay-specific capability is spent at a specific Tor relay to
build a TorPolice-enhanced circuit. Both capability types can further be com-
bined, i.e., a Tor client can use a TorPolice-enhanced circuit to reach a TorPo-
lice-enhanced service provider.
3.4 The Access Authorities
TorPolice relies on fully distributed and partially trusted access authorities
(AAs) to manage network capabilities. We assume AAs to be honest-but-
curious, meaning that they follow protocol, but seek to derive additional in-
formation about clients. An AA can be deployed by the Tor Project, service
providers (e.g., large CDNs like Cloudflare), or third parties. Each AA is a
conceptually centralized entity. However, an AA can distribute its operations
among multiple servers.
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3.4.1 Capability Seeds
AAs expect valid capability seeds from Tor clients to issue pre-capabilities,
which are the basis for deriving spendable capabilities. Any resource that is
readily available to Tor users, but costly to scale, can be adopted as capabil-
ity seeds. Reasonable choices include proof-of-work schemes (e.g., solutions
to CAPTCHAs or computational puzzles) and anonymous monetary resources.
TorPolice does not assume that capability seeds can distinguish bots from hu-
mans. Rather, botnets can still obtain more capability seeds than legitimate Tor
users. Instead, TorPolice employs capability seeds as a form of virtual identities
that enable service providers and the Tor network to control resource usage by
each Tor client.
In this thesis, we elaborate on two types of seeds (solutions to CAPTCHAs
and computational puzzles) and further discuss how TorPolice can incorporate
more types of seeds in Section 3.4.4. One key challenge of using anonymous
capability seeds is to ensure that clients do not have to solve endless challenges
while browsing the web and meanwhile ensure their activities are unlinkable.
TorPolice proposes a capability renewal protocol to address this problem (Sec-
tion 3.5.1).
Although CAPTCHAs can be deployed using publicly available libraries like
reCAPTCHAs [75], TorPolice needs additional components to support compu-
tational puzzles. At a very high level, TorPolice’s puzzle system design is similar
to Portcullis [16]. However, TorPolice’s puzzle system does make a great im-
provement over Portcullis: it can explicitly bound the percentage of CPU cycles
that any client can spend on solving puzzles. As a result, the puzzle system
can bring all bots down to the percentage that normal clients prefer to use for
puzzle computation, which significantly reduce the computation disparity be-
tween the normal clients and bots. For better readability, we defer detailed de-
sign for TorPolice’s puzzle system in Section A.1.
3.4.2 Per-Seed Rate Limiting
Each AA can only accept one type of capability seed. The rate at which a seed
can request pre-capabilities is limited. In particular, an AA publishes two rate
limiters: one determines the maximum rate at which a capability seed can re-
quest pre-capabilities used for accessing TorPolice-enhanced service providers
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and the other one determines the maximum rate at which a seed can request
pre-capabilities used for TorPolice-enhanced circuit creation. Based on these
per-seed rate limiters published by all AAs, both service providers and Tor can
configure a set of rules to fulfill their access policies. This chapter presents two
concrete examples. In Section 3.5.3, we elaborate on a design that enables a
site to bound an adversary’s achievable service request rate through Tor using
self-defined parameters. In Section 3.6.1, we present a design that allows Tor to
prevent botnets from creating numerous Tor circuits to conduct various abuses.
To improve readability, detailed settings of these rate limiters will be discussed
when presenting these access policies.
3.4.3 Key Management
Each AA maintains two pairs of keys for signing pre-capabilities, and each of
them is dedicated for one capability type. Each AA must publish the public key
of both key pairs, for instance, via Tor network consensuses to ensure other
entities can verify the AA’s signatures. An AA can periodically renew its keys,
but at any time only two key pairs from the AA are valid. After receiving signed
pre-capabilities from an AA, clients must verify that the AA uses proper keys
before using the pre-capabilities for accessing service providers or Tor. This
prevents a malicious AA from using more keys simultaneously to partition the
anonymous set. Finally, each AA is associated with a long-term fingerprint to
uniquely identity the AA, similar to the fingerprint of a Tor relay.
3.4.4 Extending the Access Authorities
Besides Tor, service providers (e.g., Cloudflare or Akamai) also have direct in-
centives to deploy and control their own set of access authorities to mitigate
Tor-emitted abuses while serving anonymous connections. In fact, at the time
of writing, Cloudflare is working on an independent implementation of a sys-
tem whose design goals are similar to our AAs.
Finally, semi-trusted third parties such as social network operators (e.g.,
Facebook, Google, and Twitter), may also run access authorities (shown as TTP
AA in Figure 3.1) based on pre-agreed terms. To prevent account information
leakage to Tor and service providers, Tor users only authenticate themselves to
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the social network operators. Service providers or Tor only learn a single bit of
information: whether a Tor client has a valid account (i.e., capability seed) or
not.
3.5 TorPolice-Enhanced Site Access
We now elaborate on the capability design for accessing TorPolice-enhanced
service providers such as websites. To mitigate the tension between service
providers and Tor users, our key observation is that service providers should
not treat all connections from one Tor exit relay equally since each exit relay
is shared by many Tor users. Instead, accountability should be enforced at the
granularity of Tor clients, so each service provider can throttle malicious Tor
clients without blocking legitimate Tor users. To this end, TorPolice designs
site-specific capabilities that allows a service provider to enforce self-selected
access rules on anonymous Tor connections.
3.5.1 Pre-Capability Design
Before visiting a TorPolice-enhanced site, a Tor client must first request pre-
capabilities from an AA. The client is free to choose any AA based on what ca-
pability seed the client prefers to give. To request a pre-capability, the client
(i) provides a valid capability seed to its selected AA and (ii) provides blinded
information for the AA to compute pre-capabilities. The client can hide its net-
work identity from the AA, for instance, by using Tor.
Capability Seed Validation. Depending on the accepted type of capability
seed, an AA performs corresponding seed verification. For instance, if an AA ac-
cepts proof-of-work schemes, it needs to verify that solutions to the presented
challenge are correct. Further, an AA needs to ensure that the pre-capability
request rates by any seed does not exceed the two rate limiters discussed in
Section 3.4.2. Since each AA maintains separate rate limiters and signing keys
for two pre-capability types (i.e., either for TorPolice-enhanced service access
or for TorPolice-enhanced Tor circuit creation), Tor clients must specify the
pre-capability type in their requests. (in this section, it is for accessing service
providers).
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Information Required to Compute Pre-Capabilities. To request pre-
capabilities, the client provides its selected AA the following information
{S,n,Ts ,F}, where S is the domain name of site that the client is going to visit,
n is a 128-bit cryptographic nonce generated by the client, Ts is a universally
agreed timestamp to indicate the freshness of the information and F is finger-
print of the selected AA. All information is blinded [73] by the client to avoid
information leakage to the selected AA.
The set of information is designed to prevent abuse. In particular, S is used
to make the capability site-specific to prevent capability double-spending at
different sites. The nonce n is added to ensure the uniqueness of each pre-
capability, which in turn ensures the uniqueness of each capability. The Ts in-
dicates the freshness of pre-capabilities so that expired ones are nullified au-
tomatically. The client is required to use Tor’s daily generated fresh random
number [76] as Ts such that all valid capabilities have the exactly same times-
tamp at any time. This design eliminates the possibility of information leakage
cased by timestamp abuse. F is added to allow other entities (i.e., clients, Tor
relays and service providers) to use correct public keys to verify signatures.
Computation. Upon validation of the client’s capability seed, the AA com-
putes pre-capabilities using the blinded information provided by the client.
Pre-capabilities computed by an AAAi are denoted by PAi . Then we have
PAi = {S | n | Ts | FAi }b | SbAi , (3.1)
where FAi isAi ’s fingerprint, S
b
Ai
isAi ’s blind signature over the set of blinded
information {S | n | Ts | FAi }b , and | represents concatenation throughout this
chapter.
Pre-Capability Renewal. One key design challenge for pre-capabilities is to en-
sure that Tor clients do not have to repeatedly solve challenges when browsing
the web. A strawman design is that an AA can issue many (i.e., a few hundred)
pre-capabilities for each solved challenge. However, this strawman design has
at least two shortcomings: (i) it breaks the site-specific pre-capability design
since the client may not be able to forecast the sites that it is going to visit so as
to provide these blinded information immediately after solving challenges; (ii)
the design makes it easier for automated bots to accumulate pre-capabilities,
weakening the entire system.
Thus, we propose a pre-capability renewal protocol to combat these prob-
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lems. In particular, when a client first presents its challenge solution to an AA,
the AA issues the client a unforgeable pseudonym as I = {r | φ} where r is a
random 128-bit nonce and φ is the AA’s signature over r . Later on, the client
presents I as a proof of validation when requesting new pre-capabilities from
the AA, allowing the client to bypass future challenges. With this design, not
only the site-specific pre-capability design holds, but also the AA can account
each pre-capability request on a specific solved challenge (i.e., capability seed)
to enforce the per-seed rate limiting in Section 3.4.2. Each pseudonym has a
validation period determined by the AA. Clients with expired pseudonyms are
required to solve new challenges to obtain new pseudonyms that are unlink-
able to previous ones.
Impact of the Pseudonym on Anonymity. Different from the pseudonym-
based anonymous blacklisting systems [77, 78], in which a user interacts with
a service provider using a persistent pseudonym, the pseudonym in our pre-
capability renewal protocol is transient and never presented to either service
providers or Tor relays. The pseudonym in our protocol is only linked with a
specific challenge solution served as an anonymous capability seed. Since a
Tor client presents its pseudonym to an AA through Tor, the AA cannot link the
pseudonym with the client. Further, since all site-related information sent to
the AA is blinded, the pseudonym is unlinkable with any site access as well.
Thus, using pseudonym in our protocol does not impact Tor users’ anonymity.
3.5.2 Site-Specific Capability Design
After obtaining PAi , the client unblinds the signature using its secret blind fac-
tor to produce the unblinded version of the pre-capability, which is the capa-
bility spendable at a specific site. In particular,
C=S | n | Ts | FAi | SAi (3.2)
The capability C contains a set of unblinded information that allows the site
S to perform capability verification when the client presents C to access the
site, as detailed in Section 3.5.3.
Employing blind signature is the key to ensure that TorPolice preserves Tor’s
privacy guarantee. First, signatures from the AAs prevent unauthorized enti-
ties from issuing capabilities. Second, using blind signature avoids disclosing
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any site-related information to the AAs since the blinded information sent to
the AAs is unlinkable with the “plain” information produced by the client. Such
unlinkability further ensures the unlinkability between the client and its capa-
bility spending even if the AAs could collude with the site, which preserves on-
line anonymity of Tor users. We provide a formal security proof in Section 3.7.
3.5.3 Site-Specific Capability Spending
Capability Validation. Tor clients spend site-specific capabilities at TorPolice-
enhanced sites to request services. Upon receiving capabilities, a TorPolice-
enhanced site first validates them before subsequent processing. A site-specific
capability is valid if (i) it encloses an authentic signature from an AA; (ii) it en-
closes a domain name that is consistent with the site; (iii) the capability is not
expired (i.e., Ts is the fresh random number released by Tor); and (iv) the capa-
bility is not nullified by the site. If any of these conditions does not hold, the site
rejects this capability to deny access. If a large CDN provider (e.g., Cloudflare)
processes capabilities on behalf of its powered sites, the second rule is passed
as long as the enclosed domain is owned by one of the CDN provider’s cus-
tomers. In the fourth rule, whether a capability is nullified or not is determined
by the site’s access policies, as detailed below.
Site-Defined Access Policies. Once a site-specific capability is validated, the
site accepts the Tor client’s service request. Since the major form of Tor abuse
is that automated bots use Tor to conduct various malicious activities against
the site [2] (e.g., content scraping, vulnerability scanning, comment spamming
and so forth), the site needs to further control the number of service requests
(e.g., HTTP requests) allowed by each capability. We clarify that each site can
have its own definition of service requests. Once a Tor client’s service request
count exceeds a threshold, the site requires a new site-specific capability for
subsequent service requests. Recall that the pre-capability request rate by each
client is limited by the AAs through the per-seed rate limiting design in Sec-
tion 3.4.2. Thus, together with these rate limiters, it is possible for the site to
design access policies so as to bound a strategic adversary’s service request rate
using self-selected parameters, as detailed below.
Policy Definition. Assume the following set of access authorities
{A0,A1, ...,An} are deployed, and each authority accepts one type of capability
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seed. In this context, the site defines its access policy as {w0, w1, ..., wn} where
wi is the number of service requests allowed by one valid site-specific capabil-
ity issued by authorityAi .
We now formulate {w0, w1, ..., wn} mathematically. Let {s0, s1, ..., sn} denote
the set of capability seeds and authority A j accepts seed s j . Let c j denote
the cost of obtaining a capability seed s j . We denote the cost of obtaining
one network identity by λ. Let r j denote the maximum rate at which a seed
s j can request pre-capabilities (for accessing service providers) from author-
ity A j . Assume that for any client connecting to the site directly without using
Tor, the site allows a maximum service request rate O˜ before either blocking the
client or forcing the client to solve challenges. Then to bound a strategic adver-
sary’s service request rate by using Tor, the site derives {w0, w1, ..., wn} to ensure
that the following condition is satisfied for any set of parameters [α0,α1, ...,αn]
where αi ∈ [0,1] and∑ni=0αi = 1.
n∑
i=0
αi ·λ
ci
· ri ·wi ≤ ² · O˜, (3.3)
where ² is a site-defined parameter.
Policy Correctness. The parameters [α0,α1, ...,αn] represent the adversary’s
strategy of purchasing various types of capability seeds. Thus, if Equation (3.3)
holds for any strategy, the site can guarantee that the maximum Tor-emitted
service request rate achieved by an adversary when spending λ on purchasing
capability seeds is no greater than ² · O˜. Thus, if an adversary that spends a
certain number of resources on obtaining network identities can access the site
with rate O without using Tor, then the maximum rate that the adversary can
request service from the site by using Tor is no greater than ² ·O, given that the
adversary spends the same number of resources on acquiring capability seeds.
Equivalently, in order to achieve the same service request rate, the adversary
has to spend 1/² times as many resources when launching attacks through Tor
as it spends when launching attacks natively without using Tor. To ensure that
Equation (3.3) holds for any attacker strategy, we choose
wi ≤ ² · ci · O˜
λ · ri
, ∀i ∈ [0,n]. (3.4)
Policy Enforcement. If wi = 1, then each capability is usable for exactly one
service request. The site can enforce this by suppressing requests with dupli-
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cate capabilities, for example, through the use of a Bloom filter. If wi > 1, then
statistically more than one service request should be allowed for each capabil-
ity. To enforce this, the site stops accepting a capability with probability 1/wi ,
and then adds the capability to duplicate suppressor. However, multiple ser-
vice requests carrying the same capability can trivially be linked by the site. We
discuss how to address this issue through system parameterization below. Fi-
nally, if wi < 1, then each capability is accepted with probability wi , and exactly
one service request is allowed for each accepted capability.
System Parameterization. We now discuss the parameterization of wi . First, to
compute wi , the site does not need to exactly know ci . Instead, the site simply
needs to assign specific weights to these capability seeds based on its policies.
Further, with an ideal parameterization, wi should be exactly one since (i) no
capability is spendable on more than one service request to ensure unlinkabil-
ity and (ii) no additional capabilities are required for a single service request to
avoid extra overhead. However, it is difficult to reach such ideal parameteriza-
tion since ri is chosen by the authorityAi that is unaware of the site’s configura-
tions ² and O˜. In addition, configurations can vary greatly among different sites
so that an ideal parameterization for one site could be undesirable for others.
To address the problem, TorPolice sets ri such that (with high probability) a
Tor client can obtain enough capabilities so that it is feasible for the client to
present a unique capability for each TCP connection to the site. This ensures
that the client can achieve the highest level of unlinkability offered by Tor, i.e.,
service providers only see TCP connections from Tor exit relays. We clarify that
it is the client who determines how to spend its capabilities across TCP con-
nections (as described below). The above parameterization is adopted only to
ensure that spending a unique capability for each TCP connection is a feasible
strategy for the client. A reasonable setting of ri can be estimated based on the
live Tor measurement in [79], which finds that in a 10-minute interval, each Tor
client opens about 24 web streams. In practice, the authorityAi should enforce
ri over a longer period of time (e.g., few hours) to accommodate usage burst.
Note that when an AA Ak is deployed by the site itself, system parameter-
ization for Ak is easier since the site determines the rate limiters for issuing
pre-capabilities.
Capability Spending. Given ri , some sites may end up with rules wi > 1, i.e.,
one capability is allowed for multiple service requests. In this case, the site
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needs to send a response to indicate whether a capability is nullified or not. Tor
clients are free to determine their capability spending strategies. For instance, a
Tor client can send wi service requests using the same capability within a single
TCP connection (due to HTTP keep-alive), which still ensures the highest level
of unlinkability. Or the client may choose to spend one capability across multi-
ple TCP connections to allow trans-TCP linkability. We note that if a Tor client
uses the default setting of the Tor Browser, it already allows trans-TCP linkabil-
ity since the Tor Browser uses session cookies. For a site that has wi less than
one, it can enforce such policies by accepting one capability with probability
wi and for each accepted capability, the site allows only one service request.
3.6 TorPolice-Enhanced Tor Access
In this section, we detail the capability design for accessingTorPolice-enhanced
Tor. The current Tor network suffers from a variety of botnet abuses such as
large-scale C&C abuse [61, 64–66, 68], relay flooding attacks [69, 70] and traffic
analysis [71, 72]. These abuses lead to various bad results, including poor sys-
tem performance for legitimate Tor users, de-anonymization threats and bad
reputation for Tor. The root cause of these attacks is that botnets can create
an arbitrary number of Tor circuits without any limitation. Enforcing local rate
limiting for circuit creation at each relay is unlikely to stop these attacks since a
strategic botnet can instruct each bot to enumerate all relays to circumvent the
local rate limiting.
With TorPolice, Tor can globally control circuit creations by any client using
our capability scheme. In particular, when TorPolice is activated, clients are
required to possess valid capabilities in order to create TorPolice-enhanced cir-
cuits (to be incrementally deployable, circuit creation requests without valid
capabilities are de-prioritized in case of congestion). Then by controlling the
rate at which a Tor client can obtain capabilities, TorPolice can explicitly limit
its circuit creation rate.
3.6.1 Relay-Specific Capability Design
To create a three-hop TorPolice-enhanced circuit, a Tor client U needs to ob-
tain three capabilities, each of them being specific to a relay on the circuit. The
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design of relay-specific capabilities is identical to that of site-specific capabil-
ities, except for the following. (i) During pre-capability requesting, the client
needs to specify the proper pre-capability type, i.e., it is for Tor-enhanced cir-
cuit creations. Further, to request a pre-capability specific to a relay R, the
client encloses the fingerprint of relay R (rather than any site domain) in the
set of blinded information sent to its selected AA. (ii) Relay-specific capabilities
are spendable at TorPolice-enhanced relays for creating Tor-enhanced circuits.
The relays first validate received capabilities (based on a set of rules similar to
those defined in Section 3.5.3) before extending circuits.
We clarify that to request pre-capabilities, clients do not have to use TorPo-
lice-enhanced circuits to reach the AAs. Thus, there is no deadlock for boot-
strapping TorPolice. Another alternative is pre-installing few relay-specific ca-
pabilities on clients so that using TorPolice-enhanced circuits to bootstrap the
system is viable.
Policy Definition. Similar to site-specific capabilities, relay-specific capabili-
ties enable Tor to enforce access rules for its relays. In this chapter, we propose
to use capabilities to limit circuit creation rate for Tor clients so as to mitigate
those aforementioned abuses against Tor. In particular, assume the following
set of AAs {A0,A1, ...,An} are deployed and authority Ai accepts a type of ca-
pability seed si . In this context, Tor defines its access rules as {q0, q1, ..., qn},
where qi is the maximum rate at which a capability seed si can request pre-
capabilities (for creating Tor-enhanced circuits) from authorityAi . Then in or-
der to bound a Tor client’s circuit creation rate, {q0, q1, ..., qn} should satisfy the
following condition for any attacker strategy [α0,α1, ...,αn] whereαi ∈ [0,1] and∑n
i=0αi = 1.
n∑
i=0
αi ·λ ·qi
3 · ci
≤T, (3.5)
where ci is the cost for obtaining one capability seed si and T is the maximum
circuit creation rate determined by Tor. We note that the constant three appears
in above equation since a standard Tor circuit contains three relays and each of
them consumes a relay-specific capability.
To ensure the correctness of Equation (3.5) for any attacker strategy, we
choose
qi ≤ 3 · ci ·T
λ
, ∀i ∈ [0,n]. (3.6)
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Parameterization. Similar to how sites compute wi in Equation (3.4), to com-
pute qi , the Tor project needs to assign certain weights to these capability
seeds. Further, a proper configuration of T can be determined based on the
live Tor measurements in [79]. In particular, during an average 10 minutes,
PrivCount [79] estimates that a Tor client opens about four circuits. Thus, the
maximum rate T at which one Tor client can create circuits should be close to
four per ten minutes. In practice, each AA should enforce qi over a longer pe-
riod of time (e.g., few hours) to accommodate usage bursts and relay churn.
3.6.2 Capability Exchange for HSes
The design of relay-specific capabilities needs to be augmented with a capabil-
ity exchange protocol to better support Tor Hidden Services (HSes). In particu-
lar, a Tor hidden server (itself runs a Tor client) needs to open many Tor circuits
in order to serve all its clients (referred to as HS-clients). Although a Tor hidden
server can continue to use legacy Tor circuits to serve its HS-clients, we do de-
sign a capability exchange protocol to enable hidden servers to build enough
TorPolice-enhanced circuits.
The design intuition is that a HS-client requests a new type of capability,
i.e., trans-capability, from the AAs, and sends it to the HS, which subsequently
redeems the trans-capability at the AAs for new pre-capabilities. The trans-
capability, accounted on the capability seed of the HS-client, anonymously in-
forms the AAs that the hidden server needs to create a new TorPolice-enhanced
circuit to serve the HS-client. For better readability, the detailed design of the
protocol is deferred in Section A.2.
3.7 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the impact of TorPolice on Tor users’ anonymity. Let
NT denote the set of Tor clients that request pre-capabilities from the AAs, and
subsequently present capabilities to access service providers or Tor relays. We
first present lemmas on unlinkability.
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3.7.1 Lemmas
Lemma 1. Consider any client U ∈ NT . By colluding with each other, both the
AAs and a service providerW gain only negligible advantage over random guess-
ing when trying to link a specific site access V using Tor with the client U.
Proof. We start the proof with the following denotations. Let V denote a site
access toW initiated by the clientU using Tor. Let C denote the service-specific
capability that U sends to W to support the access V. Let P denote the pre-
capability used by U to compute C.
Since the clientU can use Tor to connect to the AAs when requesting the pre-
capability P, in the ideal case, U is unlinkable with P. However, to ensure that
our lemma still holds in the worst case when Tor’s unlinkability is broken by ad-
versaries, we assume the AA that issuesP can linkPwith the clientU. Thus, the
service providerW and other AAs can have such linkability as well by colluding
with the AA.
Next, we prove the lemma by contradiction. Assume that the AAs andW can
design an algorithm K that enables the AAs and W to link site access V with
the client U. Since the site access V is linkable with the capability C (as C is
presented for the access V) and the client U is linkable with the pre-capability
P (based on the above assumption), designing algorithmK is equivalent to de-
signing an algorithmK′ that enables the AAs andW to link the capabilityCwith
the pre-capability P.
InTorPolice’s design,P is the blinded message signed by an AA (i.e., the blind-
signer), and C is the unblinded version of P produced by a secret factor un-
known to the blind-signer. Thus, the problem of designing K′ to link P with
C is the same as designing an algorithm K′′ that allows a blind-signer to link
the blinded message it signs to the unblinded message without knowing the
secret factor, which is impossible in a blind signature [73, 80]. This contradic-
tion proves that the hypothetical algorithm K does not exist, indicating both
AAs and W gain only negligible advantages of linking V with U via collusion.
We clarify this lemma does not claim that colluding among multiple entities
does not pose a risk; it only proves that TorPolice does not introduce any fur-
ther risk.
Using the similar reduction proof as Lemma 1, we can prove the following
lemma.
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Lemma 2. Consider any client U ∈ NT . By colluding with each other, both the
AAs and Tor relays gain only negligible advantage over random guessing when
trying to link a specific relay access with U.
3.7.2 Information Leakage Analysis
We now analyze the information leakage to an arbitrary service providerW us-
ing degree of anonymity [81, 82]. The analysis uses information-theoretic en-
tropy [83] as the measure of information contained in a probability distribu-
tion. Recall that NT denote the set of TorPolice-enhanced clients. Given an ar-
bitrary capability-enhanced site access,W believes that with probability pi the
access originates from client i inNT , i.e.,Wmaintains a probability distribution
I for anonymous accesses. Then, the entropy (i.e., the information contained
in the distribution I ) is HW =−∑i∈NT pi · log2(pi ).
Based on Lemma 1, we have pi = 1NT , where NT is the size of the anonymity
setNT . Thus, the entropy of the Tor network after introducingTorPolice is HW =
log2 NT .
Next, we analyze the system entropy before introducing TorPolice. Let N de-
note the entire set of anonymous Tor users. Before introducing TorPolice, the
maximum entropy HM of the Tor network in which the set of anonymous users
Nmay accessW is HM = log2 N , where N is the size of the anonymity setN.
Thus, based on the definition in [81, 82], the degree of anonymity d after in-
troducing TorPolice is
d = 1− HM −HW
HM
= log2 NT
log2 N
. (3.7)
Since Tor clients connect to the AAs using Tor, from the perspective of the
AAs and W, the anonymous set remains the same after introducing TorPolice,
i.e., NT =N. Thus, we have d = 1 based on Equation (3.7), proving that there is
no information leakage to the service providerW after introducing TorPolice.
The above information leakage analysis is equally applicable to Tor relays and
the AAs since same as the W, neither of them can link a particular capability
spending with a specific Tor client inNT (as stated in Lemma 2).
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3.8 Implementation
We now present the full implementation of TorPolice.
3.8.1 Capability Implementation
We implement capability-related computation using C, Python and JavaScript
to consider various usage scenarios. For instance, the capability design can be
directly built into the Tor software written in C (as shown in Section 3.8.4), or it
can be implemented as a plugin for the Tor browser, which executes capability-
related computation in JavaScript (as shown in Section 3.8.2). Websites may
compute capabilities using any language. Thus, we use Python as an example
due to its popularity in web applications.
We use the RSA algorithm to perform capability-related cryptographic op-
erations such as blind signing. The C implementation uses the OpenSSL li-
brary [84] and the Python implementation imports the PyCrypto module [85].
Since no standardized JavaScript library for computing blind signatures is
available, we develop our own library based on crypto-js [86] and BigInt [87],
two libraries that allow us to perform computation (e.g., modulo) for very large
prime numbers in JavaScript. We benchmark the capability computation over-
head in Section 3.9.1.
3.8.2 AA Implementation
For an AA accepts CAPTCHAs as capability seeds (referred to as CAA), we imple-
ment it as a web server that deploys Google’s reCAPTCHA [75] service. For an AA
accepts computational puzzles (referred to as PAA), it accepts puzzle solutions
over HTTP requests. These AA servers define a customized HTTP header (X-
Capability) to carryTorPolice-related cryptographic tokens such as pseudonyms
and pre-capabilities. To make the implementation transparent to clients (i.e.,
no client-end network stack modifications are required), the AA servers add X-
Capability in the Access-Control-Allow-Headers HTTP header option.
Although the PAA can be accessed using native HTTP libraries, the CAA needs
to be accessed using browsers. Thus, we implement a Firefox add-on (referred
to asCapJS) to executeTorPolice-related cryptographic operations in browsers.
In real-world deployment, the add-on should be developed by trusted entities
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The CAA Client (CapJS) Site
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: 
X-Capability
Validate the pseudonym
Unblind the pre-capability
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: 
X-Capability
Validate the capability
Response
HTTP(s) Request X-Capability: S | n | Ts | F | SA
AJAX GET X-Capability: I | {S | n | Ts | F}b
AJAX Response data: {S | n | Ts | F}b | SbA
Figure 3.2: Site access by a client with CapJS installed.
(e.g., the Tor project) and signed by Mozilla so that Tor users can install it on
their Tor browsers.
CapJS Design. When a Tor client connects to a CAA server, CapJS checks
cookies to determine whether a pseudonym I issued by the CAA server is locally
cached. If so, CapJS loads {I | {S | n | ts}b} into the X-Capability header, where
{S | n | ts}b is the set of blinded information described in the pre-capability
design (Section 3.5.1). If no pseudonym is available, CapJS only loads the set of
blinded information into the X-Capability header. With this customized HTTP
header, CapJS sends an AJAX GET to the CAA server.
When receiving the AJAX request, the CAA server inspects the X-Capability
header. If a valid pseudonym is retrieved, the CAA server computes a pre-
capability for the client using the blinded information carried in the header.
Otherwise, the CAA server loads a reCAPTCHA challenge page for the client.
Once the challenge is successfully solved, the CAA server computes a pre-
capability by signing the blinded information, as well as a pseudonym for the
client. These tokens are returned to the client in a JSON object responding to
the client’s AJAX GET request.
After receiving a response from the CAA server, CapJS inspects the re-
ceived data object to retrieve the pre-capability and the pseudonym. The pre-
capability is then unblinded to produce a capability, and the pseudonym is
cached for future use.
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CircID CREATE /EXTEND Capability || Original Payload
Figure 3.3: TorPolice-enhanced Tor circuit creation.
3.8.3 TorPolice-Enhanced Site Access
To serveTorPolice-enhanced Tor clients, the deployment required at websites is
lightweight. In particular, a site needs to add X-Capability in its Access-Control-
Allow-Headers HTTP header option to allow CapJS to pass site-specific capabil-
ities in the header. Upon receiving capabilities, the site verifies them using the
rules defined in Section 3.5.3 to fulfill its access policies. Figure 3.2 depicts a
site access by a client with CapJS installed on its browser.
3.8.4 TorPolice-Enhanced Tor Circuit
We now discuss the implementation ofTorPolice-enhanced Tor circuit creation.
Tor Source Code Modification. We modify the Tor software source code to inte-
grate our capability design into Tor circuit creation. The native circuit creation
proceeds as follows. The onion proxy (OP) on a Tor client sends a CREATE cell
containing the first half of the DH handshake to a guard relay, which responds
with a CREATED cell containing the second half of the handshake. To extend
the circuit to a new relay Re , the OP sends a RELAY_EXTEND cell (specifying
the address of Re and a new secret) to the last relay Rm on the partially cre-
ated circuit. Rm copies the received information into a new CREATE cell, and
forwards the cell to Re .
To create a capability enhanced circuit, in addition to these original cells, the
OP further sends a valid relay-specific capability to each hop. In our prototype,
the OP prepends a capability to the payload of the CREATE cell when connect-
ing to the guard relay. Capabilities for subsequent relays are prepended to cor-
responding RELAY_EXTEND cells. Figure 3.3 illustrates this structure. Each
relay first verifies the received capability based on the rules defined in Sec-
tion 3.6.1 before processing the onionskin carried in the remaining payload.
Since capability verification is much cheaper than the onionskin processing,
this design saves the relay considerable compute resources for processing cir-
cuit creations without valid capabilities. Alternatively, a relay-specific capabil-
ity can be carried via a customized cell. In this case, the cell should be sent
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together with the CREATE cell (or RELAY_EXTEND cell) to avoid additional
RTTs.
To validate our implementation, we test the modified Tor source code in
Shadow [88], a safe development environment to run real Tor source code in
a private Tor network. Via log analysis, our test experiments show that our im-
plementation properly embeds relay-specific capabilities into the workflow of
Tor circuit creation.
Live Tor Interaction. Since live Tor relays do not run our modified Tor source
code, we cannot create TorPolice-enhanced circuits directly through live Tor
relays. Thus, we implement another prototype to interact with live Tor relays,
as detailed in Section A.3.
3.9 Evaluation
In this section, we present a detailed evaluation for TorPolice to demonstrate
the following.
TorPolice Introduces Small System Overhead. We show that capability-
related operations introduce small overhead compared with the typical Tor cir-
cuit creation latency (Section 3.9.1). Further, we show that the deployment
overhead of the AAs is small. For instance, the AAs collectively need only 11
cores to support the entire set of current Tor users (Section 3.9.2).
TorPolice Effectively Enforces Site-Defined Policies. We demonstrate that
TorPolice allows a site to effectively enforce its access policies on anonymous
Tor users, i.e., the site can bound service request rate by any strategic adversary
via self-defined parameters (Section 3.9.3).
TorPolice Mitigates Various Abuses Against Tor. Based on real data collected
by Tor, we demonstrate TorPolice can mitigate large-scale C&C abuse and pre-
vent cell flooding attacks against the Tor network (Section 3.9.4).
3.9.1 Capability Computation Overhead
In this section, we benchmark the overhead of capability-related computation
in C, Python and JavaScript on our testbed. All results are obtained using a sin-
gle 3.30 GHz Intel i3-3120 core. We perform 10,000 runs to learn the mean, me-
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Table 3.1: The computational time (in microseconds) for capability-related
operations.
Operation Mean Median Std. Dev. Language
Generation
232.0 232.0 0.1 C
253.7 253.6 0.3 Python
27,320.0 27,240.0 245.5 JavaScript
Verification
25.6 25.6 0.0 C
32.0 32.0 0.1 Python
355.5 354.3 5.3 JavaScript
Blinding
3.5 3.5 0.0 C
46.3 46.3 0.1 Python
18.1 18.1 0.3 JavaScript
Unblinding
2.4 2.4 0.0 C
7.0 7.0 0.0 Python
64.8 64.7 6.8 JavaScript
dian, and standard deviation of the computation times for a single capability
generation, verification, information blinding and unblinding. Results shown
in Table 3.1 are obtained when the RSA key length is 1024. The overall com-
putational overhead is small. For instance, it takes an AA ∼230 microseconds
in C to compute a pre-capability. And a single capability verification takes ∼25
microseconds in C. A blinding and an unblinding operation by Tor clients can
be finished in about three and two microseconds, respectively, in C. The im-
plementations in C and Python have comparable performance. Although it is
more expensive to perform signing and verifying in JavaScript, the overhead of
blinding and unblinding operations (performed by Tor clients) in JavaScript is
comparable with other languages. The AAs, relays and service providers can
adopt more efficient languages such as C and Python.
3.9.2 Deployment Overhead of the AAs
In this section, we evaluate the deployment overhead of the AAs. We first esti-
mate the compute resources needed by the AAs to support pre-capability issu-
ing for all Tor users. Then we evaluate the pre-capability issuing latency using
the AAs deployed on our testbed.
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Figure 3.4: Figure 3.4(a) shows the number of cores required to prevent the
AAs from being flooded. Figure 3.4(b) plots pre-capability release latency
benchmarked on our testbed.
Collective Compute Resources Needed. To estimate compute resources re-
quired from the AAs, we need to estimate the amount of pre-capability requests
from all Tor clients. Recall that each AA server maintains two rate limiters for
issuing pre-capabilities: r for issuing site-specific pre-capabilities and q for is-
suing relay-specific pre-capabilities (Section 3.4.2). We estimate r and q using
the live Tor measurement results in [79]. In particular, during a 10-minute inter-
val, PrivCount [79] estimates that each Tor client opens about 24 TCP streams
and four circuits. Further, PrivCount [79] counts about 710,000 unique clients
during a 10-minute interval. Combing these, we estimate the collective pre-
capability request rate from all Tor clients is about 44,000 per second. Since it
takes one core 0.23 milliseconds to issue one pre-capability, the AAs collectively
need about 11 cores to support the entire set of current Tor users.
In practice, the AAs should be over-provisioned to prevent an adversary from
flooding them via massive pre-capability requests. We clarify that such flooding
attack aims to exhaust the AAs’ compute resources rather than their network
bandwidth (bandwidth-oriented DDoS attacks can be prevented by hosting the
AAs on well-provisioned cloud [89]). Figure 3.4(a) plots the number of cores
required in order to withstand different-sized botnets. The results show that
the AAs need about 100 cores to withstand a five-million node botnet.
Pre-Capability Release Latency. We now evaluate pre-capability release la-
tency using the AAs deployed on our testbed (Section 3.8.2). We define the pre-
capability release latency as the time required for an AA server to process a pre-
capability request, excluding networking latency and other user-introduced la-
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tency (e.g., the time required for solving challenges). We provision eight servers
on our physical testbed as AA servers in this experiment. We double-threaded
each AA server so that the eight AA servers collectively have 16 cores. To em-
ulate pre-capability requests from the entire set of Tor clients, we develop a
requester that generate requests at the rate of 44,000 per second. To send each
request, the requester randomly picks one of the eight AA servers. The results,
plotted in Figure 3.4(b), show that the pre-capability release latency is less than
few milliseconds, which is over two orders of magnitude smaller than the typi-
cal Tor circuit creation time (about 0.7s based on our live Tor measurements in
Section A.3).
3.9.3 Enforcing Site-Defined Policies
In this section, we demonstrate that TorPolice enables a site to enforce site-
defined access policies on anonymous Tor clients: i.e., a site can bound a strate-
gic adversary’s service request rate using self-defined parameters.
Access Policies. For simplicity, we assume that the site assigns equal weights
to both types of capability seeds, i.e., c0 (for CAPTCHAs) and c1 (for puzzles) in
Equation (3.4) are the same. However, the actual costs, denoted by c ′0 and c
′
1,
can be different from c0 and c1. Further, base on the measurements in [90, 91],
we assume c ′0 is close to λ (the cost for obtaining one network identity).
We evaluate three strategies that a site may use to define its access policies.
The first strategy (referred to as basic strategy) is that the site accepts all Tor
requests with valid capabilities. In the second strategy (referred to as rate lim-
iting strategy), the site enforces a maximum service request rate rmax for all
Tor requests with valid capabilities. In the third strategy, besides rate limit-
ing, the site further performs weighted fair queuing (WFQ) to serve requests:
rather than serving all valid requests in one FIFO queue, requests with capabil-
ities obtained using CAPTCHA solutions and puzzle solutions are served in two
separate FIFO queues weighted equally. The third strategy (referred to as WFQ
strategy) prevents one type of seed from overwhelming the other one.
Policy Enforcement. We now study an adversary’s service request rate through
Tor when it invests a certain amount of money on acquiring capability seeds.
Define k = c ′0/c ′1. We first present the evaluation results for k = 0.5 in Figure 3.5
and then extend our discussion to arbitrary k. For any amount of investment,
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Figure 3.5: TorPolice enables a site to bound an adversary’s service request rate
using self-defined parameter ². E0 is the adversary’s cost at the point of
diminishing returns.
the adversary’s service request rate through Tor (denoted by ra) is normalized
to the service request rate obtained when the adversary connects to the site
directly without using Tor.
Since c ′0 < c ′1 given k = 0.5, the adversary’s optimal strategy is spending all
investment on CAPTCHA solving. Thus, we have ra = ², where ² is the site-
configurable parameter defined in Equation (3.3). When the site adopts the
basic strategy, ra remains the same as the adversary increases its investment.
However, for the other two strategies, ra will reach a point of diminishing re-
turns as the adversary’s investment further increases (as shown in Figure 3.5).
In particular, when the site adopts the rate limiting strategy, the point of dimin-
ishing returns is reached when the collective service request rate from the ad-
versary and all legitimate Tor clients exceeds rmax. In Figure 3.5, we denote the
adversary’s cost at this point by 2E0. After that, further increasing investment
actually reduces ra since no more Tor requests are allowed by the site.
When the WFQ strategy is adopted, ra experiences two points of diminishing
returns as the adversary’s cost increases, as shown in Figure 3.5. The first one
happens when the collective service request rate from all Tor clients using the
optimal seed (CAPTCHAs in our evaluation) exceeds rmax2 . After this point, the
adversary has to use sub-optimal seeds in order to further get services. As a
result, ra starts to decline from the optimal rate ². The second point of dimin-
ishing returns is reached when the collective Tor-emitted service request rate
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exceeds rmax.
General Results. Our further analysis (deferred in Section A.4) proves that for
any k, ra ≤ ² if k ≤ 1 and ra ≤ k · ² if k ≥ 1. Thus, regardless of the actual cost of
obtaining capability seeds, the adversary’s service request rate is bounded by
Θ(²). This result holds no matter which strategy the site adopts and how many
types of capability seeds are accepted by TorPolice.
3.9.4 Mitigating Abuse Against Tor
In this section, we perform Tor-scale evaluations to demonstrate the following.
(i) TorPolice effectively mitigates large-scale botnet C&C abuse against Tor by
reducing circuit failure ratios by∼74% (Section 3.9.4.1) and (ii) TorPolice signif-
icantly increases Tor’s resilience against cell flooding attacks that aim to para-
lyze Tor via excessive circuit creations (Section 3.9.4.2).
Tor-Scale Simulator. We aim to show that TorPolice is able to mitigate the
harm that a multi-million botnet can do on Tor. While we do have a TorPolice
implementation that runs on Shadow [88] (see Section 3.8.4), we would run into
scalability issues with simulating millions of Tor clients. Further, Shadow is un-
able to help us simulate the cryptographic overhead that botnets would impose
on Tor relays [92]. Due to these shortcomings, we developed our own simula-
tor. We faithfully implement Tor’s path selection algorithm [93] and validate
the correctness of our implementation by comparing relays’ selection proba-
bility with the ones published by Tor Atlas [94]. We sampled the computational
capacity of relays from Barbera et al.’s work that was based on live Tor measure-
ments [69].
3.9.4.1 Mitigating Botnet C&C Abuse
In this section, we study the botnet C&C abuse that happened during Aug-Sep
2013, when Tor’s daily estimated users rapidly increased from one million to six
million. We show that Tor clients experienced very high circuit creation fail-
ure rates when Tor was under this abuse. Then we show TorPolice effectively
mitigates such abuse.
Circuit Creation Failure Rate. We use the data collected by Tor to estimate
the amounts of circuit creations initiated by the botnet during the C&C abuse.
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To improve readability, we defer the detailed modeling to Section A.5. Due to
the massive circuit creations by the botnet, compute resources of many relays
are exhausted, resulting in very high circuit creation failure rates, as depicted
in Figure 3.6. Such high failure rates are caused by the following vicious cycle.
When the abuse starts, Tor relays begin to drop requests due to the lack of com-
pute resources. These initial failures force the bot clients to continuously send
requests until their circuits are successfully created, which further increases the
network load. The resulting consequences are that the botnet still managed to
use Tor as its primary C&C channel after numerous trials whereas Tor is less us-
able for legitimate Tor users since it could require tens of trials before a circuit
is finally created, resulting a high user-perceived latency.
Mitigating Botnet Abuse in Tor. The root cause of such high circuit creation
failure rates is that bot clients deviate from typical Tor usage pattern, i.e.,
they initiate numerous circuit creation requests without any limitation. As de-
scribed in Section 3.6.1, TorPolice allows Tor to explicitly control the circuit cre-
ation by Tor clients. Thus, to counter this abuse, TorPolice sets its access poli-
cies qi so that the maximum rate at which a client can create circuits is four per
ten minutes (aligned with live Tor measurements in [79]). We plot the result-
ing circuit creation failure rates after enforcing the access policies in Figure 3.6.
Clearly, TorPolice effectively eases the network load and reduces the average
failure rate from ∼41% to ∼10%, a ∼74% reduction.
In response to the C&C abuse, the Tor project released a new version
(0.2.4.17-rc) that prioritizes the processing of onionskins using the tnor [95]
protocol since the bot clients used an older version without tnor support. Tor’s
countermeasure reduced the circuit failure ratio to about 20% [68]. We clarify
that a strategic botnet could circumvent Tor’s defense by changing adaptively
(e.g., upgrading software). However, TorPolice offers long-term countermea-
sures that can handle strategic botnets.
3.9.4.2 Mitigating Tor-Targeted DDoS Attacks
As noted in [61], a general concern of attacking a botnet by Tor in case of abuse
(e.g., by blacklisting its hidden servers) is that it may lead to retaliation. For in-
stance, a botnet can easily paralyze Tor via excessive circuit creation requests.
According to Tor design [93], a Tor client drops its current guard relay when
circuit failure rate measured by the client is above 30%. Via massive circuit
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Figure 3.6: Circuit creation failure rates when Tor faced a multi-million node
botnet C&C abuse. TorPolice can reduce the average failure rate by ∼74%.
creation requests, an adversary can easily exhaust computation resources of
the entire set of relays, driving in circuit failure ratios much higher than this
threshold. Figure 3.7 demonstrates this vulnerability: a moderate-sized botnet
with hundreds of thousands of bots is enough to cause very high circuit failure
ratios. When Tor is protected by TorPolice, however, even a multi-million node
botnet can only cause very limited failure rates for the current Tor network (rep-
resented by the consensus published on May 1, 2017).
3.10 Related Work
In this section, we discuss closely related work.
Capabilities in the Internet. Capability schemes ([11–13, 16, 89]) have been
proposed to protect the Internet from DDoS attacks. In these approaches,
capabilities specify certain traffic policing rules and meanwhile carry crypto-
graphic signatures to ensure correctness. Victims (e.g., servers or congested
routers) police traffic based on received capabilities to stop attacks. Different
from TorPolice, Internet capability designs do not consider privacy. Further,
some of these capability schemes are difficult to deploy since they require mod-
ification of Internet core and client network stack. On the contrary, TorPolice is
readily deployable in Tor with small overhead.
Anonymous Blacklisting Systems. Anonymous blacklisting systems [96] al-
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Figure 3.7: Without TorPolice, a moderate-sized adversary can paralyze Tor via
cell flooding attacks. TorPolice can effectively mitigate this vulnerability.
low service providers to maintain a “blacklist” to explicitly block abusive
users while serving non-abusive users without breaking anonymity. Anony-
mous blacklisting systems can be categorized into three broad groups: the
pseudonym systems [77, 78, 97–99], the Nymble-like systems [100–104],
and the revocable anonymous credential systems based on zero-knowledge
proofs [105–107]. These systems either offer pseudonymity instead of full
anonymity or require a trusted or semi-trusted authority to provide anonymity.
TorPolice is not designed to be a new anonymous blacklisting system. Rather,
TorPolice is explicitly designed for Tor, focusing on proposing a capability-
based access control framework that allows service providers and Tor to enforce
access rules to throttle various botnet abuses while still serving legitimate Tor
users properly. Further, TorPolice’s trust is more distributed since its AAs are
fully distributed and each of them only has a partial view of the entire system.
Relay Incentives. Tor relay incentive mechanisms [108–111] are proposed to
recruit more relays for the Tor network. Gold Star [108], BRAIDS [109] and
LIRA [110] incentivize Tor clients to relay anonymous traffic by offering them
prioritized Tor services. TorPath [111] instead pays relays Bitcoins. By allow-
ing relays to redeem their received relay-specific capabilities for various bene-
fits, TorPolice provides a general framework to support these incentive mech-
anisms. For instance, to support the similar incentive mechanism in [109], a
relay R can redeem its received generic capabilities to obtain “prioritized relay-
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specific capabilities” from the AAs. Then R, as a client, can subsequently spend
these prioritized capabilities to create premium Tor circuits to get premium ser-
vices.
3.11 Chapter Summary
This chapter presents TorPolice, the first privacy-preserving access control
framework that allows service providers and Tor to enforce self-selectable ac-
cess policies on anonymous Tor connections so as to throttle various botnet
abuses while still providing service to legitimate Tor users. TorPolice leverages
blindly signed network capabilities to preserve the privacy of Tor users. We im-
plement a prototype ofTorPolice, and perform extensive evaluations to validate
TorPolice’s design goals.
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CHAPTER 4
ENABLING WORK-CONSERVING
BANDWIDTH GUARANTEES FOR
MULTI-TENANT DATACENTERS VIA
DYNAMIC TENANT-QUEUE BINDING
4.1 Introduction
Sharing the network of multi-tenant datacenters has been a critical theme for
public clouds. The two primary objectives, among others, are bandwidth guar-
antees and work conservation. Bandwidth guarantees ensure predictable lower
bound network performance for tenant applications. Recent studies show that,
without bandwidth guarantees, network performance can experience 5x or
more variations, leading to poor application performance [112]. Work conser-
vation enables a tenant to use spare bandwidth beyond its minimum guarantee
to further improve its application performance as well as boost provider net-
work utilization. Given that datacenter traffic is bursty in nature and that the
average network utilization is low [113–115], work conservation can deliver over
10x additional bandwidth to a tenant VM upon its minimum guarantee [116].
However, it is hard to achieve both bandwidth guarantees and work conser-
vation simultaneously. Prior works such as Oktopus [112] and SecondNet [117]
can achieve bandwidth guarantees, but they are not work-conserving. Sea-
wall [118] and NetShare [119] achieve work conservation, but they do not pro-
vide bandwidth guarantees (more details in Section 2.9).
ElasticSwitch [116] takes the first step toward achieving both properties at
the same time. It is an endhost based solution that first needs to translate
per-VM hose-model bandwidth guarantees into VM-to-VM pair rate limiters
(referred as Guarantee Partitioning, GP), and then dynamically allocates spare
bandwidth to these VM pairs to achieve high utilization (referred as Rate Allo-
cation, RA). However, this approach confronts two challenges. First, as tenant
applications are typically agnostic to network operators, it is difficult for GP to
accurately capture the real communication patterns among VMs. Second, to
detect spare bandwidth, RA needs to probe the network by increasing rates,
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which causes a tradeoff between accurately providing bandwidth guarantees
and being work conserving [116, 120]: a conservative RA sacrifices work con-
servation, while an aggressive RA affects other tenants’ bandwidth guarantees
(see experiments in Appendix B).
Trinity [120] moves one step further to complement ElasticSwitch with sim-
ple in-network support. It exploits two priority queues in switches to segregate
and prioritize the bandwidth guarantee traffic over work conservation traffic, so
that aggressive RA of one tenant does not affect bandwidth guarantees of oth-
ers. Trinity addresses the second challenge of ElasticSwitch as it eliminates the
tradeoff, but it still inherits the challenge of GP since it still relies on endhost
rate limiters to perform bandwidth guarantees and work conservation. Fur-
thermore, it incurs additional issues such as packet reordering and starvation
due to traffic segregation and priority queuing.
This thesis introduces QShare, a comprehensive in-network solution to ad-
dress the above challenges. Instead of using two priority queues to segregate
traffic for two different types, QShare directly leverages multiple weighted fair
queues (WFQs) to slice network bandwidth for tenants. This ensures that (i)
bandwidth guarantees are achieved through proper queue weight configura-
tion and tenant placement rather than endhost rate limiters, thus relieving
us of GP; (ii) the network link is driven to full utilization instantly as long as
one tenant has sufficient demand; (iii) no matter how aggressively a tenant
transmits, bandwidth guarantees of other tenants are not affected as they are
served in separate weighted queues; and (iv) no packet reordering or starvation
arises. While promising, QShare faces a practical challenge of queue scarcity—
the number of queues on a commodity switch port (typically 8) can be less than
the number of tenants served by this port (see Section 4.7.3.1 for details).
To address this challenge, we make the following observation: although the
total number of embedded tenants associating with a port may be large, dur-
ing a short time interval (e.g., a few seconds), the number of concurrent ten-
ants whose traffic demands exceed their bandwidth guarantees is small. This
is also reflected by the measurement results in production datacenters, where
the average link utilization is low [113–115]. Thus, to support more tenants with
limited queues, QShare dynamically assigns dedicated queues for tenants with
higher demands than their guarantees, while serving low-demanded tenants in
a shared queue altogether.
QShare mainly contains two modules: a balanced tenant placement module
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and a dynamic tenant-queue binding module (Section 4.3). The tenant place-
ment module is responsible for allocating network resources to tenants to pro-
vide bandwidth guarantees. To facilitate the dynamic queue allocation for em-
bedded tenants, our placement also tries to balance the usage of switch ports
among tenants to avoid overwhelming certain ports. The tenant-queue bind-
ing module then takes into account the traffic demands of tenants and their
payment factors to dynamically distribute queue resources among tenants.
We implement a prototype of QShare with ∼2000 lines of code (C for Linux
kernel space and Python for user space), and perform extensive evaluations on
testbed and via simulations. Our results suggest that:
• Without sacrificing bandwidth guarantees, QShare achieves (i) perfect
work conservation given correct prediction on demand trends (not the
exact demand), and (ii) over 91% link utilization given completely unpre-
dictable demands.
• Given the above desirable properties, QShare significantly benefits appli-
cations, for instance, by reducing their flow completion times (FCTs) by
up to 50% compared with the state-of-the-art [116, 120].
• With production datacenter settings, QShare can assign dedicated
queues to ∼90% of all embedded tenants even when the datacenter is
fully reserved, yielding at least 3x throughput gain over the guarantees
and better efficiency in link utilization.
4.2 Background And Motivation
4.2.1 Background
In multi-tenant datacenters [112, 117, 121, 122], a conceptually centralized ten-
ant manager with global view of the datacenter state is responsible for man-
aging all tenants, including tenant embedding, routing updates, logging, fail-
ure handling and recovery and so forth. By designing various components for
the tenant manager, datacenter operators are able to achieve self-interested
goals, such as accommodating more tenants and achieving efficient resource
utilization. QShare can be viewed as a newly designed component in the tenant
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Figure 4.1: Figure 4.1(a) shows the tenant (VM) bandwidth guarantees defined
in a symmetric hose model. Figure 4.1(b) shows the bandwidth reservation on
each link after embedding the tenant: R1=min{B1+B2,B3+B4};
R2=min{B3,B1+B2+B4}; R3=min{B4,B1+B2+B3}.
manager to simultaneously accomplish the following two desirable properties:
bandwidth guarantees and work conservation.
Network bandwidth guarantees are preferable properties in cloud comput-
ing to offer tenants predicable performance. A typical way to model bandwidth
guarantees is the hose model [112, 116, 121, 123–126]. As an illustrative exam-
ple, Figure 4.1(a) shows a tenant A’s bandwidth guarantees defined in a hose
model, and Figure 4.1(b) illustrates the reserved bandwidth on each physical
link to satisfy the bandwidth guarantees after tenant embedding. For simplic-
ity, a symmetric hose model is plotted in Figure 4.1. Providing accurate band-
width guarantees for VMs that can use multiple paths is an open problem since
it requires a perfect load balancer to accurately distribute each VM’s traffic over
multiple paths such that the sum of guarantee on each path equals to the to-
tal amount of guaranteed bandwidth. As a result, prior proposals for provid-
ing bandwidth guarantees are either within the scope of tree-based network
topology [112, 116, 117] or confining each tenant’s traffic within a tree in multi-
path network topologies [5, 121]. QShare belongs to the second category as
typical datacenters (e.g., fattree [127]) are built with path redundancy. QShare,
however, can still fully utilizes the redundant network links via balanced tenant
placement.
Work conservation is desired for achieving efficient resource utilization. For-
mally, in the context of multi-tenant datacenters, work conservation is defined
as follows: for any link L in the network, as long as there exists at least one ten-
ant that has packets to send along link L, L cannot have spare bandwidth [124].
We note that work-conservation does not guarantee that there are no idle links
in the network. Idle links may exist due to the lack of traffic demands or high-
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demanded tenants are bottlenecked by other links.
4.2.2 State-of-the-Art Solutions
ElasticSwitch [116] makes the first attempt to achieve work-conserving band-
width guarantees. It is an end-host based solution composed of two modules:
a Guarantee Partitioning (GP) module that divides VM X ’s hose-model guaran-
tee into guarantees to/from each other VM that X communicates with, and a
Rate Allocation (RA) module that assigns spare bandwidth to these VM pairs to
achieve high network utilization. However, it suffers from the following two key
challenges.
First, since the traffic matrix (TM) among the VMs of a tenant is typically ag-
nostic, GP has to gradually learn each VM-pair’s demand via periodic source-
destination VM coordination and throughput measurement. Whenever the TM
changes, GP needs to re-estimate the TM even if per-VM demand remains the
same (see illustrative example in Section B). Given highly bursty and dynamic
TM in datacenters, it is challenging for the GP to capture the real communi-
cation pattern and estimate the TM correctly, especially considering that tens
of thousands of VMs can produce billions of VM pairs. Further, at such scale,
the overhead of maintaining these VM-pair rate limiters at hypervisors is non-
negligible [116].
Second, RA in ElasticSwitch [116] aims to grab available network band-
width beyond the provided guarantees. It probes the network by increasing
rates, detects congestion via packets losses or ECN, and then allocates the
spare bandwidth to VM pairs in max-min fashion following weighted TCP al-
gorithms [118, 128]. As mentioned in [116, 120], it has a tradeoff between ac-
curately providing bandwidth guarantees and being work-conserving: aggres-
sive RA could affect other tenants’ guarantees whereas conservative RA ends up
with bandwidth waste. In practice, RA’s performance depends on the parame-
ter choice and system tuning.
Trinity [120] moves one step further to complement the endhost based Elas-
ticSwitch with simple in-network support. It exploits two priority queues in
switches to segregate and prioritize the bandwidth guarantee traffic over work
conservation traffic. As a result, VMs can send work-conservation traffic more
aggressively without affecting bandwidth guarantees of others. Thus, Trinity
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Figure 4.2: Compared with pure endhost-based solution, QShare achieves
perfect (no tradeoff) work-conserving bandwidth guarantees via in-network
support.
achieves work conservation in a static context, i.e., the demand of each VM-
pair is a priori knowledge. However, it inherits the challenges of GP in dynamic
context since it still needs to translate per-VM bandwidth guarantees into VM-
pair rate limiters on hypervisors. Further, since network traffic is segregated
and served with strict priorities, Trinity raises packet reordering and starvation
issues in practice.
4.3 QShare Overview
QShare is a comprehensive in-network solution to address the above chal-
lenges. Instead of using two priority queues to segregate traffic for two different
types, QShare directly leverages multiple weighted fair queues (WFQs)1 to slice
network bandwidth for tenants. This enables QShare to provide tenant-level
bandwidth guarantees and work conservation (instead of rigid VM-to-VM pair
level as in both ElasticSwitch [116] and Trinity [120]), thus leaving tenant appli-
cations full flexibility to use the allocated bandwidth as needed. We note that
such tenant-level bandwidth guarantees are also used in [112, 129], but they fail
to achieve work conservation.
1The WFQ is emulated by WRR on some types of switches.
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Figure 4.3: Three illustrative examples for QShare’s design. Figure 4.3(a) shows
that QShare incorporates the in-network WFQ support. Thus, tenants A and B
sharing the link L are served in two separate weighted queues. Figure 4.3(b)
shows that QShare’s tenant placement algorithm balances the usage of switch
ports among the embedded tenants. Figure 4.3(c) shows that assigning a
dedicated queue for tenant A with sufficient traffic demand achieves perfect
work conservation. Meanwhile, tenant B and C’s bandwidth guarantees are
immediately satisfied once they become active.
4.3.1 In-Network Support
WFQ on commodity switches offers desirable in-network support for achieving
work-conserving bandwidth guarantees. We use the following experiment to
demonstrate its benefit. We place two tenants A and B, both provisioned with
10 VMs, on our testbed. Each tenant’s VMs are evenly distributed across two
racks connected by a core link with one Gbps capacity. As A and B share the
core link L, their flows are served in two separate queues whose weights are
configured proportionally to their guaranteed bandwidth on the link (Figure
4.3(a)).
Consider a case where both A and B adopt the same symmetric hose model,
in which each VM is guaranteed 50 Mbps bandwidth. Thus, both tenants have
250 Mbps guaranteed bandwidth on the core link. To generate traffic, each VM
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in one rack is configured to communicate with randomly selected VMs, using
our client/server program described in Section 4.7. Each VM’s demand and its
communication pattern are completely random. Only intra-tenant communi-
cation is considered. We measure the amount of core-link bandwidth utilized
by each tenant. As plotted in Figure 4.2(a), without relying on any TM estima-
tion, QShare achieves perfect work-conserving bandwidth guarantees without
imposing packet reordering or starvation issues. We repeat the experiment us-
ing self-implemented prototype of ElasticSwitch. As illustrated in Figure 4.2(b),
we notice a significant gap (over 300 Mbps) between the aggregate bandwidth
of A and B and the link capacity, i.e., over 60% of the unreserved bandwidth is
wasted. We are aware that ElasticSwitch’s performance depends on parameter
settings. We consider different settings in Appendix B.
4.3.2 Design Overview
The key challenge of QShare is to address the problem of queue scarcity: the
number of queues on each switch port (typically 8) can be less than the num-
ber of tenants served by this port so that we cannot allocate a dedicated queue
for each tenant. To address this challenge, QShare designs two modules: a bal-
anced tenant placement module and a dynamic tenant-queue binding module.
The placement module first seeks to provision tenant network to ensure
bandwidth guarantees. Further, it balances the usage of switch ports among
tenants to reduce the stress of performing the dynamic queue allocation in
the binding module. For instance, if both placements in Figure 4.3(b) satisfy
bandwidth guarantees,QShareprefers the one on the right side since the switch
ports (and their queues) are more evenly utilized by the tenants.
The tenant-queue binding module dynamically assigns dedicated queues
to tenants whose demands are higher than their guaranteed bandwidth, and
meanwhile serves all the low-demanded tenants in a shared queue (they may
employ ElasticSwitch-like rate allocation to improve the worst case perfor-
mance, as explained below). As a result, tenants in dedicated queues can burst
their traffic in arbitrary communicate patterns without affecting other tenants.
This design is the key to avoid the challenging GP and to eliminate the tradeoff
between bandwidth guarantees and work conservation in the endhost based
solutions [116, 120]. We perform an experiment to show this. Consider that
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Figure 4.4: The architecture of QShare.
three tenants A, B and C compete on a link L with one Gbps capacity, shown
in Figure 4.3(c). Each tenant has 300 Mbps guarantee on L. Assume L can
support two queues. Suppose tenant A is high-demanded so that QShare as-
signs it a dedicated queue (with weight one) whereas B and C share a common
queue (with weight two). When onlyA is active, it fully utilizes the link capacity,
achieving work conservation. Further, B and C are not overwhelmed by A, and
immediately receive their guaranteed bandwidth once becoming active.
One challenge of the binding mechanism is how to assign right tenants dedi-
cated queues since traffic demand is dynamic. QShare addresses the challenge
as follows. First, rather than predicting traffic matrix for each tenant as pro-
posed in [116, 120], QShare’s demand prediction relies on only a scalar metric
(detailed in Section 4.5.1) of each tenant, which greatly reduces stress of predic-
tion. Second, to improve the worst case performance when traffic demand pre-
diction is inaccurate and high-demanded tenants are mistakenly placed in the
shared queue,QShare can employ ElasticSwitch for tenants in the shared queue
to achieve moderate work-conserving bandwidth guarantees in the spirit of
ElasticSwitch. Finally, we perform testbed experiments (Section 4.7.1) to quan-
tify effects of the binding mechanism: (i) the average utilization deficit caused
by binding errors is less than 9% of the total capacity; (ii) to achieve good per-
formance, it is sufficient to perform dynamic binding at more coarse time gran-
ularity (e.g., a few seconds) compared with the traffic matrix estimation per-
formed at the granularity of milliseconds in [116, 120].
We plot the system architecture in Figure 4.4. Next we briefly discuss the
components of each module, and defer their design details in Section 4.4 and
Section 4.5, respectively.
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4.3.2.1 Balanced Tenant Placement Module
The balanced tenant placement module has two components. In particular,
given a tenant request, the routing explorer (Section 4.4.1) outputs all Tenant
Routing (TR) candidates that can accommodate the tenant. The placement al-
gorithm (Section 4.4.2) evaluates each candidate to select the most desired one.
Tenant Routing (TR) Exploration. As explained in Section 4.2.1, a tenant T’s TR
is a tree in the physical network topology that connects the servers/hypervisors
hosting T’s VMs (“servers” and “hypervisors” are used interchangeably). Traffic
generated by T’s VMs is confined within its TR. Thus, the TR needs to be pro-
visioned with sufficient VM slots and network bandwidth to fulfill T’s require-
ment. TR exploration, essentially, is the topology search process that produces
a set of virtual networks (i.e., overlay trees) that can accommodate T. Admission
rules are applied here to accept new tenants only if the datacenter has sufficient
spare capacities.
TR Candidate Election. Each TR candidate is evaluated based on two criteria:
bandwidth reservation cost and queue occupation cost. Reducing bandwidth
reservation cost allows datacenters to accommodate more tenants, while the
key reason for considering the queue occupation cost is to reduce the manage-
ment stress for the dynamic tenant-queue binding module.
4.3.2.2 Dynamic Tenant-Queue Binding Module
The dynamic binding module executes periodically to distribute queues among
tenants. It is built on (i) tenant demand trend prediction (Section 4.5.1), (ii)
the queue-to-tenant allocation algorithm (Section 4.5.3) and (iii) the policy en-
forcer enforcing allocation decisions inside the network (Section 4.5.4).
Traffic Demand Trend Prediction. Based on the usage measurement in current
control interval, QShare predicts demand trends of tenants in the next interval,
i.e., whether a tenant tends to have higher demand than its guarantees in the
next interval. QShare’s prediction relies on only a scalar metric rather than the
per-VM pair traffic matrix as proposed in [116, 120].
Queue-to-Tenant Allocation. The allocation algorithm dynamically dis-
tributes queues among tenants. In case of queue scarcity, it ranks the compet-
ing tenants based on both their demands and payment. Considering payment
mitigates the problem of real demand lying by tenants.
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Policy Enforcer. The tasks of policy enforcer include performing network-
related operations (e.g., switch configuration), tagging tenant packets with
proper dscp values and running ElasticSwitch-like rate allocations at hypervi-
sors for tenants without dedicated queues.
4.4 Balanced Tenant Placement
The goals of tenant placement are (i) provisioning virtual networks for tenants
to satisfy their computation and bandwidth guarantees and (ii) balancing the
overall switch queue utilization among tenants. The placement algorithms pro-
posed in [112, 121] aim to maximize the number of accepted tenant requests,
which is an NP-hard problem similar to [123]. Different from their algorithms
that make local embedding decisions (i.e., embed a tenant immediately once a
feasible option is found), our balanced tenant placement requires global topol-
ogy investigation, i.e., evaluating all feasible options before making embedding
decisions. Thus, our placement algorithm, formulated in Algorithm 2, includes
two parts (i) TR candidate exploration and (ii) candidate election.
4.4.1 TR Candidate Exploration
We first explain TR candidate exploration in the widely adopted multi-rooted
tree datacenter topology [5, 121, 127, 130, 131]. Then, we discuss extending
such exploration to support randomly connected topology [132, 133].
Given a tenant request, Algorithm 2 explores the topology from the lowest
layer (hypervisor layer) toward the highest layer (core switch layer). At each
layer, function get_TRs_at_layer (line 7) obtains all TR options at this layer.
A layer-i TR option is a tree rooted at layer i . Its leaves are the servers reach-
able from the root using only downward paths. Then the algorithm evaluates
these TRs to produce feasible ones, called TR candidates (line 9). Generally
speaking, a TR option is feasible if it has enough capacity to accommodate the
tenant. Function evaluate_TR, detailed in Section 4.4.2, determines such fea-
sibility. If no TR candidates can be found, the algorithm continues exploration
in the next layer (line 11). Otherwise, it stops further exploration and returns
the desired TR elected from all candidates (line 15) using the criteria described
in Section 4.4.2. The early return confines tenants at the lowest possible layer to
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Algorithm 2: Balanced Tenant Placement
1 Input: A tenant request with explicit guarantees.
2 Output: The desired TR or an embedding error.
3 Main Procedure:
4 begin
5 l ayer ← 1;
6 while True do
7 T Rs ← get_TRs_at_layer(layer);
8 for T ∈ T Rs do
9 [ f easi ble,cost ]← evaluate_TR(T);
10 if feasible then T R_candi d ates.add((T, cost));
11 if T R_candi d ates is empty then
12 l ayer ← l ayer +1;
13 if l ayer > n then return False;
14 else
15 return get_desired_TR(T R_candi d ates)
16 Function: evaluate_TR(T ):
17 O A← get_optimal_allocation(T );
18 if OA is feasible then return [Tr ue, (cb ,cq )];
19 else return [F al se,null ];
avoid unnecessary network usage at higher layers. If no TR candidates can be
found after exploring the entire topology with n layers, the algorithm returns
false (line 13), indicating an embedding error due to the lack of resources.
Random Topology. To support random topology, Algorithm 2 adopts the k-
shortest path algorithm [134] to obtain a set of paths between each hypervisor
pair and then combines them to produce TR options. k, similar to l ayer in
Algorithm 2, determines TR exploration space.
4.4.2 TR Evaluation and Candidate Election
A TR option is feasible if (i) the total available VM slots from all its servers are
enough to hold the tenant’s VMs and (ii) each link of the TR has enough avail-
able capacity to satisfy the tenant’s bandwidth guarantees. Although evaluating
the first rule is straightforward, the second rule requires more investigation. In
particular, given a TR option, the amounts of bandwidth required on its links
depend on the VM locations inside the TR. Specifically, consider a homoge-
neous hose model where all VMs have the same inbound and outbound band-
width guarantee B. Given a link L of the TR, removing L breaks the TR into two
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Figure 4.5: Given the TR rooted at S1, the bandwidth required on its link
depends on VM locations inside the TR.
disjoint components. If m VMs are in one component and n VMs are in the
other one, then the bandwidth required on L is B ·min{m,n}. Figure 4.5 plots a
TR rooted at S1. For the VM location in Figure 4.5(a), the two links (S1↔H1 and
S1↔H2) both need to reserve B (min{B,4 ·B}) whereas they have to reserve 2B
for the VM location in Figure 4.5(b).
To reduce the total network bandwidth required for embedding the tenant,
function get_optimal_allocation (line 17) produces the VM location that re-
quires the least bandwidth reservation. For homogeneous hose models, the
optimal allocation is produced as follows: (i) find the server H in the TR with
the largest usable VM slots, (ii) allocate as many VMs as possible to H , (iii) up-
date the remaining network/server capacity after allocation and (iv) repeat step
one until either all VMs are allocated (indicating feasibility) or all servers in the
TR have been investigated (indicating infeasibility). The usable VM slots for
H in the TR is restricted by both the available VM slots in H and the available
bandwidth on the path from H to the TR’s root. For instance, in Figure 4.5, if we
assume the available bandwidth on link S1↔H1 is less than B, the usable VM
slots in H1 is 0, rather than four.
If the TR’s optimal allocation is feasible, it becomes a candidate for embed-
ding the tenant. Algorithm 2 then computes its bandwidth cost cb as the sum
of reserved bandwidth for the tenant on each link of the TR, and the queue oc-
cupation cost cq as the largest number of tenants served by any of the TR’s links
(line 18).
Candidate election is based on both cb and cq . Each TR candidate is associ-
ated with a cost combining cb and cq . The desired TR is the one with lowest
cost . One strategy for computing cost is assigning more weight to cq when the
datacenter load is light to prefer more balanced placement whereas assigning
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more weight to cb for heavy-loaded network to prefer the placement with fewer
bandwidth cost.
Supporting High Availability. Algorithm 2 can be extended to support high
availability [135]. In [135], the worst-case survival ratio (WCS) is defined as
the smallest fraction of VMs remaining functional during a single point failure.
Consider server as the fault domain. Given a tenant with N VMs and WCS as f ,
one server can host at most (1− f )N VMs for this tenant. By patching the con-
straint in function get_optimal_allocation, Algorithm 2 can produce TR that
satisfies the high availability requirement.
Search Complexity. The search complexity for embedding tenants depends on
the layers at which Algorithm 2 returns. In a fattree topology [127], the worse
case complexity (i.e., the algorithm returns at the core switch layer) is O(V
5
3 ),
where V is the number of nodes in the network. For topologies built with higher
over-subscription ratios than fattree, the search complexity is smaller as the
number of TR options at each layer is smaller. Further, the topology search
results can be cached to achieve long-term efficiency [136].
4.5 Tenant-Queue Binding
To support more tenants with limited number of queues, QShare’s design is in-
spired by how the working set of a process is often much smaller than the total
memory it consumes. Similarly, only tenants whose traffic demands exceed
their bandwidth guarantees need dedicated queues. Thus, there is an oppor-
tunity for QShare to dynamically allocate limited number of queues to high-
demanded tenants. In particular, QShare periodically evaluates each tenant
and allocates queues among tenants based on their scores. Each tenant’s score
encapsulates its usage factor (Section 4.5.1) and payment factor (Section 4.5.2)
so as to prioritize high-demanded and honest tenants.
4.5.1 Tenant Demand Trend Prediction
As prior works [116, 120] rely on Guarantee Partitioning (GP) to achieve band-
width guarantees, they need to predict each tenant’s traffic matrix, i.e., per VM-
pair traffic demand. However, since tenant applications are often agnostic to
network operators, it is challenging to capture the real communication patterns
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among VMs and predict traffic demand between each VM pair. On the contrary,
QShare’s tenant-queue binding module only needs to predict whether a tenant
tends to have higher demands than its guaranteed bandwidth. Thus, rather
than predicting traffic matrix, QShare proposes to use a scalar metric, usage
factor (U-factor), to indicate a tenant’s network utilization with respect to its
guaranteed bandwidth. We do not claim that U-factor is the optimal metric for
demand prediction. However, it does greatly reduce the stress of prediction by
focusing on tenant-level demand trend rather than VM-level traffic matrix.
Each tenant’s U-factor is computed per control interval. Specifically, in
each control interval, all hypervisors measure the bandwidth utilization of
their hosted VMs. As VMs can have both inbound and outbound traffic, bi-
directional bandwidth usage is considered. For instance, consider a hypervi-
sor H j hosting m VMs of a tenant T. Then T’s inbound (outbound) bandwidth
usage U ij (U
o
j ) measured by H j is the sum of inbound (outbound) bandwidth
usage from all these m VMs.
At the end of each control interval, QShare computes each tenant’s U-factor.
For tenant T, one way of computing its U-factor UT is as follows
UT =min{max
H j∈H
max{U ij ,U
o
j }
B j
,1}, (4.1)
where H is the set of hypervisors hosting T’s VMs and B j is T’s guaranteed band-
width on H j ’s network interface. If H j hosts m VMs from T (provisioned with
total N VMs), B j = B ·min{m, N−m} considering a symmetric and homoge-
neous model with per-VM guarantee B.
The design rationale of Equation (4.1) is as follows. The innermost max is
necessary as the high-demanded VMs may either send or receive large volumes
of traffic. The middle max is designed to handle many-to-one traffic pattern
in which many source VMs in remote servers are communicating with a few
destination VMs in the local server. Although source hypervisors may measure
small usage since source VMs are bottlenecked by destination VMs. T actually
has large traffic demand at these receivers. Taking the largest usage among all
hypervisors will capture such a communication pattern. Finally, the outermost
min sets a UT cap of one. We leave the exploration of other U-factor definitions
in future work.
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4.5.2 Tenant Lying Mitigation
Merely using U-factors to allocate queues has problems when tenants lie about
their real bandwidth guarantees: a tenant can deliberately request smaller
guaranteed bandwidth so as to have high U-factors. Note that no work-
conserving allocation policies can completely prevent tenants from gaining
advantages via lying, i.e., being strategy-proof [124]. To mitigate the prob-
lem caused by lying, QShare proposes to consider payment factors, along with
U-factors, when scoring tenants. Each tenant’s payment factor and its guar-
anteed bandwidth are positively correlated such that deliberately requesting
lower guarantees reduces a tenant’s score whereas exaggerating guarantees re-
quires higher payment. As designing pricing model is not the focus of this
chapter, QShare assumes, for simplicity, that a tenant’s payment factor is pro-
portional to the total guaranteed bandwidth required by its hose model.2 Thus,
given tenant T with N VMs and each VM requests guaranteed bandwidth B, its
payment factor is kN B, where k is a constant depending on the pricing model.
Simplifying UT in Equation (4.1) as min{
Um
Bm
,1}, then tenant T’s score ST is
computed as follows
ST = kN B ·UT =
k˜Um , if UT < 1kN B, otherwise. (4.2)
k˜ = kN B/Bm , where Bm is determined by the number of T’s VMs hosted by
hypervisor Hm .
Using ST as the criterion for queue allocation can mitigate problems caused
by lying. On the one hand, as ST is bounded by kN B, deliberately requesting
smaller B would result in a lower cap of ST, which is disadvantageous when
competing with other tenants. On the other hand, deliberately requesting
higher B than real demand also has problems as (i) tenant T would have to
pay more and (ii) its ST would be determined by T’s real usage rather than its
claimed guarantees if T has smaller demands than its guarantees (i.e., UT < 1).
Generally, high-demanded tenants are preferred since ST is non-decreasing as
bandwidth usage increases, which is desirable for queue allocation.
2Payment for computation resources is not considered as QShare focuses on bandwidth
management.
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Algorithm 3: Queue Allocation Algorithm
1 Input: The set of embedded tenants S.
2 Output: Tenant-queue assignment.
3 Sort the tenants in S decreasingly by their scores;
4 for T ∈ S do
5 if T has a dedicated queue then continue;
6 else if T’s TR has a spare queue then
7 enqueue_tenant(T);
8 else opportunistically_enqueue(T);
9 Update queue allocation state;
10 Queue weight computation;
11 Function: enqueue_tenant(T):
12 for L ∈ T’s TR do
13 reserved_bandwidth← B ·min{m, N −m};
14 Function: opportunistically_enqueue(T):
15 for L ∈ T’s TR do
16 get_opportunistic_queues_from_LSTs(L);
17 if T’s TR has an opportunistic queue then
18 enqueue_tenant(T);
4.5.3 Dynamic Queue Allocation
We present the queue allocation logic in Algorithm 3. A tenant is assigned a
dedicated queue only if it is assigned a dedicated queue on each link of its TR.
Otherwise, the tenant will be served in the shared queue on each link of its TR.
To prioritize tenants with higher scores, Algorithm 3 starts queue assignment
from the tenant with the highest score, breaking tie randomly (line 3).
If a tenant T already occupies a dedicated queue, it continues to hold the
queue (line 5) for the next control interval. This indicates that T maintains its
high score or owns a dedicated queue on each link of its TR due to the lack of
queue contention, which is possible due to the balanced placement (see anal-
ysis in Section 4.7.3.1).
If T is currently placed in the shared queue, Algorithm 3 determines whether
allocating T a dedicated queue is possible. To satisfy the condition on line 6,
each link of T ’s TR needs to have at least one spare queue. If positive, function
enqueue_tenant assigns T a queue on each link L of its TR (line 12).
Finally, if at least one link of T ’s TR runs out of queues, function opportunis-
tically_enqueue (line 8) opportunistically finds queues for T by preempting
queues from low-scored tenants (LSTs). Specifically, on link L without spare
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queues, the algorithm obtains an opportunistic queue occupied by a tenant T˜
such that (i) T˜ ’s score is less than T ’s score and (ii) T˜ ’s score is the smallest
among all tenants owning a queue on L (line 16). If an available queue, either
opportunistic or unoccupied, exists on each link of T ’s TR, we say that T ’s TR
has an opportunistic queue (line 17), and then enqueue T . The dequeued ten-
ants will be served in shared queues during the next control interval.
Queue allocation state is updated after handling T (line 9). Once queue al-
locations for all tenants are finished, QShare computes weight for each queue
(line 10). For a queueQi on link L, its normalized weight is the ratio of reserved
bandwidth in Qi to the total reserved bandwidth on link L. In practice, weights
need to be proportionally translated into the supported values (e.g., one to 15
on our switches).
Tenant departures will trigger state update as well. Newly arrived tenants are
served in shared queues, and will be evaluated at the end of current interval.
4.5.4 Policy Enforcer
To enforce queue allocation decisions inside the network, QShare needs to per-
form (i) packet tagging and (ii) network configuration. Packet tagging is to en-
sure that packets are served in correct queues. We use dscp tagging to achieve
this. To avoid ambiguity, the D-tenants (tenants with dedicated queues) whose
TRs share at least one common link cannot use the same dscp value. D-tenants
whose TRs are non-overlapping can reuse the same dscp value. Given that dscp
values range from zero to 63, finding the smallest possible number of dscp val-
ues in a legal assignment can be reduced to the k-coloring of a graph, which is
NP-hard [137].
To address the dscp usage concerns, we analyze the efficiency of a greedy as-
signment in large scale datacenters based on production datacenter settings.
The results show that 64 dscp values are sufficient to avoid conflict even when
the datacenter is fully reserved (see details in Section 4.7.3.1). Further, techni-
cally, it is possible to mutate dscp values on switch ports via the dscp-to-dscp
mutation map [138]. Thus, based on a dscp mapping on each port, a tenant can
use different dscp values on different ports, eliminating the static dscp value
reservation required on each link of its TR, which in turn eliminates the possi-
bility of dscp conflict.
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Network configuration involves configuring queues on each link with proper
weights and dscp values, which requires WFQ configuration on both ports of
the link. For edge links connecting servers and switches, software WFQ is re-
quired on hypervisors. To support automation, QShare designs a network ac-
tion container to perform configuration in a batch: operations on different
switches are parallelized via multi-threading so that the marginal configuration
latency is negligible.
The final part of the policy enforcer is that QShare can run ElasticSwitch-like
rate allocation mechanisms [118, 128] for tenants without dedicated queues
to provide them bandwidth guarantees and achieve moderate work conserva-
tion in the worse case when all D-tenants have insufficient demands. However,
QShare imposes smaller overhead than ElasticSwitch [116] since it only per-
forms rate allocations for tenants without dedicated queues.
4.6 Implementation
The prototype of QShare contains both user-space and kernel-space programs,
as shown in Figure 4.6. The user-space programs, executed globally, are respon-
sible for managing the whole datacenter whereas the kernel-space program,
running on each hypervisor, manages the local hypervisor. Two spaces inter-
act with each other such that queue allocation decisions are made based on
the distributed measurement reported by all hypervisors, and meanwhile the
allocation decisions are pushed back to the kernel modules for enforcement on
hypervisors. The implementation has∼2000 lines of code (Python in user space
and C in kernel space).
The user-space programs include tenant placement, queue allocation and
the network action container. The kernel-space module, built on NetFil-
ter [139], includes tenant traffic monitor, rate allocation (for tenants in shared
queues), software WFQ (for tenants with dedicated queues) and packet dscp
tagging. On each hypervisor, a user-space deamon (not plotted) based on
Netlink [140] interacts with the kernel module.
Note that implementing a hypervisor that can support all kinds of VM man-
agement is out of this chapter’s scope. Our prototype builds a simple hypervi-
sor that can support QShare-related operations, such as identifying the VMs of
each tenant.
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Figure 4.6: The software implementation of QShare.
4.7 Evaluation
Our evaluation centers around the following questions:
(i)How does traffic dynamic affectQShare’s performance? With correct pre-
dictions on demand trend (not the exact demand), QShare achieves perfect
work-conserving bandwidth guarantees: all bandwidth guarantees are satisfied
and meanwhile the bottleneck link is fully utilized (Section 4.7.1.1). Even when
demand trends are completely unpredictable, QShare drives the bottleneck link
to over 91% utilization (Section 4.7.1.2) without comprising bandwidth guaran-
tees.
(ii) How well can QShare benefit applications? Given the above desirable
properties, QShare significantly benefits applications, for instance, by reducing
their flow completion times (FCTs) by up to 50% compared with the state-of-
the-art solutions [116, 120] (Section 4.7.2).
(iii) How well can QShare manage large-scale datacenters? Based on obser-
vations from production datacenters, we analyze QShare in a large scale data-
center. We show that QShare can assign dedicated queues to ∼90% of the ten-
ants in any control interval even when the datacenter is fully reserved. Thus,
QShare produces at least 3x throughput gain over the guarantees and achieves
higher efficiency in link utilization (Section 4.7.3).
(iv) How much overhead does QShare impose? QShare imposes small over-
head for switch configuration, running rate allocations and embedding tenants
(Section 4.7.4).
Testbed Experiment Setup. We build a physical testbed containing 10 servers
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and each server provisions 10 VM slots, for a total of 100 VMs. Each server in-
stalls a Gigabit Ethernet NIC and runs the 3.13.0 Linux kernel. We evenly dis-
tribute the servers into two racks inter-connected by two Pronto-3297 48-port
Gigabit (ToR) switches. Thus, the topology is 5:1 oversubscribed and the core
link may be congested when VMs are sufficient demands. Each port supports
up to eight WFQ queues. We embed multiple tenants in the testbed, with ran-
dom sizes from two to 20 VMs.
We develop a client/server program to generate traffic. The clients initi-
ate long-lived TCP connections to randomly selected servers and request flow
transmission. All VMs run both the client and server programs. Only intra-
tenant communication is allowed.
4.7.1 Work-Conserving Bandwidth Guarantees
In this section, we consider how traffic dynamics may affect QShare’s perfor-
mance for enabling work-conserving bandwidth guarantees. We consider the
following two scenarios. The first case is that a tenant’s demand trend is pre-
dictable: i.e., once a tenant has high traffic demand, this trend continues for few
seconds. Trend predictability is not over-optimistic since hot spots in produc-
tion datacenters can last over tens of seconds [114]. The second case is that the
demand trend is completely unpredictable: i.e., a tenant’s future demands are
independent on its current or previous demands. In both cases, QShare does
not impose any constraint on VM communication patterns, i.e., one client can
request flow transfers from arbitrary servers at any time.
To quantify the worst-case performance degradation caused by traffic unpre-
dictability, we first disable the ElasticSwitch-like rate allocations for the tenants
without dedicated queues, and allocate them at most their guaranteed band-
width.
4.7.1.1 Predictable Demand Trend
In this experiment, we consider 10 tenants competing on the core link. Each
tenant is guaranteed 94 Mbps bandwidth on the core link. To generate traf-
fic, we randomly pick five tenants (referred to as T1 to T5) as high-demanded
tenants whose clients request sufficient flow transfers during our measurement
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Figure 4.7: Figure 4.7(a) plots runtime bandwidth utilization of all tenants
given correct demand prediction. QShare achieves perfect work-conserving
bandwidth guarantees in this case. Figure 4.7(b) plots the total runtime
utilization given completely unpredictable demands. Only few under-utilized
cases are observed during the measurement period, yielding over 91% average
utilization. Figure 4.7(c) shows the average link utilization when the length of
control interval varies.
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period. The remaining tenants (referred to as T6 to T10) have insufficient de-
mands during the measurement period. Low-demanded tenants may initiate
their flow transfers at any time during the measurement period. In this experi-
ment we first fix the length of control interval as four seconds. Different settings
are considered in Section 4.7.1.2.
Figure 4.7(a) plots the runtime core link bandwidth obtained by each ten-
ant in a 10-second measurement period. During this period, QShare’s tenant-
queue binding algorithm assigns each of the tenants in T1 to T7 a dedicated
queue on the core link; T8, T9 and T10 are served in a shared queue. When low-
demanded tenants are inactive at the early stage, T1 through T5 fairly share the
entire core link capacity. Later on, low-demanded tenants T6, T8, T9 and T10
become active. As T8, T9 and T10 are in the shared queue, they all obtain their
guaranteed bandwidth. T1 to T6, each exclusively occupying a queue, equally
share the remaining capacity. At about eight second, T7 becomes active and
fairly shares the core link with T1 to T5. It is clear that all tenants receive at
least their guaranteed bandwidth regardless of their communication patterns
and other tenants’ demands. Meanwhile, the core link is always fully utilized.
Thus, QShare achieves perfect work-conserving bandwidth guarantees.
4.7.1.2 Unpredictable Demand Trend
In this section, we consider the case when tenant demand trend is unpre-
dictable. We clarify that the predictability of traffic demand is only relevant to
QShare’s tenant-queue binding module, which affects the performance of work
conservation. Thus, we mainly focus on the performance of work conservation
when handling unpredictable demands.
We use the same set of tenants as in Section 4.7.1.1. To generate unpre-
dictable traffic demands, each client requests flow transmissions from ran-
domly selected servers. Flow sizes are sampled from the empirical datacenter
workloads [141]. When the current flow finishes, a client randomly switches be-
tween being active (i.e., requesting a new flow transmission) or dormant (i.e.,
sleeping for a random period of time before requesting a new flow transfer). All
transmissions are completely random and do not follow any specific probabil-
ity distribution.
Figure 4.7(b) illustrates the runtime core link utilization over a one-minute
measurement period. We measure the aggregated link utilization from all ten-
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ants at the granularity of 0.1 second. As illustrated in Figure 4.7(b), in spite of
unpredictable demands, under-utilized cases are rare, rendering over 91% av-
erage link utilization (plotted Figure 4.7(c)). This is because that QShare does
not rely on good TM estimation to achieve work conservation. Instead, for any
D-tenant (tenant with a dedicated queue), its VMs can burst traffic with arbi-
trary communication patterns, allowing them to effectively grab possible spare
bandwidth. As long as one VM pair from all D-tenants is high-demanded, it
can drive the core link to full utilization. Mathematically, the probability that
all VM pairs from D-tenants have insufficient demands is low. In particular, as-
suming each VM pair independently determines to be either active or dormant
with equal probability during a small time interval, the probability that the core
link observes insufficient demands in the small interval3 is ( 12 )
N, whereN is the
number of VM pairs from all D-tenants. Thus, demand unpredictability has
minor effects on work conservation.
We further plot the average core link utilization for different lengths of control
interval in Figure 4.7(c). For predictable demand trend,QShare achieves perfect
work conservation as long as the length of control interval is comparable with
how long the trend lasts. For unpredictable trend, the utilization drops slightly
as the length of control interval increases.
Based on this evaluation, we conclude that in order to achieve good work
conservation, (i) QShare does not require perfect demand prediction and (ii) it
is sufficient to perform tenant-queue allocation at coarse time granularity (e.g.,
a few seconds). Thus, QShare’s dynamic queue-tenant binding module does
not need to react quickly enough to capture traffic bursts, which significantly
reduces the stress for large scale deployment.
Fairness. We now consider the benefits of enabling ElasticSwitch-like rate al-
locations for the tenants without dedicated queues. First, it improves the link
utilization for those under-utilized cases shown in Figure 4.7(b). Second, it im-
proves the fairness for sharing the spare bandwidth since both tenants in the
shared queue and tenants with dedicated queues are able to utilize such band-
width.
3Given a small interval (e.g., sub-millisecond), a small flow transmission may be considered
as sufficient demand.
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Figure 4.8: Empirical traffic distributions used for measuring FCTs. The Bytes
CDF shows the distribution of traffic bytes across different flow sizes.
4.7.2 Application Benefits
Given the desirable property in Section 4.7.1, QShare can benefit tenant appli-
cations by significantly reducing their flow completion times (FCTs). In this
section, we demonstrate QShare’s edges over ElasticSwitch [116], Trinity [120]
as well as the static reservation for improving FCTs. Among all embedded ten-
ants, we consider one tenant T with 10 VMs evenly distributed in two racks.
Tenant T has 94 Mbps guaranteed bandwidth on the core link. We consider the
shuffle phase of MapReduce jobs where a client requests flow transfers from
all servers (recall that a VM runs both the client and server program). The
flow sizes, illustrated in Figure 4.8, are sampled from empirically observed traf-
fic patterns in two deployed datacenter traces [130] and [141]. Each client re-
quests a new flow once the previous one is finished, indicating that T is high-
demanded.
In the experiment, we create different datacenter fabric loads by varying the
guaranteed bandwidth of background tenants (i.e., the tenants competing with
T on the core link). The load is computed as the ratio of total guaranteed band-
width from background tenants to the core link capacity. The results for using
the enterprise datacenter workload [141] are illustrated in Figure 4.9 (results
for using the data-mining workload [130] are similar and we omit them for
brevity). Because of the efficient resource utilization, QShare greatly reduces
FCTs compared with both ElasticSwitch [116] and the static bandwidth reser-
vation. Such improvement is even more significant for smaller fabric loads.
In spite of its improvement over static reservation, ElasticSwitch [116] has a
non-trivial performance degradation from QShare (up to 2x long FCTs) even
if it adopts very aggressive RA to probe available bandwidth (scarifying band-
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Figure 4.9: FCT statics for varying fabric loads (part of the results for static
reservation are out of the plot scope). Despite its improvement over static
reservation, ElasticSwitch [116] has a large performance degradation
compared with QShare (up to 2x long FCTs) even if it adopts aggressive RA at
the expense of compromising bandwidth guarantees. In term of bandwidth
utilization, Trinity has roughly the same performance as ElasticSwitch with
aggressive RA.
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width guarantees [116]). We are aware that ElasticSwitch’s performance de-
pends on parameter settings and system tuning. Our self-implemented Elas-
ticSwitch prototype uses the default parameter setting in its paper. We do not
further plot the results of Trinity [120] since ElasticSwitch with aggressive RA
has roughly the same performance with Trinity in terms of bandwidth utiliza-
tion (Section B), whereas Trinity has reordering and starvation issues.
We note that QShare is orthogonal to the approaches [4, 142–145] that reduce
FCTs by creating more efficient transport protocols. Rather, QShare is an ap-
proach to allocate network resources for tenants.
4.7.3 QShare in Large Scale
In this section, we evaluate QShare in large scale. In particular, we shed light on
the extent of switch queue scarcity (compared with the number of tenants) in
large scale datacenters. Further, we showQShare’s benefit for providing tenants
more bandwidth than their guarantees and improving link utilization efficiency
in large scale datacenters. We consider a three-layer multi-rooted tree topology
with 1024 servers and 100 VMs per server, for a total of 100 thousand VMs. The
network interface of each server is 10 Gbps and the switch port capacity is 40
Gbps. The network topology is constructed based on the k = 16 fattree [127]
topology. By disabling certain links and switches, we can create a topology with
different oversubscription ratios.
4.7.3.1 The Extent of Switch Queue Scarcity
To be consistent with the production datacenters [112, 118], the number of VMs
requested by each tenant follows an exponential distribution with mean 49.
The bandwidth guarantee of each VM is randomly sampled from five values 10
Mbps, 50 Mbps, 100 Mbps, 200 Mbps and 300 Mbps to better represent various
bandwidth requirements from tenants. In the experiment, we keep embedding
tenants until either network resources or computation resources are fully re-
served, i.e., the datacenter operates at 100% load. To do a stress test for queue
scarcity, we assign more weight to cq in Algorithm 2. We test three different
over-subscription ratios 1 : 1, 4 : 1 and 16 : 1.
The tenant placement results are tabulated in Table 4.1. Overall, the extent of
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Table 4.1: Tenant placement results in a large scale datacenter. RNP<9 is the
percentage of ports serving less than nine tenants. RNL∈[9,12] and RNL>12 have
similar definitions. RND is the percentage of tenants permanently assigned a
dedicated queue and RNI is the percentage of tenants assigned a dedicated
queue, either permanently or opportunistically, in any control interval.
O. R. RNL<9 RNL∈[9,12] RNL>12 RND RNI
1 : 1 96.7 3.26 0 66.7 90.4
4 : 1 95.1 4.88 0 67.2 90.1
16 : 1 92.1 7.89 0 66.7 90.6
queue scarcity is moderate, counterintuitive to the common assumption [124].
For instance, only ∼4% switch ports are overloaded in the 1:1 over-subscribed
topology. Among the over-utilized ports, the largest number of tenants handled
by a single port is 12, slightly higher than the total number of queues. From
the tenants’ perspective, two thirds of them are assigned dedicated queues
throughout their lifetime due to the lack of queue contention, i.e., on any link
of their TRs, the number of competing tenants is fewer than eight. About 90%
of all tenants can have dedicated queues, either permanently or opportunis-
tically, in any control interval, indicating that only a small fraction of tenants
need to run rate allocations at hypervisors. After placement, we assign tenants
dscp values to analyze the dscp usage mentioned in Section 4.5.4. dscp zero is
reserved for tenants in shared queues. For each tenant with dedicated queues,
we greedily assign it the next non-conflicting dscp value. It turns out that 64
dscp values are sufficient even for the fully reserved datacenter.
We further emulate the processes of tenant arrival and departure. The ten-
ant arrival is modeled by a Poisson process with rate λ and the lifetime of each
tenant is a constant, similar to [121]. By varying λ, we tune the datacenter load.
As the datacenter load drops, the queue scarcity is mitigated as well. When the
load is less than∼60%, all tenants are permanently assigned dedicated queues.
This demonstrates that our tenant placement module effectively spreads ten-
ants across available switch queues to relieve queue contention.
The takeaway for this evaluation is that in reality, the problem of queue
scarcity is moderate. By performing dynamic tenant-queue binding, QShare
can effectively handle such scarcity in large scale datacenters.
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Figure 4.10: QShare’s performance in large scale. Figure 4.10(a) plots the
high-demanded tenants’ average throughput gain over the static reservation
with various inactive ratios. Figure 4.10(b) shows the CDFs of normalized link
utilization for QShare and static reservation.
4.7.3.2 QShare’s Performance in Large Scale
In this section, we evaluate QShare’s performance based on large scale simula-
tions. We show that QShare produces significant throughput gain for tenants
compared with the static reservation and achieves efficient link utilization in
large scale datacenters. We develop a simulator incorporating QShare’s tenant
placement module and dynamic queue allocation algorithm.
The experiment is performed on the 16:1 over-subscribed topology as it is
the most challenging setting in terms of queue scarcity. Meanwhile we still
consider the tough scenario where the datacenter operates at full load, i.e., re-
sources are fully reserved. We define the inactive ratio ri n as the percentage of
low-demanded tenants. Since the experiment tries to capture the tenant-level
throughput, our simulator does not focus on detailed packet-level communi-
cations, but allowing the tenants to fully utilize the available bandwidth.
Throughput Gain. The throughput gain for a tenant is defined as the ratio of
its actual achieved throughput to its guaranteed bandwidth. For simplicity, we
assume the throughput gain for tenants in shared queues is one (no gain). For
a tenant T with dedicated queues, its bandwidth gain on different links of its TR
may be different since the actual demands on each link vary. We quantify the
throughput gain of T as the smallest bandwidth gain obtained on any link of its
TR. Thus, our experiment shows the worst-case throughput gain for T when the
link with the smallest bandwidth gain is the bottleneck.
Figure 4.10(a) illustrates the average throughput gain given varying inactive
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ratios. Overall, QShare produces significant throughput gains (e.g., over 3x for
all inactive ratios) over bandwidth guarantees. The throughput gain increases
dramatically (up to ∼50) as the inactive ratio increases, demonstrating that
QShare can effectively utilize spare bandwidth.
Utilization Efficiency. A natural benefit of work conservation is that QShare
can improve link utilization efficiency, i.e., more links are operating at high uti-
lization. Specifically, consider that tenant T’s throughput gain allows it to re-
ceive an extra 100 Mbps bandwidth besides its guaranteed bandwidth. This
extra bandwidth will distribute among the links of T’s TR, driving these links
to higher utilization. Without loss of generality, we consider a communica-
tion pattern spreading the throughput gain across T’s links proportionally to
T’s guaranteed bandwidth on these links. As the throughput gain is obtained
as the minimal bandwidth gain among all links, this distribution will not drive
any link to over 100% utilization.
Figure 4.10(b) plots the CDFs of normalized link utilization (to the link capa-
bility) in the datacenter given ri n = 0.5. The results show that QShare achieves
better efficiency in link utilization than static reservation. For instance, with
QShare, half of the links’ utilization is over ∼60% compared with ∼25% in static
reservation; about 14% links are fully utilized with QShare compared with zero
percentage in static reservation. These bottleneck links show that QShare has
driven the network to the maximum possible utilization, i.e., achieving work
conservation.
4.7.4 System Properties
In this section, we report the following system properties to demonstrate
QShare’s scalability.
Switch Configuration. The network action container (Section 4.5.4) executes
switch configuration commands in a batch. The latency for configuring queues
on all 48 ports of our legacy switch is less than 50 ms, and the configurations
on different switches are parallelized using multi-threading. For OpenFlow
switches, configurations can be finished almost in real time via SDN controllers
such as OpenDayLight [146]. Thus, even in large scale datacenter with thou-
sands of switches, the overall configuration latency is negligible, compared with
the length of control intervals (Section 4.7.1.2).
104
Table 4.2: Property comparison with related work. “BG" and “WC" mean
bandwidth guarantees and work conservation, respectively.
Oktopus [112] Tag [121] ES [116] EyeQ [125]
BG Yes Yes Tradeoff Yes
WC No No Tradeoff Yes
Multi-tenant
isolation & placement
No Yes No Yes
Others None
Application
driven
None
Non-congested
core
Seawall [118] Silo [5] QJump [6] TorPolice
BG No Yes Yes Yes
WC Yes No No Yes
Multi-tenant
isolation & placement
No Yes No Yes
Others None
Hardware
modification
Hardware
modification
None
CPU Overhead. The major CPU overhead is contributed by the kernel mod-
ule on hypervisors (Section 4.6), which is affected by traffic volume. At the full
NIC speed (940 Mbps), we measure∼3% CPU overhead on our servers (shipped
with a quad-core Intel 2.8 GHz CPU).
Tenant Placement. In the large-scale network topology in Section 4.7.3, the
average time for figuring out the most desired TR for a tenant request is∼60 ms
whereas the worst case takes no more than 100 ms.
4.8 Related Work
Table 4.2 summarizes the properties of some closely related work. Second-
Net [117], Oktopus [112], and TIVC [147] provide static, non work-conserving
bandwidth guarantees. EyeQ [125] and GateKeeper [126] achieve work-
conserving bandwidth guarantees only if the network core is congestion-free,
which may be not true for many datacenters [114, 115, 135]. ElasticSwitch [116]
relies on challenging traffic matrix estimation and has a tradeoff between pro-
viding accurate bandwidth guarantees and being sufficiently work-conserving.
Trinity [120] improves ElasticSwitch’s work-conservation in static context via
in-network priority queuing. However, it has starvation and packet reordering
issues. Although Silo [5] and QJump [6] can provide both bandwidth and in-
network latency guarantee, Silo is not work-conserving and QJump lacks the
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tenant placement and isolation.
Using switch queues has been proposed before. For instance, vShaper [148]
proposes to virtualize the physical queues to mimic the traffic shaping behav-
ior of more queues, without considering bandwidth guarantees. pFabric [144],
QJump [6] and PIAS [145] instead use priority queues to achieve low latency,
although pFabric requires new hardware support, such as P4 [149].
FairCloud [124] proposes several models (or design principles) for sharing
the network resources in datacenter. QShare’s design follows the PS-P model,
which, in theory, supports both work conservation and bandwidth guarantees
simultaneously.
The bandwidth guarantees defined in the hose model can be enforced either
at the level of per-tenant (e.g., [112, 129]) or at the level of VM pairs, as proposed
in [116, 120, 121]. Generally, QShare enforces per-tenant guarantees. However,
for tenants without dedicated queues, their bandwidth guarantees need to be
enforced through VM-pair guarantees.
4.9 Chapter Summary
This chapter presents QShare, the first complete in-network solution enabling
work-conserving bandwidth guarantees in multi-tenant datacenters. At its
core, QShare’s tenant placement module provides accurate bandwidth guaran-
tees, and its tenant-queue binding module dynamically assigns high-demand
tenants dedicated switch queues to achieve work conservation. We implement
a prototype of QShare, and perform extensive evaluations on physical testbed
and via simulations to validate QShare’s design goals. The results show that
QShare improves state-of-the-art solutions in two aspects: (i) it does not rely
on challenging traffic matrix prediction to achieve good performance and (ii)
it eliminates the tradeoff of providing good bandwidth guarantees and being
work conserving without raising starvation or packet reordering issues. Finally,
QShare imposes small system overhead.
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CHAPTER 5
MANAGING VIRTUAL NETWORKS IN
MULTI-TENANT DATACENTERS: A SEARCH
AND OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
5.1 Introduction
Along with the rise of cloud computing, multi-tenant datacenters grow into the
scale of thousands of switches and servers hosting tens of thousands of tenant
Virtual Machines (VMs) [150, 151]. Managing multi-tenancy at such a scale to
ensure efficiency, scalability and agility is a challenging problem drawing con-
siderable research and engineering attention. Prior solutions [122, 152] place
major management effort at hypervisors for the sake of easy configuration and
implementation, whereas little effort has been made to manage in-network
routings, particularly at the granularity of tenants. As a result, although the
VM locations of each tenant are decided, datacenter network operators lose
the visibility of actual in-network traffic forwarding for each tenant.
The lack of tenant-level traffic accountability and routing control could lead
to various limitations. From the perspective of business, network operators
cannot customize tenant routings in accord with tenants’ service level agree-
ments (SLA) (e.g., latency, bandwidth, reliability or security requirements),
which may close the door for such a business model in the virtual private cloud
(VPC) market. From the perspective of management, in case of resolving hot
spots in datacenters, for instance, it is difficult for network operators to deter-
mine the affected tenants and effectively re-route their traffic around conges-
tion in time.
Thus, it is desirable to have explicit tenant routing control. The traditional
way to achieve tenant routing management relies on topology search cou-
pled with an objective function to greedily find the desired overlay network for
each tenant. Although instant network configuration is technically enabled by
SDN [153, 154], the conventional approach still has at least two shortcomings.
First, tenant routing updates are all-time tasks, which can be triggered by vari-
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ous reasons including network load dynamics, tenant arrivals/departures, hot
spots, link failures and so on. Repeatedly performing topology search for each
routing update will impose significant search cost. Second, a tenant routing
is updated typically to fulfill certain goals. However, it is uncertain that topol-
ogy search coupled with an objective function is sufficient to achieve any goal.
For instance, optimizing a performance metric depending on virtual links (i.e.,
VM pair communications) is subject to sub-optimality since the mapping be-
tween physical links and virtual links is unknown during topology search (Sec-
tion 5.2.3).
To address these issues, we propose OpReduce in Chapter 5, a novel search
and optimization decoupled design for routing management. For each ten-
ant routing update, OpReduce first comprehensively searches all desired over-
lay candidates considering only the tenant’s VM locations. Then it applies a
global objective function over these candidates to finalize the most desired one.
OpReduce’s decoupled model offers at least two advantages. First, since topol-
ogy search is not directed by any objective function, search results are general
and can be reused across routing updates that share the same VM locations: i.e.,
regardless of their goals, topology search for future routing updates is saved as
long as their VM locations have been explored. Second, with the global view
of all routing candidates, objective functions are not limited to be greedy and
local. This eliminates the possibility of sub-optimality even when optimizing
complex performance metrics, for instance, involving virtual links.
One concern of the decoupled design may be that finding all desired overlay
candidates for a tenant can be expensive. However, since the VMs of one ten-
ant are typically spanning across a few racks, we can reduce the search space
to a subgraph of the entire topology. Further, most datacenter topologies (e.g.,
VL2 [130], fattree [127]) are hierarchically organized into several layers and net-
work traffic is never forwarded back and forth between different layers. We can
adopt these properties to further refine the search space. Our proposed routing
search algorithm imposes small complexity (Section 5.3.1).
We implement a prototype of OpReduce and perform extensive evaluations
to validate its design goals. On the one hand, we show that OpReduce greatly
reduces the search cost for tenant routing updates, meanwhile imposing small
system overhead for managing large-scale datacenters (e.g., small routing
cache size and agile network configuration). On the other hand, we demon-
strate that OpReduce is able to achieve complex optimization goals for routing
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updates, yielding significant networking performance improvement over com-
mon practice.
5.2 Background and Motivation
5.2.1 Managing Per-Tenant Routing
For the sake of configuration simplicity, encapsulations protocols such as
VXLAN [155] and NVGRE [156] are widely adopted in multi-tenant datacen-
ters [152]. However, by simply tunneling tenant traffic, network operators lose
the traffic visibility and accountability, i.e., they are not able to identify the ori-
gin of network traffic since packets are sent on behalf of hypervisors and one
hypervisor may host VMs for multiple tenants. Such invisibility becomes even
worse when datacenters run link aggregation and/or perform load balancing
(i.e., ECMP, Hedera [157], or CONGA [141]) to spread traffic across redundant
physical links. As a result, even if one tenant occupies only a small fraction
of computation resources in the datacenter, its traffic could appear on many
physical links, making network operators unaware of actual in-network traffic
forwarding for the tenant.
The lack of in-network tenant routing management causes various operation
restrictions. For instance, it is difficult for network operators to perform moni-
toring, measurement and trouble-shooting for a tenant as its traffic may spread
across many network links. Further, as virtual private cloud gains popularity,
more tenants have incentives to customize their private cloud based on their
own needs, e.g., one tenant may want to promote latency performance of web
servers, whereas someone else may want to optimize bandwidth for MapRe-
duce tasks. Without explicit tenant-level routing control, it is difficult to cus-
tomize routings for individual tenants.
Thus, it is desirable for network operators to have explicit tenant routing con-
trol. In particular, for each tenant, network operators explicitly configure a Vir-
tual Tenant Network (VTN), which is an overlay network connecting the ten-
ant’s VMs. The tenant’s traffic is confined within its VTN and no other physical
links besides the ones in its VTN can carry the tenant’s traffic. As tenants can be
identified by their VTNs, traffic is accountable, which eliminates these manage-
ment limitations. Further, network operators can customize a tenant’s routing
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based on its requirement by embedding its VTN into an overlay that can best
satisfy the requirement.
The traditional way of embedding VTN for a tenant relies on topology search
coupled with an objective function to find the desired overlay. Such an ap-
proach, however, has at least two shortcomings: (i) it runs into scalability issues
when handling frequent VTN embedding requests and (ii) it may be insufficient
to find the optimal overlay for complex embedding goals. Next, we elaborate on
the two issues.
5.2.2 Frequent VTN Updating Requests
In multi-tenant datacenters, VTN embeddings/updates are all-time tasks on
the basis of individual tenants, which are up to tens of thousands [150, 151].
VTN embedding requests are triggered by many sources including network load
dynamics, link congestions and failures, hot spots, tenant departures and so
on. Although efficient graph search algorithms, such as Prim’s and Kruskal’s,
have been proposed for decades, consistently and frequently performing over-
lay search for a large number of VTN updates still imposes significant cost. Re-
solving the scalability problem is the first step towards efficient tenant routing
management in large-scale datacenter networks.
5.2.3 VTN Embedding Goals
A VTN embedding/update may not be as simple as finding a random overlay
network for the tenant. Instead, the VTN may need to satisfy various require-
ments such as guaranteed bandwidth [112, 117, 121], bounded latency [5, 6],
required security appliances [158, 159], and other performance metrics de-
pending on the tenant’s SLA. As these embedding goals become more complex,
it is uncertain that the conventional search and optimization coupled solution
can find the real optimal routing.
We use a simple illustrative example in Figure 5.1 to demonstrate such insuf-
ficiency. Network operators perform VTN update for a tenant whose VMs are
hosted by the set of hypervisors [S1,S2,S3]. The embedding goal is to minimize
the communication cost of the tenant’s virtual links. For simplicity, we define
the communication cost of a virtual link as the number of hops on the path
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Figure 5.1: Due to the lack of mapping between virtual links and physical links,
conventional search and optimization coupled solution is subject to
sub-optimality when optimizing performance metrics depending on virtual
links.
connecting the two VMs of the virtual link. Thus, if VM1 and VM2 take path
S1-A-C-S2, the cost is three.
This embedding is a classic minimum spanning tree problem that can be
solved by a greedy topology search algorithm. At certain intermediate state of
the overlay search (Figure 5.1(a)), AB has been appended to the overlay. Based
on the tie breaker in the algorithm, BC is then appended to the ongoing over-
lay, and the final overlay returned by the algorithm is S1-A, S2-C, S3-B, AB, BC
(Figure 5.1(b)). With a different algorithm, AC could be the link to append af-
ter state (a) rather than BC, and the final overlay returned will the one shown
in Figure 5.1(c). However, no matter how the search algorithm is designed, the
optimality of an overlay is up to the distribution of VMs. Although VM loca-
tions are known a priori, in an intermediate state, the search algorithm cannot
determine exactly which virtual links a physical link will carry. Thus, the search
algorithm cannot guarantee to capture the real optimal overlay (Figure 5.1(d)).
In fact, due to the lack of mapping between virtual links and physical links,
the conventional search and optimization coupled solution is subject to sub-
optimality when optimizing any performance metric involving virtual links.
5.2.4 Decoupling Search and Optimization
To address the above challenges, OpReduce proposes a novel search and op-
timization decoupled design. For a routing update request, OpReduce first
comprehensively finds all desired overlay candidates considering only VM lo-
cations. Then it applies an objective function, designed with the global view
on all routing candidates, to finalize the optimal one. In the above example,
111
OpReduce will first obtain all three overlay candidates (figures (b), (c) and (d) in
Figure 5.1) and then evaluate them to find the optimal one (Figure 5.1(d)). With
the global view on all candidates, OpReduce knows the exact mapping between
virtual links and physical links. Thus, it can design a global objective function in
evaluation to guarantee optimality. Further, as topology search is not directed
by any objective function, search results are general so that they can be reused
for further VTN updates that have the same VM locations. This saves consider-
able cost for performing frequent VTN updates in large-scale datacenters.
5.3 System Design
In this section, we elaborate on the design of OpReduce. Figure 5.2 illustrates
the architecture of OpReduce. OpReduce is built upon a network information
database and a controller. The network information database allows OpReduce
to retrieve network related information, such as network topology and link uti-
lization. The controller is used to manage both computation and networking
resources, such as assigning VMs to tenants and configuring VTNs for tenants.
OpReduce’s decoupled design is achieved by its VTN embedding module which
includes routing search engine, routing cache, objective functions and network
action container.
Next, we describe the workflow of performing routing update using OpRe-
duce. Upon receiving a request, OpReduce first obtains a list of desired routing
candidates based on the VM placement. These routing candidates may come
from either the routing search engine or the routing cache if the VM placement
has been explored before. Then OpReduce needs to evaluate each candidate
to determine the most desired one for achieving an embedding goal. To assist
evaluation, network operators propose evaluation methods, defined as objec-
tive functions, to score each routing candidate. The design of objective func-
tions is facilitated by the global view of all possible routing candidates. Fur-
ther, network information that is helpful for evaluation can be retrieved from
the network information database. Finally, after determining the most desired
routing, OpReduce enforces the VTN embedding inside the network by per-
forming a list of network tasks via the network action container.
Although setting up the network information database, the network con-
troller and the computation controller takes considerable implementation ef-
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forts, we omit these details to focus on the research part of OpReduce in the
thesis. In the following, we describe each individual component of OpReduce’s
VTN embedding module. Hereafter, we use routing and VTN interchangeably
to indicate the overlay network carrying a tenant’s traffic.
5.3.1 Routing Search Engine
Given a certain VM placement, the routing search engine is used to produce a
list of desired routings (or routing candidates). In the typical layered datacenter
network layout (e.g., fattree [127], Clos [130, 160]), a routing is desired if traffic
between two VMs does not bounce back and forth between two different layers.
For random topology (e.g., [132, 133]), we can bound the maximum number of
hops on VM-pair paths to exclude undesired routings. As datacenter fabric is
often built with a high level of redundancy, exploring all desired routings will
provide sufficient candidates to achieve the embedding goal of the routing up-
date request.
In this section, we detail an algorithm for searching all desired routings in lay-
ered datacenter topology that meets the following requirements. (i) The topol-
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ogy consists of a set of isolated zones (or pods), which are inter-connected by
several core switches. (ii) Each pod consists of a few layers. Switches on one
layer are connected only to switches on different layers. Most of the common
datacenter implementations such as VL2 [130] and fat-tree [127] satisfy these
requirements.
In the network, we associate each node with a height. All core switches are
assigned height 1 and the initial height for other nodes is infinity. Then we
trace down from core switches toward other nodes to assign them a height.
The height of a node is the minimum height among all its neighbours plus
one. All nodes with the same height compose a layer whose layer number is
the node height. We define a path as straight if all nodes on the path have dif-
ferent heights. Straight path is either upward (from a source at a lower layer to
a destination at a higher layer) or downward.
Note that traffic in desired routings is never forwarded back and forth be-
tween different layers. Thus, to connect two hypervisors h1 and h3, h1 needs to
have a straight path which shares the same endpoint with one of h3’s straight
paths. The shared endpoint is defined as a common node for the hypervisor set
[h1,h3]. Formally, a node is defined as the common node for a set of hypervi-
sors if it has at least one straight path to reach each hypervisor in the set. Then
traffic from h1 can first take one straight path to reach the common node and
then bounces back to reach h3 via another straight path. Thus, a routing con-
necting [h1,h3] is composed of the above two straight paths. Similarly, a rout-
ing connecting all VMs of a tenant is composed of several straight paths, among
which each straight path is originated from one hypervisor and all these paths
are ended at one same common node.
We formulate our search procedure in Algorithm 4. At the very high level,
the algorithm works as follows: (i) find all common nodes for the hypervisor
set (line 5); (ii) for each common node, find one downward straight path from
the common node to each hypervisor (line 8), and (iii) combine these paths to
produce one routing candidate (line 9). Since a routing candidate can only con-
tain one common node (having more will produce loops), Algorithm 4 provably
finds all desired routings in the network. Even though the algorithm compre-
hensively finds all desired routings, the algorithm complexity is O(|E |) (not ex-
ponential), where |E | is the total number of edges in all upward graphs (line 4),
which is much smaller than the number of edges in the entire network topol-
ogy. We defer detailed complexity analysis in Appendix C.
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Algorithm 4: Routing Search Algorithm
1 Input: VM placement H .
2 Output: All desired routing candidates.
3 for hi ∈ hypervisor set H do
4 Ti ← GetUpwardGraph(hi ); T←⋃i Ti ;
5 CommonNodes←⋂Ti∈TTi .nodes();
6 foreach c j ∈ CommonNodes do
7 for hi ∈ hypervisor set H do
8 N j ←⋃i GetDownwardPath(c j , hi , T j );
9 returnN←⋃i Ni ;
10 Function: GetUpwardGraph (hi )
11 return The graph containing all upward straight paths starting from hi and
ending at core switches.
12 Function: GetDownwardPath(c j , hi , T j )
13 return The straight path from c j to hi in graph T j .
For a random datacenter topology [132, 133], OpReduce can first adopt the k-
shortest path algorithm [134] to obtain a set of paths between each hypervisor
pair and then combine these paths to produce routing candidates. The k can
be parameterized to exclude undesired routings.
5.3.2 Routing Cache
The search results for routing candidates are cached using a dictionary (hash
table) data structure, where the key is VM placement and the value is a list of
all desired routings for the VM placement. Each routing is stored as a list of
physical link IDs, which can be used to retrieve link related information (e.g.,
utilization, status) from the network information database. Generally, entries
in the dictionary are valid as long as the network topology remains the same.
In OpReduce’s prototype, we associate each entry in the dictionary with a rel-
atively long validation period (e.g., few weeks), and re-perform routing search
after an entry is expired.
In OpReduce’s implementation, we allocate 32 bits for both the hash key and
physical link IDs. In Section 5.5.2.2, we show that even in large-scale k = 32
fat-tree datacenter with over eight thousand servers, the cache size for manag-
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ing 10 thousand tenants is about hundreds of megabytes, which can be easily
managed by commodity servers.
5.3.3 Objective Functions
The objective functions are used to evaluate routing candidates so as to deter-
mine the most desired one for fulfilling embedding goals. For instance, a valid
objective function can be as sophisticated as a combination function balanc-
ing latency, bandwidth, the number of hops and so on. Or it can be as de-
tailed as optimizing specific virtual links for latency and other virtual links for
bandwidth. In general, OpReduce is open to accept any objective function. But
OpReduce offers global views on all possible routing candidates so that objec-
tive functions are not limited to be greedy and local. Relevant network informa-
tion, available in OpReduce’s network information database, can be applied to
evaluate these routing candidates. In production datacenters, to achieve a wide
variety of VTN embedding goals, network operators can pre-install inOpReduce
a set of abstract objective functions that can be parameterized accordingly.
5.3.4 Network Action Container
After determining the most desired routing, the final step is enforcing the
routing inside network. The enforcement process is essentially configuring
switches on the routing (e.g., configuring VLAN tags [161] or adding Openflow
rules [154]) to guide the switches to perform desired traffic forwarding. To fa-
cilitate routing management in large-scale datacenters, we develop a network
action container to perform network configurations in a batch. For instance,
configurations on different ports of one switch are aggregated in one thread
and configurations on different switches are paralleled via multi-threading. As
shown in Section 5.5.2.3, the network action container significantly reduces the
overall configuration latency.
5.4 Implementation
We have a full implementation of OpReduce. We use OpenStack to create VMs
on hypervisors and assign VMs to tenants. On our testbed dedicated for ex-
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periments, the OpenStack environment has four compute nodes as hypervi-
sors that can host about one hundred VMs, one network node, and one con-
troller node. Because OpenStack is limited to computation virtualization, we
unify it with our physical network via an OpenDayLight [146] controller that
uses OpenFlow and netconf [162] protocols to manage OpenFlow and legacy
switches, respectively.
On our testbed, we allocate a dedicate VLAN tag for each VTN. Then embed-
ding a VTN is about configuring relevant switch interfaces with corresponding
VLAN tags to achieve reachability. Certainly there could be other network virtu-
alization solutions, e.g., slices in sliceable switch [163], VLAN tag stacking [164].
OpReduce’s network controller is extendible to support these virtualization so-
lutions. We are aware that VLAN tags are limited to 4096 values which may be
insufficient in large-scale datacenters. To resolve this scalability issue, OpRe-
duce implements a helper component, based on Panopticon [165], to achieve
VLAN tag reuse in hybrid datacenters with both legacy and OpenFlow switches.
5.5 Evaluation
Our evaluation centers around the followings. (i) In Section 5.5.1, we show
OpReduce is guaranteed to find the least congested routings for VTN embed-
dings under various settings, which yields significant networking performance
improvement over common practice. (ii) In Section 5.5.2, we show that OpRe-
duce greatly reduces the search cost for managing numerous routing updates
and imposes small system overhead for managing large-scale datacenters.
5.5.1 Congestion-Aware Routing Updates
One representative goal for routing updates in multi-tenant datacenters is to
find the least congested routing to re-accommodate a tenant. The traditional
search and optimization coupled solution for finding the desired routing is us-
ing the Prim’s minimal spanning tree algorithm with physical link utilization as
the edge weight. However, since network traffic is generated by VM pairs, mini-
mizing the congestion experienced by virtual links is the more direct and there-
fore more accurate goal for finding the least congested routing. Thus,OpReduce
uses the following algorithm to determine the most desired routing. Assume
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OpReduce produces m routing candidates {T1, ...,Tm} for a routing update re-
quest that has n virtual links {l1, ..., ln}. Then the most desired routing is
T∗ =min
Tk
∑n
i=1 λi ·Fk (li )
n
, (5.1)
where k ∈ [1,m], Fk (li ) is the congestion level experienced by virtual link li for
routing candidate Tk and λi is the weight of li . Both F and λi are configurable
to allow high flexibility for routing customization. For simplicity of performing
evaluation in the thesis, Fk (li ) is defined as the highest congestion level of all
physical links in Tk that carry li , where the congestion level of a physical link
is estimated as its average link utilization. Further, all virtual links are equally
weighted.
Besides the conventional search and optimization coupled solution (referred
to as the local solution), we also compare OpReduce with flow-level ECMP, the
common practice for load balancing and congestion reduction in datacenters,
and the bottomline solution which embeds VTN to a randomly selected routing
candidate.
For each embedding request, we compare the routing determined by OpRe-
duce and the ones selected by the other three solutions. We use average flow
completion time (FCT) as the metric to quantify the congestion experienced
by virtual links (similar to [141, 166]), expecting that a better routing will have
shorter average FCT.
5.5.1.1 Testbed Experiments
We start the evaluation on our physical testbed. We build a network topology
illustrated in Figure 5.3(a). The datacenter has pre-embedded tenants to gener-
ate traffic using our client/server programs. The clients initiate long-lived TCP
connections to randomly selected servers to request flow transfers. All VMs run
both the client and server programs. Only intra-tenant communication is al-
lowed.
In this experiment, we perform routing update for a tenant who has 10 VMs
that are randomly distributed in all four hypervisors on our testbed. In total,
we perform 40 sets of experiments under different network utilization. Figure
5.3(a) shows the snapshot of network utilization in one experiment set. In each
experiment set, we perform three individual routing updates using OpReduce,
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Figure 5.3: Testbed experiments for improving FCTs.
ECMP and the bottomline solution. After the tenant VTN is embedded, its vir-
tual links (VM pairs) start to generate traffic using our client/server programs.
Flow sizes are randomly sampled from the empirical datacenter workload [141],
whose flow size distribution is plotted in Figure 5.4. To ensure fair comparison,
the set of flow sizes used for the three experiments in each experiment set is
identical. We compute the average FCT among all flow transfers as our perfor-
mance metric.
Figure 5.3(b) illustrates the desired routing produced by each solution for
the network utilization shown in Figure 5.3(a). Since OpReduce first outputs
all routing candidates (i.e., E1-C1-E2, E1-C2-E2, E1-C3-E2) and then applies the
objective function (Equation (5.1)) to determine the most desired one, it can
always find the least congested routing (E1-C1-E2 in this case). However, both
ECMP and bottomline are unaware of the link utilization. Consequently, their
static hashing could result in overwhelming these more congested links.
Figure 5.3(c) plots the average FCT in each experiment set when using enter-
prise workload [141] (results for using data-mining workload [130] are similar,
and we omit them for brevity). Although the bottomline solution and ECMP
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Figure 5.4: Empirical datacenter workloads used in evaluation.
may end up with different FCTs in one set, their average FCTs over 40 sets are
close. Comparing OpReduce with the other two solutions, we find that OpRe-
duce can consistently find the most desired routing which offers average ∼30%
less FCTs and up to ∼5x reduced FCTs in some sets (outside the plot scope of
Figure 5.3(c)).
Note we do not compare OpReduce with the local solution in our testbed ex-
periments. This is because the local solution and OpReduce will produce the
same routing in such a small topology. In the following, we show that given
large network topologies, it is very likely for the local solution to return sub-
optimal overlays, which results in significant performance degradation.
5.5.1.2 Large-Scale Simulations
In order to investigate how OpReduce’s performance is affected by various
factors that are not covered by our small-scale testbed experiments, we per-
form detailed simulations using large-scale datacenter topologies and empiri-
cal workloads obtained from production datacenters (Figure 5.4). As summa-
rized in Table 5.1, we thoroughly evaluate the performance of OpReduce un-
der the impact of five factors: the topology, the network/fabric load, the traffic
workload, the average number of VMs occupied by a tenant, and the average
VTN scale.
Various Fabric Loads (Exp NO. 1): In multi-tenant datacenters, the fabric load
can be quantified as the VM over-subscription ratio, which is defined as the ra-
tio of worst-case achievable aggregate bandwidth among VM pairs to the total
capacity of the topology. A fat-tree fabric has an hypervisor over-subscription
of 1:1 because all hypervisors may potentially send at the full bandwidth of their
network interfaces. Thus, if the average number of VMs hosted by a hypervisor
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Table 5.1: Experimental settings. “*” refers to that we vary the factor to isolate
its impact in the experiment.
Exp.
NO.
Topology
Fabric
load
Workload
# VMs
per tenant
Average
VTN scale
1 k=8 FT * enterprise 20 4
2 k=8 FT 3:1 * 20 4
3 * 3:1 enterprise 20 4
4 k=8 FT 3:1 enterprise 20 *
5 k=8 FT 3:1 enterprise * 4
is N , the VM over-subscription ratio is N :1. Hereafter, we refer the VM over-
subscription ratio as the load degree.
We tune the datacenter load degree in the range of 1 : 1-7 : 1 by varying the
number of embedded tenants. For each load, we create five different snapshots
to avoid bias. For each snapshot, we randomly pick a tenant to perform routing
update using all four solutions: OpReduce, the local solution, ECMP and the
bottomline solution. Thus, we perform four independent experiments for the
tenant. In each solution, after the desired routing is finalized, we assign each
virtual link a randomly sampled flow size to generate traffic and compute the
average FCT among all flow transfers. Among all four experiments for the same
tenant, we use the same set of flow sizes. After finishing the current tenant,
we recover the network snapshot and re-sample another tenant to continue
evaluation. In total, 100 routing updates are performed for each snapshot.
Figure 5.5 plots the min-median-max distribution of the averaged FCT across
all five snapshots for each load degree. As illustrated in the Figure 5.5(a), OpRe-
duce outperforms ECMP and bottomline with a significant margin: up to 80%
FCT reduction for small fabric loads and at least 40% FCT reduction for all
loads. Again, this is because ECMP and bottomline are static solutions that are
unaware of the network utilization. Further, as load degree increases, OpRe-
duce offers less FCT reductions since there is less routing optimization space in
heavily utilized network. Since production datacenters typically have 3x over-
provisioning to absorb traffic burstiness [167], we can expect large performance
benefits offered by OpReduce in production datacenters.
Due to the lack of exact mapping between virtual links and physical links, the
local solution often produces sub-optimal routings. As shown in Figure 5.5(b),
with high probabilities (up to ∼60%), the local solution returns an overlay dif-
ferent from the one produced by OpReduce. Consequently, these sub-optimal
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Figure 5.5: Impact of the fabric load on OpReduce’s performance. The
normalized FCT is used as the performance metric. Parts (a) and (b) use the
enterprise workload [141]. Parts (c) and (d) use the data-mining
workload [130].
routings result in 1.2−4x FCT inflation, compared with the routings produced
by OpReduce, as shown in Figure 5.5(a).
Datacenter Traffic Workload (Exp NO. 2): In Figures 5.5(a) and 5.5(b), we use
the enterprise datacenter workload. We repeat the same experiment using the
data-mining workload to learn the impact of traffic workload on OpReduce’s
performance. The results, plotted in Figures 5.5(c) and 5.5(d), show that OpRe-
duce provide similar benefits for data-mining workload.
Fabric Topologies (Exp NO. 3): We investigate four datacenter topologies:
three organized topologies (Clos, k = 8 and k = 16 fat-tree) and another or-
ganized topology added with random short-cuts. The Clos topology has the
same number of hypervisors as the k = 8 fat-tree topology except that the over-
subscription ratio is 2 : 1. All three organized topologies have different routing
redundancy. In particular, they have eight, 16 and 64 shortest paths between
two randomly chosen hypervisors in different pods, respectively. The short-cut
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Figure 5.7: OpReduce offers consistent benefits for different VTN scales and
different per-tenant VM counts.
topology is built by adding random links into the k = 8 fat-tree topology. The
links are randomly added between ToR switches to inter-connect different pods
so that besides traversing through the core switches, the inter-pod communi-
cation can alternatively use the short-cut bridges as well. We set the load degree
as 3 : 1 in all these topologies.
For each topology, we perform the similar experiments as in evaluating the
impact of fabric loads. Figure 5.6 plots the CDF of all obtained FCT reductions
(compared with the bottomline solution). By comparing the results of all three
fat-tree topologies, we conclude that OpReduce offers more benefits for topolo-
gies built with more redundant links. This is because OpReduce has larger opti-
mization space in more redundant topologies.
We further investigate how topology short-cuts may affect the performance
of OpReduce. In organized datacenter topologies, alternative routing options
typically have less diversity in the sense that they all have the same number
of hops, although they are varying in terms of utilization. In contrast, short-
cut topology can create more diverse routings with different numbers of hops
as well as different utilization. Thus, OpReduce has even larger optimization
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Figure 5.8: In spite of the numerous routing updates as load degree increases,
OpReduce introduces small search cost since the cache hit ratio increases
dramatically.
space in the short-cut topology so as to produce more performance benefits.
We also investigate the average VTN scaleNh (the average number of hyper-
visors used by a tenant’s VMs) and the average per-tenant VM count Nv . We
consider Nh = [3,4,5] and Nv = [10,20,30] since they are the common prac-
tices in our production datacenters. We find that OpReduce consistently pro-
vides performance benefits in these settings, as shown in Figure 5.7.
5.5.2 System Properties
In this section, we present system evaluation.
5.5.2.1 Search Cost Reduction
The number of routing update requests is affected by the amount of embed-
ded tenants, i.e., the load degree. Figure 5.8(a) plots search cost reduction un-
der various loads for k = 16 fat-tree topology. Although the absolute number
of routing updates increase as load degree increases, the normalized search
cost actually reduces. This is because OpReduce’s knowledge base about rout-
ing candidates for various VM locations also increases as the load degree in-
creases. As a result, the cache hit ratio dramatically increases as well (shown
in Figure 5.8(b)). Thus, in spite of the numerous routing updates, OpReduce
introduces small topology search cost.
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Figure 5.9: The routing cache size even in large-scale datacenters is small.
5.5.2.2 Routing Cache Size
The routing cache size is affected by two factors: the topology and the average
VTN scale. The topology affects the cache size because it affects the number of
routing candidates for one VM placement. The VTN scale affects the cache size
since it determines the number of physical links in one routing candidate.
Figure 5.9(a) plots cache sizes with respect to the number of tenants and the
average VTN scales in k = 16 fat-tree topology. The cache size increases with
the average VTN scale and linearly grows with the number of tenants. However,
even with very sporadically distributed VTNs, i.e., large average VTN scales,
caching routing candidates for 10 thousand tenants consumes no more than
40 MB memory. Even if we consider a much larger k = 32 fat-tree datacen-
ter with over eight thousand servers, the cache size for 10 thousand tenants is
about hundreds of Megabytes (Figure 5.9(b)), which can be easily managed by
commodity servers with gigabytes of memory.
5.5.2.3 Switch Configuration Latency
Both SDN switches and legacy switches may co-exist in today’s datacen-
ters [168]. Configurations on OpenFlow Switches can be finished almost in real
time via SDN controllers such as OpenDayLight [146], but it takes non-trivial
time to configure legacy switches. Thus, to ensure that routing enforcement
does not become the bottleneck for routing update, OpReduce designs a net-
work action container to properly aggregate configuration tasks so as to reduce
the overall configuration delay.
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In OpReduce’s prototype, one switch configuration task is about associating
one VLAN tag on a certain port of a switch. We notice that configuring a single
port on a legacy switch takes almost the same amount of time as configuring
multiple ports on the switch. Thus, our network action container aggregates all
configuration tasks on the same switch together to perform batch configura-
tion so as to reduce the overall configuration delay. Meanwhile, batch configu-
rations for different switches are executed simultaneously via multi-threading.
Figure 5.10 plots the measured configuration delay on our testbed. The results
show that even if we simultaneously configure 24 ports on one switch and on
each port we configure 24 VLAN tags (576 single configuration tasks), the over-
all configuration time is less than 1.5 times the delay for configuring just one
VLAN tag on a single port. Thus, with the network action container, routing en-
forcement can be finished timely so that it will not be a bottleneck in practice.
5.6 Related Work and Discussion
Multi-Tenancy Management. Prior designs for multi-tenant datacenters, such
as NVP [152] and Netlord [122], focus on multi-tenancy management at hyper-
visors. For instance, NVP maintains virtual switches on each hypervisor and
leverages a set of tunnels between each pair of hypervisors to deliver traffic for
tenant VMs. The actual tenant traffic forwarding in the physical network is not
managed. Several prior works have considered to perform one-time in-network
routing management to achieve various goals, such as guaranteed bandwidth
[112, 117, 121], bounded latency [5, 6] and user/service isolation [169]. OpRe-
duce, on the other hand, focuses on managing routing updates, which is an
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all-time task in our production datacenters.
A Wide Variety of Performance Enhancement. Many approaches have been
proposed to improve datacenter networking performance. For instance, load
balancing approaches [141, 157, 170, 171], priority queuing approaches [143,
144, 172], deadline-aware approaches [142] and DCTCP [4] are proposed to im-
prove latency performance. Portland [173] and fat-tree [127] propose scalable
datacenter architectures to support high bandwidth between servers whereas
VL2 [130] virtualizes datacenters into server pools to allow applications to ob-
tain high throughput. Although OpReduce is not proposed to explicitly im-
prove certain performance, its efficient tenant routing management and de-
coupled design allow network operators to enhance a wide variety of customer-
interested performance metrics, and some of these metrics cannot be opti-
mized using prior approaches.
Achieving Agile Routing Updates. To be readily deployable in production dat-
acenters, OpReduce is augmented by SDN to perform agile in-network routing
updates. B4 [167] and SWAN [174] also adopt SDN to perform traffic engineer-
ing in wide area networks to achieve high inter-datacenter throughput.
5.7 Chapter Summary
This chapter presents OpReduce, a system for managing virtual tenant network
update in multi-tenant datacenters. Conventional solutions that rely on topol-
ogy search coupled with an objective function to find desired routings have at
least two shortcomings: scalability issue for handling numerous routing up-
dates and the inefficiency for satisfying various routing requirements. To ad-
dress these issues, OpReduce proposes a novel search and optimization decou-
pled design, which enables routing search result reuse and guaranteed rout-
ing optimality. We implement a prototype of OpReduce and perform extensive
evaluations to valid OpReduce’s design goals. Evaluation results show that (i)
even for complex VTN embedding goals, OpReduce ensures routing optimality
which yields significant networking performance improvement over conven-
tional approaches; (ii) OpReduce greatly reduces search cost for managing nu-
merous routing updates and imposes small system overhead.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
The end-to-end principle plays a key role for the success of computer networks.
However, over the past years, a number of new requirements have emerged
for computer networks and their running applications, which creates various
challenges in different networked systems. To address these challenges, there
are no obvious solutions without adding in-network functions to the network
core. Therefore, this thesis proposed the first design principle for guiding the
implementation of in-network functions and then applied this principle to pro-
pose four designs in three different networked systems to address four separate
challenges. Specifically, In the Internet, this thesis proposed MiddlePolice, the
first readily deployable DDoS defense mechanism that can enforce a wide va-
riety of victim-selectable policies during DDoS mitigation. In the Tor network,
the thesis proposedTorPolice, the first privacy-preserving access control frame-
work for Tor that enables service providers to effectively throttle Tor-emitted
abuses and meanwhile serve legitimate clients. In multi-tenant datacenter net-
works, the thesis proposed QShare and OpReduce, in which QShare is designed
to achieve work-conserving bandwidth guarantees and OpReduce is designed
for optimizing tenant virtual networks based on tenant-desired metrics. For
each proposed system, this thesis presented full implementations to demon-
strate its feasibility in practice and performed extensive evaluations to validate
its design goals.
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APPENDIX A
TORPOLICE: TOWARD ENFORCING
SERVICE-DEFINED ACCESS POLICIES FOR
ANONYMITY SYSTEMS
A.1 Distributed Puzzle Systems
TorPolice introduces a distributed puzzle system for distributing computa-
tional puzzles. Compared with prior systems (e.g., Portcullis [16]), the nov-
elty of TorPolice’s puzzle system is that it can explicitly bound the CPU usage
by any client for solving puzzles. In particular, legitimate clients do not pre-
fer to use all their CPU cycles to compute puzzles. However, automated bots
do. To enable access control, prior systems (e.g., Portcullis [16]) would need to
prioritize requests based on the difficulty level of puzzles since otherwise the
bots could overwhelm the system by solving easy puzzles. Thus, to compete
with automated bots, legitimate clients are forced to use all their CPU cycles
to solve puzzles while still at the risk of being denied access when facing auto-
mated bots with significant computation resources. On the contrary, by explic-
itly bounding the percentage of CPU cycles allowed for solving puzzles, TorPo-
lice’s can bring all bots down to the percentage that normal clients prefer to use
for puzzle computation, which significantly reduces the computation disparity
between legitimate clients and automated bots.
A.1.1 Puzzle System Overview
All computational puzzles are computed based on a series of puzzle seeds that
are released periodically. Tor’s existing directory authorities (DAs), for instance,
can be used for releasing puzzle seeds. The puzzle system works on the basis of
two periods, as illustrated in Figure A.1. In each puzzle seed release period (P sr ),
one fresh puzzle seed is released at the beginning of the period and no more
puzzle seeds will be further released in this period. The seed release algorithm
(Section A.1.2) ensures that the puzzle seeds cannot not be pre-computed and
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Figure A.1: TorPolice’s puzzle system works on the basis of P sr and P
s
a : One
fresh puzzle seed is released in each P sr and puzzle solutions are redeemable at
AAs for pre-capabilities only within P sa in each P
s
r .
each valid seed requires the participance from a majority of all DAs.
In each P sr , all puzzles are computed based on the puzzle seed released in
the current P sr . Thus, it is impossible to pre-compute solutions for future puz-
zles even if the puzzle generation algorithm (Section A.1.3) is public. Similarly,
solutions to previous puzzles are unusable as valid capability seeds. To bound
client’s CPU usage for solving puzzles, all puzzle solutions have to be returned
to the AAs within the puzzle solution acceptance period (P sa). Late solutions
will not be accepted. Thus, the percentage of CPU usage for solving puzzles is
bounded by P sa/P
s
r .
A.1.2 Puzzle Seed Release
The puzzle seed release process requires the participation of at least n of Tor’s
DAs. n should include the majority of DAs to avoid centralization, and mean-
while it does not need to include all DAs to be fault-tolerant, similar to how the
Tor network consensus is released. Specifically, each DA contributes its part for
puzzle seed by generating a random nonce signed by its public key along with
a timestamp, as formulated below.
si = ni | ts | SDi , (A.1)
where ni is the nonce, ts is the timestamp set to the starting time of the current
P sr (e.g., t1 in Figure A.1) to indicate the freshness of the si , and SDi is the i th
DA’s signature to prove the integrity of si . To construct a puzzle seed for the
current P sr , clients need to concatenate at least n authentic seed pieces issued
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by n distinct DAs, We note that Tor’s existing random value generator [76] does
not fit for TorPolice since it computes a fresh value every day whereas TorPo-
lice’s puzzle seeds need to be released more frequently to improve usability, as
explained in Section A.1.4.
A.1.3 Puzzle Computation
Assume that in the kth P sr , the puzzle seed obtained by a client is hk . Then one
puzzle is computed as follows.
p =H(pstub)=H(hk | r | s | F), (A.2)
where H() is a public cryptographic hash function, r is a random 128-bit cryp-
tographic nonce generated by the client to ensure the uniqueness of the puzzle,
s is a 128-bit solution to the puzzle p, andF is the fingerprint of the AA selected
by the client to redeem the puzzle solution. The s is considered as a valid solu-
tion to p only if p
2L0−1 < pp , where L0 is the length of the hash function’s output.
pp is a parameter for tuning the puzzle system. We provide detailed discussion
for pp in Section A.1.6. The {hk | r | s | F} is defined as the puzzle stub pstub ,
which will be sent to the AA (specified by F) to redeem the puzzle solution.
Incorporating F into the puzzle design prevents the client from redeeming a
single puzzle solution at multiple AAs.
A.1.4 Puzzle Solution Acceptance Period
In order to be treated as valid capability seeds, puzzle stubs must be returned
to the AAs within the puzzle solution acceptation period P sa , i.e., an AA only
accepts puzzle solutions received within [t1, t2] in the current P sr (and equiva-
lently [t3, t4] in the next P sr ), as illustrated in Figure A.1. The slot [t2, t3] is the
cool-down period, during which no puzzle stubs are accepted. As a result, a
client, regardless of whether it is bot or a legitimate Tor user, can spend at most
P sa−Pc
P sr
< P saP sr percent of its CPU cycles on solving computational puzzles, where
Pc is the networking latency for retrieving the puzzle seed and returning the
puzzle stub to the AAs.
Because of the cool-down period in each P sr , clients who missed the current
P sa (either because they do not compute valid solutions on time or they obtain
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the puzzle seed later than t2) will have to wait until the starting of the next P sr
(t3) to get another chance to solve new puzzles. As such, P sr needs to be small
(e.g., at most few minutes) to avoid introducing usability problems.
A.1.5 Puzzle Solution Verification
To initiate puzzle verfication, a client sends the puzzle stub the corresponding
AA. Upon the reception of puzzle stub, the AA performs the following checks
to validate the puzzle stub. (i) The puzzle stub is returned within the current
P sa . (ii) The puzzle stub is computed based on the fresh puzzle seed released
in the current P sr . (iii) The puzzle stub encloses its fingerprint. (iv) The puzzle
solution is valid, as defined in Section A.1.3. (v) The puzzle stub has not been
spent before. To enforce the fifth rule, the AA needs to cache all spent puzzle
stubs. The cache space is bounded as the AA can erase the puzzle stubs received
in previous periods since they are no longer spendable.
A.1.6 Puzzle System Analysis
In each P sr , the number of puzzles solved by a client follows the following bino-
mial distribution
Gseed ∼B
(
pp ,
⌊
P sa −Pc
tp
⌋)
, (A.3)
where Gseed denotes number of solved puzzles, pp is the probability that one
attempt (i.e., hash computation) produces a valid puzzle solution according
to the rule in Section A.1.3, tp is the amount of time it takes for the client to
attempt a single hash computation and
⌊
P sa−Pc
tp
⌋
is the number of attempts U
can make within the time limit.
TorPolice can control pp and P sa to affect the numeric values of Gseed . In
particular, pp should be chosen such that with high probability (i.e., 0.99) a
client with slow computation speed (e.g., a mobile device released few years
ago) and slow network connection (e.g., 99th percentile of the RTT measured
by CAIDA [175]) can correctly solve one puzzle so as to produce a valid ca-
pability seed. In particular, given that the slow device’s computation speed
is t 0p and the 99th percentile network latency is P
99th
c , pp is selected such as
1− (1−pp )N0 > 0.99, where N0 =
⌊
P sa−P 99thc
t 0p
⌋
.
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A.2 Trans-Capability Design Detail
In this section, we detail the capability exchange protocol introduced in Sec-
tion 3.6.2. Since a Tor hidden server (itself runs a Tor client) needs to open many
Tor circuits in order to serve all its clients (i.e., HS-clients), enforcing per-seed
rate limiting for pre-capability release may limit the availability of Tor HSes. To
address this issue, we design the following capability exchange protocol.
In particular, a HS-client needs to request a new type of capability, i.e., trans-
capability, from the AAs. During the hidden service set up process, along with
the information about Rendezvous Point, the HS-client sends a trans-capability
to one of the HS’s Introduction Points. The HS subsequently redeems the trans-
capability at the AAs for new pre-capabilities, which can be used for generating
new relay-specific capabilities. The trans-capability, accounted on the capabil-
ity seed of the HS-client, anonymously informs the AAs that the HS needs to
create a new circuit to serve the HS-client.
Trans-Capability Computation. Each trans-capability is computed based on
pre-trans issued by the AAs. By default, all Tor clients request pre-trans to pre-
vent the AAs from knowing whether a client has the intention to visit HSes.
Clients that do not visit any HS ignore the received pre-trans. To request pre-
trans, the HS-client sends {ς | n | ts}b to the AAs, where ς is a pre-defined system
value for trans-capability. No information about the HS is enclosed to protect
the HS’s privacy. The AAs then compute blind signatures over the information
to produce a pre-trans. Finally, the HS-client unblinds the received pre-trans to
produce a trans-capability.
Redeeming Trans-Capability. The process of redeeming trans-capability is
identical to how a Tor client requests relay-specific pre-capabilities using its
capability seed (the trans-capability now serves as a new capability seed), ex-
cept that the HS contacts the AAs through Tor to hide its network location. The
AAs reject all unauthentic, expired or spent trans-capabilities.
A.3 Live Tor Interaction
In this section, we continue our discussion in Section 3.8.4 for live Tor network
interactive.
RelayManager Design. Since the live Tor relays are capability-agnostic (i.e.,
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CIRC event
new_circuit
OP
RelayManager
extend_circuit
Figure A.2: The design of RelayManager.
they do not run our modified Tor source code described in Section 3.8.4), we
cannot create TorPolice-enhanced Tor circuits directly through live Tor relays.
Thus, we implement another prototype to interact with live Tor relays during
capability-enhanced circuit creation. The prototype relies on the Tor control
protocol [176]. In particular, on the OP, we implement a RelayManager based
on the Stem [177] library to execute the capability-related operations, as il-
lustrated in Figure A.2. The RelayManager controls the OP’s circuit creation
to “embed” capabilities into live Tor circuit creations. In particular, after the
OP selects relays for its circuit. the RelayManager blinds relay information, re-
quests pre-capabilities from our deployed AAs described in Section 3.8.2, and
then computes relay-specific capabilities. Whenever the OP’s partially-built cir-
cuit reaches a relayRn in the live Tor network, theRelayManager receives aCIRC
event callback from the Tor control protocol. As Rn is capability-agnostic, we
offload capability verification to the RelayManager. Upon validation, the Relay-
Manager sends an extend_circuit command through the Tor control protocol
to continue circuit creation. Otherwise, the RelayManager terminates circuit
creation by issuing a close_circuit command.
We clarify that RelayManager should not be used in real-world development
since the capability verification is offloaded to the OP. Rather, the Tor relay
source code needs to be modified to securely embrace TorPolice, as proposed
in Section 3.8.4.
Latency Measurement. To validate the design ofRelayManager, we instruct our
Tor clients to create circuits through live Tor relays and use RelayManager to
embed our capability-related operations into the creation process. Meanwhile,
we measure circuit creation latencies to quantify the overhead caused by the
our capability design. Figure A.3 plots the CDF of measured latency with and
without relay-specific capabilities. The results show that TorPolice introduces
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Figure A.3: TorPolice introduces negligible overhead for Tor circuit creation.
negligible overhead. This is because a capability verification operation merely
takes ∼0.03ms (Section 3.9.1) whereas the median time for creating a (native)
Tor circuit is ∼0.7s. We clarify that since the capability verification is offloaded
from live Tor relays to the OP, there could be some marginal errors in our la-
tency measurements since live Tor relays may simultaneously process multiple
circuits requests.
A.4 Enforcing Site-Defined Policies
In this section, we continue the analysis in Section 3.9.3 to prove that an ad-
versary’s service request rate ra is always bounded by Θ(²). In particular, when
k ≤ 1, CAPTCHA solutions are the optimal seeds since c ′0 < c ′1. Therefore, the
optimal ra is obtained when the adversary spends all investment on purchas-
ing CAPTCHA solutions. Thus we have ra = ². When k ≥ 1, solutions to compu-
tational puzzles become the optimal seeds. In this case, the adversary’s optimal
ra is k ·² which is obtained by investing all money on solving puzzles.
When the site adopts the basic strategy (i.e., accepts all Tor requests with
valid capabilities), the adversary can continuously use optimal capability seeds
to maintain its optimal ra as its investment increases. However, if either the
rate limiting strategy or the WFQ strategy is adopted, the adversary will reach
a point of diminishing returns when the site no longer accepts service requests
using capabilities that are obtained via the optimal seeds. As a result, the ad-
versary’s ra starts to drop from the optimal value.
Thus, regardless of k and the site’s strategy, ra is always bounded byΘ(²). The
above analysis can be easily extended to more types of capability seeds.
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A.5 Modeling for Botnet C&C Abuse
In this section, we continue the discussion in Section 3.9.4.1 to detail the mod-
eling for estimating the amount of circuit creation requests in Tor when Tor was
under the large scale C&C abuse.
We collect the Tor network consensus published from September 1 to
September 30, 2013 when the number of estimated daily Tor users ranged from
four million to six million. Since one consensus file is published in each hour,
we use the average statistics from all 24 consensus files published in a day to
represent the Tor status in that day. We model the relay computation capacity
based on the live Tor relay measurements in [69] by uniformly sampling their
measurement numbers, excluding the samples with low confidence.
The number of circuit creation requests received by Tor is modeled by a Pois-
son Process with arrival rate λ. To compute λ, we first estimate the number
of unique Tor clients in a time interval and then estimate the number of cir-
cuits opened by each client in the same interval. Mathematically, we have
λ = N1·r1+N2·r2t0 , where N1 and N2 are the number of unique legitimate clients
and bot clients, respectively, over the time interval t0; r1 and r2 are the aver-
age number of circuit creations requested by a legitimate client and bot client,
respectively, over the same interval t0. N1 and N2 can be estimated using
the metric inferred from live Tor measurements in [79]. In particular, over a
10-minute interval, PrivCount [79] counts 710 unique clients when Tor’s daily
estimated user count is 1.75 million, which indicates the client population
turnover rate ρ is about 2.5. Since the methodology used by Tor to estimate
its daily user has not changed since 2013, we assume that ρ obtained in 2016
is also applicable in 2013. Thus, over a 10-minute interval, we have N1 =N L1 /ρ
and N2 = (N L2 −N L1 )/ρ, where N L1 and N L2 are the number of legitimate daily
users and total daily users estimated by Tor, respectively. We estimate N L1 as
one million, which was the estimated daily Tor user number right before the
abuse started in August 2013. Further, PrivCount [79] counts about four cir-
cuits opened for each Tor client over a 10-minute interval, thus we estimate r1
is about 4 in a 10-minute interval, assuming that legitimate Tor clients had the
same usage pattern in 2013 as they have in 2016.
However, the above usage pattern inferred from [79] cannot be applied to de-
termine r2 since bot clients may have different usage patterns from legitimate
clients. Thus, we estimate r2 using historical data. In particular, we find that
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the highest circuit creation failure rate on September 27 2013 is about 35% [68].
Then using the network consensus of the same day, r2 is estimated at about 150
over a 10-minute interval.
Based on the above modeling, we study the circuit creation failure rates using
our Tor-scale simulator. The results are plotted in Figure 3.6.
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APPENDIX B
QSHARE: ENABLING WORK-CONSERVING
BANDWIDTH GUARANTEES FOR
MULTI-TENANT DATACENTERS VIA
DYNAMIC TENANT-QUEUE BINDING
In this appendix, we revisit the experiments in Section 4.3.1. We hope to share
our experience of experimenting with ElasticSwitch [116] and Trinity [120] to
validate our motivation. We implement a prototype of both ElasticSwitch and
Trinity based on the designs in their papers.
We first quantify ElasticSwitch’s tradeoff of providing accurate bandwidth
guarantees and being sufficiently work-conserving. Since the traffic matrix is
unknown a priori, ElasticSwitch needs to allocate the bandwidth to each VM
pair based on network condition probing. As a result, conservative allocation
may result in bandwidth waste, especially when the total guaranteed (reserved)
bandwidth is smaller than the link capability, whereas aggressive allocation
may affect other tenants’ guarantees, especially when large numbers of VM
pairs are competing one congested link.
Conservative Allocation. During conservative allocation, ElasticSwitch [116]
uses the following three mechanisms: (i) Headroom: leaving a gap between
the link capacity and the maximum offered guarantees on any link; (ii) Hold-
Increase (HI): delaying the rate increase after each congestion event and (iii)
Rate-Caution (RC): being less aggressive to increase rates once the current rates
are above the guarantees. Please refer to [116] for the details of each mecha-
nism. We use the following experiment to show the bandwidth waste caused
by the conservative allocation. Consider the case where both tenant A and B
adopt the same symmetric hose model, in which each VM is guaranteed 50
Mbps bandwidth. Thus, both tenants have 250 Mbps guarantees on the core
link, i.e., the network link is half reserved. To generate traffic, each VM in one
rack is configured to communicate with randomly selected VMs in the other
rack, using our client/server program described in Section 4.7. Each VM’s de-
mand is completely random. Only intra-tenant communication is considered.
We measure the total amount of core-link bandwidth utilized by each tenant.
As illustrated in Figure B.1(a), we notice a significant gap (over 300 Mbps) be-
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Figure B.1: Quantify the tradeoff between providing accurate bandwidth
guarantees and being sufficiently work-conserving for ElasticSwitch [116].
tween the aggregated bandwidth of A and B and the link capacity, i.e., over 60%
of the unreserved bandwidth is wasted.
Aggressive Allocation. To achieve aggressive allocation, we disable all those
three mechanisms used in conservative allocation so that the RA module im-
mediately increases rates on each positive feedback (lack of congestion). We
consider a case where tenant A has 700 Mbps guarantee and B 200 Mbps guar-
antee on the core link. As shown in Figure B.1(b), ElasticSwitch fails to guaran-
tee A’s bandwidth although it drives the link to higher utilization with aggres-
sive allocation. In fact, ElasticSwitch [116] has demonstrated that bandwidth
guarantees will be compromised once disabling RC and HI.
We are aware that ElasticSwitch’s performance depends on parameter
choices. Thus, in practice, network operators can boost ElasticSwitch’s perfor-
mance via system tuning. Our implementation uses the parameters specified
in its paper.
Analysis. The causes of the above performance degradation are twofold: (i) the
challenge of guarantees partitioning (GP) without prior knowledge of commu-
nication patterns and VM-pair demand, and (ii) the challenge of relying con-
gestion feedback to learn real-time network bandwidth. Trinity [120] is effec-
tive to resolve the second cause since it does not need to learn the spare net-
work bandwidth. Instead, it serves bandwidth-guarantee traffic in a prioritized
queue so that senders can aggressively send work-conservation traffic with-
out worrying that such aggressiveness would affect other tenants’ guarantees.
Thus, in terms of achieving high link utilization, Trinity and ElasticSwitch with
aggressive RA have roughly the same performance. Both our experiments and
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Figure B.2: The GP has to re-learn each VM pair’s guarantee each time the TM
changes, even when both per-VM and tenant-level demand remains the same.
its paper show that Trinity achieves good work-conservation in static context
(the traffic matrix is known and stable). However, we also notice some practical
issues such as starvation and packet reordering in our experiments with Trinity.
However, achieving good GP without prior knowledge still remains as an
open problem. Since GP transforms each tenant’s per-VM bandwidth guaran-
tee defined in the hose model into traffic matrix (TM), it essentially complicates
the model. Consider the illustrative example in Figure B.2. The item ai j in the
TM represents VM i ’s sending demand to VM j . When the actual TM changes
from the left pattern to the right one, GP needs to gradually learn the update via
probing. However, the demand of each VM actually remains the same despite
the TM change. Further, given the VM placement in Figure B.2 (three VMs are
placed in three different hypervisors), the amount of bandwidth required for
the tenant on each link also remains the same. Therefore, GP needs to do ex-
tra work even when per-VM and tenant-level demand remain the same, which
essentially increases the stress of traffic demand prediction.
Different from state-of-the-art solutions ElasticSwitch and Trinity [116, 120],
QShare does not rely on GP in its design. AlthoughQShare’s tenant-queue bind-
ing module does require demand prediction, it is much more lightweight than
TM estimation since QShare only predicts a scalar metric for each tenant. Ad-
ditionally, as shown in our evaluations (Section 4.7.1), QShare does not require
perfect prediction in order to achieve good work conserving bandwidth guar-
antees.
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APPENDIX C
OPREDUCE: MANAGING VIRTUAL
NETWORKS IN MULTI-TENANT
DATACENTERS: A SEARCH AND
OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
In this appendix, we analyze the complexity of Algorithm 4 in Section 5.3.1.
The first step of the algorithm is to find the upward graph for each hypervisor
in H . Essentially, it is a breadth-first search process. Thus the search com-
plexity is O(|E |) where |E | is the number of edges in the upward graph. Note
that the upward graph is much smaller than the entire network. Specifically,
|E | =∑Lk=2 Rk ·Nk , where Rk denotes the link redundancy ratio at layer k, Nk is
the number of nodes at layer k in the upward graph and L is the number of lay-
ers in the upward graph. The link redundancy ratio at layer k is defined as the
number of links that one node in layer k can has to reach nodes in layer k−1.
For instance, in k = 8 fat-tree topology with four layers, R4 = 1,R3 = R2 = 4.
There is no R1 since layer 0 does not exist. Thus |E | = 21, which is very small
compared with entire network size (|E | = 384). For simplicity of presentation,
we assume all nodes in layer k have the same Rk . However, both our search
algorithm and complexity analysis are not restricted by this assumption.
The second search step is that in upward graph T j , finding the downward
straight paths from the common node to hypervisor hi . It is depth-first search,
which has O(|E |) worst-case complexity. However, in topologies like fat-tree
and Clos [160], T j turns out to be a tree rooted at hi with all the common
nodes as its leaves. Thus only L−1 edges need to visited to find a downward
straight path from the common node (leaf) to hi (root), which introduces con-
stant (negligible) overhead.
Table C.1 summarizes the search cost (the number of visited edges) for find-
ing all desired routing candidates in different fat-tree topologies. We list the
number of nodes and edges in the network to show that the search space is
much smaller. Nh is the average number of hypervisors used by one tenant.
We consider the complexity for both intra-pod (all the hypervisors are located
within one pod) and inter-pod (the tenant spreads across at least two pods).
For the special case that the all hypervisors in H are sharing the same ToR
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Table C.1: One-time comprehensive search cost for fat-tree topologies. Nh is
the average VTN scale.
Topo. Intra-Pod Inter-Pod (nodes,edges)
k=8 5Nh 21Nh (200,384)
k=16 9Nh 71Nh (1296,3072)
k=32 17Nh 273Nh (9248,24567)
k (1+ k2 ) ·Nh
(
1+k2+( k2 )2
)
·Nh (∼k34 , 3k
3
4 )
switches, there will only one routing connecting them. It is clear that even
in large-scale datacenters with thousands of servers, the one-time compre-
hensive search cost is small and acceptable. For other topologies with larger
over-subscription ratio (e.g., 2:1 Clos topology) than the fat-tree topology (1:1),
search cost will further be reduced due to the smaller number of redundant
paths in these topologies.
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